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EDITOR'S NOTE

Welcome to the sixth volume of Paideia. Volume Six aims to recognize the
outstanding work of Cal Poly Political Science students in both academic
and professional fields. This collection of student-authored papers reflects the
diversity of a Political Science degree and the knowledge, experience, and
interests of the authors. Alumni Spotlights further highlight the opportunities
presented to Cal Poly Political Science students in their careers.
This year, Paideia continues its founding goal of showcasing current and
former student’s work throughout the University and digitally around the
world. It is our goal to encourage discussions between all disciplines on both
existing and emerging issues, as well as challenging conventional notions of
how the world works in the 21st century.
The sixth volume of Paideia will be accessible in print, as well as digitally
through Kennedy Library’s Digital Commons database. We hope that by
providing the journal in an online format we will be able to reach readers
across the globe and aid in furthering the research developed throughout this
journal.
We hope that as you read through Paideia you are challenged intellectually
and will be inspired to create discussion on important topics.
The Paideia team and I are delighted to serve Cal Poly San Luis Obispo’s
Political Science Department and thank you for taking the time to explore the
sixth volume of Paideia.
Amy Holmes
Executive Editor
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Cyber: The Ultimate Political Weapon
Shafali Raj

Abstract
Cyber is one of the newest frontiers we face as a modern society. There
are many unknowns when it comes to this intangible platform that has
become shared globally. Political Science takes an interest in cyber because
today it is used as a battle ground for attackers on the international scale. Our
understanding of cyber warfare is still emerging, and much scholarship fails
to discuss the usage of the United States’ use of such weapons. This paper
goes beyond a discussion of coders and hackers leaking into government data
and instead focuses on the evidence of cyber as a weapon in world politics.
Through three qualitative case studies, I will reveal the use of cyber for
informational, psychological, and physical endeavors globally.

Introduction
On March 16th, 2018 Samantha Raphelson with NPR reported on
accusations from the Department of Homeland Security on Russian
involvement in various cyber-attacks on US power grids. The report
released by DHS emphasized the imminent cyber threats and described
them as attacks on energy, nuclear, water, aviation, manufacturing, and
commercial facilities within the United States, perpetrated by actors from
around the world.1 One investigation detailed in the DHS report referred to
the findings of American cybersecurity firm, Symantec, regarding a group
named Dragonfly that broke into core operations of energy companies in the
US and Europe.2 Additionally, DHS official, Amit Yoran, describes other
1 Raphelson Samantha, “Report Russian Hackers Had the Ability to Shut Down U.S.
Power Plants.” National Public Radio (March 16, 2018)
2 Ibid
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foreign attacks such as Russian meddling in public infrastructure and the
2016 election as “unprecedented and extraordinary” in the report.3 Officials
from the DHS as well as heads of cybersecurity companies stress the ability
of Russians to interfere with critical US infrastructure, stating they have
already employed attacks as far back as last March. Such findings prove the
existence of cyber as a weapon.
The release of the DHS report represents change because it is the
first time the United States government has openly held foreign actors
accountable for a cyber-attack. The DHS report also discusses an imminent
or impending threat using cyber weapons, which represents a shift in warfare
to methods outside traditional means. This article specifically focuses on the
open accusations and warning from the DHS on Russian attacks in various
industries such as those on power grids in Texas.4 Raphelson’s story makes
it apparent that security officials fear Russian attacks like those made on
Ukrainian industries just two years earlier that were also mentioned in her
article. However, it is important to contextualize these events. the United
States continues to be a world power, leveraging its influence and capabilities
to achieve certain goals. With this background in mind, the released DHS
report become questionable, leading us to contemplate the real capabilities of
the United States.
Yet this DHS report is important for world politics because the new
strategies and intelligence stipulated by the United States will influence the
actions of states all around the world. In addition, it poses the United States
at the receiving end of a threat, which suggests cybersecurity is a top concern
for the US and future policy decisions. This is the first time the United States
has accused foreign actors such as Russia for outright interference in industry
and political happenings and is momentous in the formation of future policy.5
In addition, the DHS report does not address the fact the United States has
been involved in and contemplated cyber-attacks such as those on the Iranian
power grid.6 The open discussion on cyber as a domain of war will change
world politics forever as new weapons and methods enters the forefront
of warfare. The report also does not consider accepted norms such as US
military strength and its increased presence abroad, which leads me to ask the
following research question, how does the United States utilize cyber as an
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
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offensive weapon in world politics? I will answer this question by analyzing
effects on environment, human rights, and labor standards.

Conventional Wisdom
The contemporary perceptions surrounding cyber threats is that most
Americans are not confident in the United States’ security capabilities.
According to a Pew Research Center public opinion poll, seventy percent of
Americans believe the United States will experience a major cyber-attack on
public infrastructure within the next five years.7 The same study found that
only thirteen percent of participants feel that the United States government is
“very” prepared for a cyber-attack. In addition, a poll performed by Gallup
found that seventy-three percent of American adults ranked cyber-terrorism
as a top three critical threat to US interests.8 These two public opinion polls
reflect the common feeling of insecurity amongst US citizens when it comes
to matters of cyber. These findings present the conventional wisdom that the
United States is not prepared for a cyber-attack or that the military has yet
developed the tools to combat such threats.
However, the current conventional wisdom surrounding US cyber
threats is extremely misleading. Most Americans are unaware of the
capabilities the United States has developed and has already utilized. My
research challenges the conventional wisdom regarding cybersecurity by
exposing the uses of cyber as a weapon by the United States itself. Although
common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign cyber threats,
it is vital to understand that the United States remains a global power and
is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The released DHS report
mentioned earlier might fuel paranoia amongst US citizens, but my research
challenges the idea that the United States will be the victim of a crippling
cyber-attack.

Case Study: Informational Cyber Tactics
Information warfare has been a legitimate strategy of the United States’
military for decades and continues to be applied to new domains of warfare
such as cyber. Unlike armed warfare, information warfare might take on
more discrete forms and will always hold a political target. For instance, a
Congressional Research Service Report defines information warfare through
7 “Americans and Cybersecurity,” Pew Research Center (January 26, 2017)
8 “Americans Cite Cyberterrorism Among Top Three Threats to U.S.” Gallup
(February 10, 2016)
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defensive and offensive operations such as “propaganda, misinformation,
and disinformation.”9 Today, most information warfare is through cyber
in the form of “botnets” or computers that are infected with a malicious
software that can be used without the owner’s knowledge. Social media has
also become a contemporary platform through which information can be
amplified to send a specific message and generate attitudes or confusion.10
Social media is a perfect channel for information warfare because this
strategy seeks to intensify the “fog and friction” or uncertainties each side
experiences during times of war and peace by achieving political goals and
controlling information.11 Cyber has become the easiest means through
which the United States can exercise information warfare, as new strategies
of attack have been developed to include this domain. The Department of
Defense has revealed and defined cyber operations to include activities
such as “Cyber Network Attacks” which seek to “disrupt, deny, degrade or
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks.”12 CNAs
became an official part of cyber strategy when the Secretary of Defense,
William Cohen, gave the NSA the authority to develop CNA techniques in
1997. Additionally, DOD policy outlines that the United States will employ
a physical or non-physical attack “to provide support for full spectrum
dominance.”13 Secretive documents such as DOD directives imply that the
United States military and government do have the capability for offensive
cyberwar. Moreover, the United States is ready and extremely willing to
utilize cyber as a means for informational gain or stealing.
Through my research, I have found several pieces of evidence that
demonstrate the bridge between cyber and information warfare the United
States military has attempted to build. In 1997, William Black Jr. was
appointed as the Special Assistant for Information Warfare and wrote the
piece, “Thinking Out Loud about Cyberspace” for the National Security
Agency.14 Black emphasizes the recurring need for cyber technology in
the NSA and the Informational Warfare unit itself at the time. This once9 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
10 Ibid
11 Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, Princeton University Press, June 1, 1989.
12 William B. Black, National Security Agency, “Thinking Out Loud About
Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXIII,1 (Spring 1997). Secret.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid

5

Shafali Raj

classified piece is an early indication of the integration of information
warfare into the cyber domain. The National Security Agency in conjunction
with other defensive units concluded that the primary method of conducting
war in cyberspace is through Informational War tactics. In 1997, the NSA
predicted the exploitation of computers and networks, which are troves of
information, and set the agenda to include cyber a means of information
dominance by exploring the term “cyber weapons.” Offensive weapons
for information war outlined by the NSA include “viruses, worms, logic
bombs, Trojan horses, spoofing, masquerading, and ‘trap’ doors.”15 Although
these are types of software and not a physical weapon, they have the power
to destroy any nation’s information infrastructure completely if utilized
properly.16
In this case study, I will detail various instances of the use and
development of cyber weapons for informational gains by the United States.
In his book, Dark Territory, Fred Kaplan tracks the emergence of cyber units
within the United States government such as the Department of Defense
and the National Security Agency as well as their functions and strategies.
These agencies work together to achieve goals that include acquiring
information from interest nations or areas to promote an outcome ideal to
the United States interests. A little-known US target to cyber-attacks was the
Serbian military. In 1977, the US along with other NATO forces created the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) to enforce the end of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
war after the replacement of the president, Slobodan Milosevic.17 This special
force was enlisted to hunt war criminals and work in conjunction with US
based agencies such as the NSA and J-39, a secret unit within the Pentagon’s
Joint Staff.18 On March 24, 1999 NATO forces began a bombing campaign
against the Federation of Yugoslavia which sought to ethnically cleanse the
Balkan region. During the attack, US forces relied on spoofing techniques to
intercept and stop military communications from the enemy. The specialized
J-39 unit commanded hacks on the Serbian air defense system, sending
false directions to aircrafts and relaying wrong informational updates.
The changes were slight so that the Serbs could not detect their computer
systems were interrupted by US commanded B-2 Spirit stealth bombers.
“Spoofing” is when a person or program successfully imitates another by
15 Ibid
16 Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory(New York: Simon Schuster, 2016)
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
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sending false data to the recipient and this is a basic example of how cyber
is utilized as a tool by the US to gain a political/military advantage. This
military operation ended in the bombing of Yugoslavia and allowed for US/
NATO peacekeeping forces to enter the region. Since its inception in 1977,
the SFOR and joint agencies have developed such offensive capabilities for
informational gain in both military and civilian operations.
David Sanger with The New York Times reported in 2012 of another
virus, Flame, in his article, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against
Iran.”19 Flame illustrates a contemporary example of the US ability to steal,
copy, and share information. This code was a continuation of the original
US-created code named Duqu, which was a reconnaissance tool that could
copy blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program. The newer Flame virus sent a
visible code onto Iranian officials’ computer to essentially steal information
on Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.20 No single state has claimed
Duqu or Flame, but later findings suggest it was the work of the United
States and Israel. The nature of these events insinuates a physical attack since
a USB was manually inserted into these individuals’ personal computers.21
However, physical damage was just a secondary objective for these two
cyber operations. Flame and Duqu were utilized as a covert method to steal
information from Iran. It had the sole purpose of achieving a political goal
just as any informational warfare operation. These instances prove to be
unique, however. Cyber was the domain of warfare for this operation and
in an effort to remain secretive; the code could not be traced to an original
creator. This attack was successful, in that the computers affected were
useless or had their information copied and shared.22 Such events prove the
efficiency and emergence of cyber offensive tools to fulfill tasks such as
information gathering to achieve political gains.

Case Study: Psychological Cyber Tactics
Psychological warfare and its methods fall under the “umbrella”
of information warfare. The psychological war strategy conducts covert
missions or attacks to gain information. PSYOPS, or psychological
19 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York
Times(June 1, 2012)
20 Ibid
21 Nicole Perlroth, “Researchers Find Clues in Malware,” The New York Times (May
30TH, 2012).
22 Ibid
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operations, has become an integral part of military defensive and offensive
plans. The Department of Defense directives define PSYOPS as operations
“meant to induce foreign attitudes favorable to the originators cause.”23
Psychological warfare is not a new phenomenon and was a powerful
tool throughout United States history. For example, during the Cold War,
President Eisenhower deployed pamphlets and boosted programs such as
Voice of America in Europe to change attitudes toward the Soviet Union
through such offensive psychological warfare tactics.24 Eisenhower’s success
reflects the possibilities and effectiveness psychological warfare can achieve
if aided with new technology such as cyber.
PSYOPS came to the forefront of operations such as those during the
Iraq War under the Bush Administration, which pushed for informational
gains and the use of psychological war to attain new material and altern
negative perceptions of the West.25 A small number of cyber uses were
stipulated by the military and US government but were not employed.
These included possible plans in which an individual can have access to a
weapon or tool that would target a specific computer or system and modify
its functions/ information it receives and spreads. Other plans detailed how
a PSYOP team could develop a website for an audience in Iraq so that
behaviors can change indirectly.26
My research indicates that psychological tactics have played a large
role in United States military operations in the past and will continue to do
so in the future. The United States Army Field Manual explicitly states that
PSYOPS “are meant to change the behavior of a foreign target audience to
support U.S. national objectives.”27 In 2005, the tasks of PSYOPS soldiers
were written to be to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate, and
evaluate psychological war materials and tools.28 Cyber can be used in the
23 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
24 Kenneth A. Osgood, Form Before Substance Eisenhower Commitment to
Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy, Diplomatic History
25 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press,
September 2005).
26 Ibid
27 Department of the Army. “Tactical Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures,” (Manual, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 28,
2005)
28 Ibid
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form of social media and the Internet, for example, by interfering with the
interactions and information an individual receives. The Internet has become
increasingly utilized as a means of achieving psychological war through
cyber. The United States has ownership of the Internet and has utilized it as a
tool for democracy in nations all over the world. For example, after bombing
Yugoslavia with NATO forces, the US decided to allow Serbians to maintain
access to the internet to allow the people to see the atrocities committed in
Kosovo by the Milosevic regime.29 Additionally, the Serbian government
attempted to stop the independent radio station, B92, from organizing
protests. When this occurred, B92’s transmission was broadcasted to the
Internet and relayed back to Serbia by the British Broadcasting Channel and
Voice of America radio stations.30 This case demonstrates the US’s attempt
to bolster Serbian support after an exploitative and violent US venture and
displayed the ease of utilizing cyber for a political gain through an everyday
institution such as the Internet.
Similarly, a contemporary use of psychological warfare through means
of cyber can be seen through Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq
war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States employed various
methods to gain US support in Iraq against troubling political figures such
as Saddam Hussein.31 During this operation, broadcast messages were sent
from Air Force plane, EC-130E and from Navy ships operating on the
Persian Gulf. These messages were accompanied by a barrage of emails,
faxes, and cell phone calls to numerous Iraqi leaders.32 The message being
sent by US forces was to abandon Saddam Hussein. In hopes of changing
public opinion, the US military led Operation Iraqi Freedom utilizing cyber
and psychological warfare. Military Deception or “MILDEC” is a strategy
used by the United States army that relies on sending false signals to the
enemy. Deception is a primary part of psychological warfare in that it keeps

29 Briscoe; Jon Swartz, “Administration Drops Idea of Blocking Serb Net Sites,”
The San Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 1999: in Eden-Webster Passports/Lexis-Nexis
[database online], World News library.
30 David J. Rothkopf, “Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the
Information Age,” Journal of International Affairs 51 (Spring 1998): in Columbia,
International Affairs Online [database online], (9 January 2001).
31 Catherine Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and
Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL 34387, (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2008)
32 Ibid
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the enemy or public unaware of reality or of future outcomes.33 During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States used deceptive methods such as
the Navy’s Tactical Air Launched Decoy system. This tool could divert fire
from Iraqi air defenses using a digital capability, making aircrafts unsure of
the target or source of attacks in the sky. The United States’ attempts display
that offensive methods, coupled with discrete operations such as building
fake websites, yield the strength and magnitude to influence the political
objectives/opinions of individuals.
Psychological operations are critical to the United States’ endeavors
and is deployed abroad and domestically. Today, the US counts on the Media
Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which is accountable for printing and
disseminating audio, video, and print psychological operation products.34
Since the actual production of psychological warfare materials are done
domestically, there must be an efficient and overt method of spreading
this information abroad. Cyber is a primary means of deploying such
materials through social media and satellite communications.35 Additionally,
Deployable Audio Production Systems is a technology widely used in
PSYOPS. Missions can be carried out with SOMS B vehicles have the
capacity to create audio and video in the air which can then be shared
using DAP technology. One of the first uses of this technology was in
Afghanistan (2001) when The Commando Solo aircraft transmitted pro
US radio broadcasts.36 Since its first use, the Commando Solo, alongside
SOMS B, have been vital to US interests in bolstering support in the Middle
East. These are just a handful of cyber technologies that make the spread of
psychological warfare materials efficient and possible beyond conventional
methods.

Case Study: Physical Cyber Tactics
The Department of Defense defines the cyberspace domain as consisting
of three interdependent “layers” including the physical, the logical, and
the cyber persona. “Physical” refers to the environment of devices and the
33 Clay Wilson, Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related
Policy Issues, CRS Report No. RL31787, (Washington DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2006)
34 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press,
September 2005).
35 Ibid
36 Ibid

10

PAIDEIA

geographical location of these systems.37 This is the network of people and
materials. Therefore, a physical attack can also be on a computer or a system
that causes a degradation of the material item itself.38 This is a strategy that
carries a human aspect because it requires one’s presence and compliance
to attack another entity. Past events of physical cyber-attacks suggest these
types of operations carry a specific target and are motivated by a material or
political gain since the nature is destructive and deliberate. A contemporary
example of this would be the Stuxnet malware which stunted Iran’s
development of nuclear weapons by stopping uranium enrichment processes
in nuclear facilities.
In 2010, fifteen plants across Iran reported technical failures and
difficulties in nuclear plant processes. These malfunctions were later found
to be the result of “Stuxnet,” a malicious software and the first known “cyber
weapon.”39 This event is also considered the first “act of force” using cyber.
Stuxnet was the only malicious software of its kind, specifically designed to
interact with and destroy a nuclear Industrial Control System. The Stuxnet
code targets a Microsoft application that the nuclear ICS devices use daily
during uranium enrichment operations. That being said, the virus can enter
devices through a USB or gaps in internet connection. However, the nature of
Stuxnet implied that it must have been implemented in person at the facilities
or by an insider. Stuxnet is significant because it was the first code that set
out to inhibit the production of nuclear materials. It was also a part of a larger
campaign for offensive cyber operations entitled, Operation Olympic Games.
This operation began under the Bush Administration in 2006 and continued
under Obama as a cyber-campaign against Iran, which was made possible
with the help of US friendly, Israel.40
Operation Olympic Games was a secretive joint effort made between the
US and Israeli governments to cripple and destabilize Iran’s nuclear program
entirely. Cyber was the chosen domain of warfare for this operation and
cyber weapons were central to the plan of Olympic Games.41 This revelation
37 Catherine Theohary and Anne Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and
Plans: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R43848 (Washington DC, Congressional
Research Service, 2015)
38 Ibid
39 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York
Times(June 1, 2012)
40 David Sanger, Confront and Conceal (Broadway Books, June 2012)
41 Ibid
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starkly contrasts the notion that the United States is a victim to cyber threats
given its role in the first contemporary mass cyber-attack. Eventually, cyber
and tech experts from around the world revealed the dark components of the
virus. This code held features described by scholars as “dual warheads,”
that remain dormant and send false signals to computer systems signaling
that things are running normally when they are not.42 The code is a weapon
in every way given its precise duty and properties. One part was designed
to specifically command 984 machines linked together. This is the same
number of downed uranium- enrichment centrifuges, inspectors at the Natanz
plant reported following the attack.43 With these attributes, Stuxnet was
truly the first cyber-weapon, enabling a physical attack on a political target.
The realities of the Stuxnet attack contradicts the notion that the US is only
developing weapons and not utilizing harmful offensive components. Stuxnet
was formulated not to only send a message, but to destroy the enemy target
just as any military operation might seek to do.
Stuxnet was used as a weapon against Iran for the advancement of US
political goals in that it delayed Iran’s nuclear program by downing almost
10,000 Industrial devices. Furthermore, I have found several manifestations
of the intent and use of cyber weapons as a part of a political/material
gain by the United States. In 2017, The United States-Israel Cybersecurity
Cooperation Enhancement Act passed the House of Representatives. This
bill requires The Department of Homeland Security to create a fund limited
to US and Israeli citizens for research and development on cyber protection,
response, and strategies.44 The adopted amendment provides for a “Cyber
Center of Excellence,” for the development of new capabilities. This
example directly displays the intent to continue developing and using cyber
strategies or weapons on a political target.45 The strategic relationship with
Israel can be applied to any other country the US seeks intelligence from in
developing new capabilities of warfare such as cyber weapons. This update
indicated that the US is willing to negotiate and work with other nations to
42 Paul Kerr, John Rollins, Catherine Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm:
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, CRS Report No. R41524 (Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010)
43 Ibid
44 [1]U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Cybersecurity Cooperation
Enhancement Act. 2017. 115thCongress.
45 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, “Bill Summary Cybersecurity
Cooperation Enhancement Act,” (March 2018)
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create offensive cyber strategies on specific political targets such as Iran.
Through my research, I have found the intent of the United States has not
changed since the inception of Operation Olympic Games in 2006. These are
just a few examples that have been exposed as linked to US intelligence and
military operations but there are still many unknowns.

Implications
With the emergence of cyber, leaders are faced with new issues and
challenges their predecessors did not have to contemplate. Stuxnet is an
important example for world politics in that it was the first well-known
cyber weapon and was able to conduct a physical threat and influence later
events. I believe the United States must take accountability for developing
these technologies. The United States set a precedent by utilizing cyber for
physical, psychological, and informational gains and must be responsible for
the repercussions. Both states and independent actors have learned from the
US example. As cyber becomes a legitimate domain of war, it is inevitable
states will compete for the most powerful cyber weapons. This leads me
to question, just how far the US and other states are willing to go for cyber
dominance. History reveals that weapons such as the nuclear bomb had
the power to change history forever. I can imagine a cyber-weapon of this
magnitude as being possible in the future.
Addressing US cyber offensive strategies is vital in recognizing the
power and influence of the United States in areas such as military strength.
Although common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign
cyber threats, it is vital to understand that the United States remains a
global power and is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The
US has proven its willingness to use cyber weapons through these three
case studies. As cyber weapons are increasingly developed and utilized, the
public remains unaware. Today, top news stories detail foreign involvement
in the US political process through the Internet and social media outlets.
These recent events signal that cyber-attacks or war is increasingly viable
and can be hidden for long periods of time. This leads me to ask the future
capabilities of sabotage by the United States and foreign actors as well
in addition to attacks the public might never know about. Therefore, it is
important that instances such as Stuxnet are discussed for security and the
formation of future policy or norms.
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U.S. Energy Independence
Lorenzo Waller

Abstract
While many know the United States is the largest consumer of oil in
the world, recently, it has become the biggest producer of the resource as
well.1 Within the next decade it will export more oil than it imports, which
will mark a significant change in the global energy market. This paper will
investigate and evaluate what changes are to be expected, with a specific
focus on OPEC member countries. I will utilize qualitative evidence in the
form of three case studies. These case studies will provide detailed discussion
and analysis of how energy independence in the United States will lead to
financial loss, destabilization, and a decline in the influence of oil exporting
countries. I found that if the US continues at its current pace of energy
production, OPEC countries will need to adapt to the new international
energy market, which will look vastly different in the coming years.

Introduction
Near the end of 2017, The Wall Street Journal published an article
noting that the United States is on track to achieve energy independence in
as little as four years, if production reaches the highs it did before 2014.2
Moreover, the article also details The International Energy Agency’s recently
published World Energy Outlook for 2017, which proclaims that “…the
U.S. [is] set to become a net exporter of petroleum within a decade,” even
if oil output remains low.3 Before the price of oil plummeted in 2014, the
1 “What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil?” U.S. Energy
Information Administration (December 3, 2018).
2 Robert Rapier, “Is the U.S. On Track for Energy Independence?” The Wall Street
Journal (November 15, 2017).
3 Ibid.
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US was on track to achieve energy independence as early as 2019.4 Today,
the US is only four million barrels per day away from becoming petroleum
independent, a feat that has eluded the country for decades as petroleum is
the only energy resource that the United States depends on other countries
for. Of course, even once energy independence is achieved, there will still
be economic reasons for the US to continue to import oil, but there will no
longer be a glaring dependence on foreign countries for petroleum.
The implications of US energy independence will be vast for OPEC
member countries, as almost all of their economies rely on oil exports for a
majority of their revenue. While OPEC countries may not rely completely
on the US in particular for their oil export revenues, the US becoming a
net exporter and one of the largest petroleum producers will certainly have
an impact on other countries that OPEC provides oil for. One of Saudi
Arabia’s top goals as outlined in their Vision 2030 document is to reduce
their dependence on oil exports, as well as to start privatizing the industry to
further help decrease the state’s dependence on oil revenues.5 Saudi Arabia
is just one of many examples of oil-exporting OPEC countries attempting to
lessen their dependence on the resource — in part a response to the United
States’ energy transition. The United States’ massive increase in fracking
as well as petroleum and natural gas production in the last two decades is
the main driver for this change, which paid off recently when in August
2018 the US became the worlds largest crude oil producer.6 These empirical
observations lead me to ask the following research question: How will US
energy independence affect OPEC countries?

Conventional Wisdom
The layman’s view of the United States is that the country is in decline.
According to a poll carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2017, just
29% of Americans believe the country “stands above all other countries in
the world”, down from 38% in 2011.7 This poll also found that while only
8% of Americans thought “there are other countries better than the U.S.” in

4 Ibid.
5 “Vision 2030 Report,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Assessed on May 27, 2018.
6 “U.S. monthly crude oil production exceeds 11 million barrels in August,” U.S.
Energy Information Administration (November 1, 2018).
7 Laura Thorsett, “Most Americans Say the U.S. is among the Greatest Countries in
the World,” Pew Research Center (June 30, 2017).
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2011, that number climbed to 15% in 2015.8 Additionally, a poll by Gallup
found that in 2016, 50% of the globe viewed China as the worlds leading
economic power today while only 37% believed it to be the United States. 9
These polls show the trend that the United States is declining not just in the
eyes of the world, but in the eyes of Americans as well.
The layman’s view that the United States is in decline is wrong. Not
only does the increase in petroleum and natural gas production spell good
news for the US, it also puts the country in an ideal position to be a top
energy exporter. When the United States becomes energy independent, it will
become vastly less dependent on importing oil from OPEC countries. This
means that the state will be solving an issue some have called the top foreign
policy concern.10 Considering how powerful the United States already is,
the implications of energy independence should not be taken lightly. Soon,
the US will be not be dependent on any countries for energy, while other
countries will be significantly more dependent on the US to meet their energy
needs.11 While it is certainly true that some countries are catching up to the
US in specific areas, such as the size of China’s GDP, even this measure
won’t come close to the US before 2029 at current rates of GDP growth.12
This is why the less-popular view that the US power and influence is on the
rise is a superior view.

Methodology and Evidence
In order to properly analyze the topic, I will utilize qualitative evidence
in the form of three case studies. These case studies will provide detailed
discussion and analysis of how energy independence in the United States
will lead to financial loss, destabilization, and a decline in the influence of
oil exporting countries. This paper will exercise the use of both primary
and secondary evidence. Primary evidence will consist of sources such as
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, committee discussions held
within the United States Senate, quotes in a National Intelligence Council
report from the CIA, as well as presidential policy decisions dating back to
8 Ibid.
9 Lydia Saad, “Americans See China as Top Economy Now, but U.S. in Future,”
Gallup (February 22, 2016).
10 Robert Fri, “U.S. Oil Dependence Remains a Problem,” Issues in Science and
Technology, Vol. 19, no. 4 (Summer, 2003).
11 op. cit., fn. 1.
12 Malcom Scott, “Here’s How Fast China’s Economy Is Catching Up to the U.S.”
Bloomberg (May 24, 2018).
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the 1970’s. I will use secondary evidence attained from sources such as The
Wall Street Journal, the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as scholarly
journals. In order to best answer my research question, I will employ the
use of realism as a theoretical paradigm though which I can most effectively
analyze the issue. Realism assumes that the world is anarchic with no power
surpassing that of the state, that the most important international actors are
states, and that states are the primary drivers of change. This is emphasized
in Brian Schmidt’s article where he states that “…the international
distribution of power is an autonomous force that has a direct influence on
the behavior of states.”13 This point is also emphasized by Fareed Zakariah
when he says that “…a state’s foreign policy is a consequence of pressures
emanating from the distribution of power in the international system.”14 By
looking at the world through a realist viewpoint, I can best determine how
changes in the energy market will effect the distribution of power and how
states will end up responding.

Research Findings
Financial Loss
My first case study will detail how US energy independence will lead to
financial losses for oil-exporting countries. According to the World Economic
Forum, oil exports account for roughly 45% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP and a
staggering 90% of their exports.15 Saudi Arabia lies in the middle of oilexporting countries in terms of oil as a percentage of exports. The percentage
gets as high as oil making up 99.8% of exports in Iraq and as low as 22.3%
of exports in Malaysia.16 OPEC countries also rely heavily on oil to make up
a large amount of their GDP. These GDP percentages get as high as ~55%
in Kuwait, and go as low as ~2% in the United States.17 To summarize these
statistics, oil-exporters are hugely dependent on just one natural resource for
their financial stability. This stands in stark contrast to countries such as the
United States, which utilizes a diversified approach to its export system, and
chooses to produce many different types of goods. Diversification decreases
the country’s financial reliance on just one commodity. When oil prices
13 op. cit., fn. 14.
14 Ibid.
15 “Which economies are most reliant on oil?” World Economic Forum (May 10,
2016).
16 Ibid.
17 “Oil Rents (% of GDP),” The World Bank (March 5, 2019).
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fluctuate, the US is able to adjust and is not crippled by a fall in demand.
According to another report published by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, due to the huge drop in oil prices resulting from increased
US production, in 2015 OPEC members’ net oil export revenue reached the
lowest level since 2004 and is still forecasted to fall to levels unseen since
the early 1980’s.18 In 2014, OPEC member countries earned $753 billion in
oil export revenue.19 This figure plummeted to only $404 billion just one year
later in 2015, representing a 46% decline in revenue.20 States such as Iraq,
Nigeria, and Venezuela were hit much harder by the drop in prices because
they lacked the financial reserves some of the Persian-gulf states enjoyed,
which continues to be the case today.21 Yet, even Saudi Arabia claims “…it
wants to end its ‘addiction to oil’.”22 These statistics are meant to showcase
oil-exporters’ financial dependence on the commodity, as well as the havoc
that falling oil prices can wreak on their revenues. Oil revenues declining
nearly 50% in just one year demonstrates how detrimental external forces
can be to OPEC economies if they cannot count on oil as their main source
of revenue. This becomes even more of an issue in countries employing a
state-run approach to oil production, as the loss in revenue also has a huge
impact on the government.
Next I would like to connect these empirical statistics back to my
theme of US energy. The Economist attributes the abrupt drop in oil prices
in the summer of 2014 to four factors; one of the largest being the fact that,
“America has become the world’s largest oil producer.”23 In a separate article,
The Economist explains how much the economics of oil have changed in
recent years.24 Undermining OPEC’s ability to keep oil prices stable, The
Economist remarks, “the main culprits are the oilmen of North Dakota and
Texas.”25 This fact is backed up by one of my five primary sources. A US
Senate press release cited a report stating, “America’s combined recoverable
18 “OPEC members’ net oil revenue in 2015 drops to lowest level since 2004,” U.S.
Energy Information Administration (August 26, 2016).
19 Ibid.
20 “OPEC members’ net oil revenue in 2015 drops to lowest level since 2004,” U.S.
Energy Information Administration (August 26, 2016).
21 Ibid.
22 op. cit., fn. 18.
23 “The Economist explains: Why the oil price is falling,” The Economist (December
8, 2014).
24 “The new economics of oil: Sheikhs v Shale,” The Economist (December 4, 2014).
25 Ibid.
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natural gas, oil, and coal endowment is the largest on Earth.”26 A separate
CRS report, noting that “no country can effectively isolate itself from
changes elsewhere in the market, nor is it likely that any nation can take
actions that do not indirectly affect other nations,” reaffirms my point that the
massive increase in US petroleum production is intimately linked to drops in
the price of oil.27 From this, it should be clear how powerful the effect of the
US shale revolution has been on world energy markets. I would also like to
emphasize the relationship US supply has on world oil prices, and how much
control the former has over the latter.
My research findings relating to financial losses incurred by OPEC
member countries supports my statement regarding the conventional wisdom
being wrong. Statements made by the CRS stating the United States is the
worlds largest energy producer directly contradict the belief that the Untied
States is in decline. After analyzing my main sources, I would argue that
OPEC member countries are actually in decline, as the US is amassing
energy power within its borders. Not only is the layman’s view wrong, but
OPEC countries are scrambling to break their dependence on oil, especially
in states where oil production has been nationalized.28 The financial losses
amounting in oil exporting countries that are a part of the OPEC cartel is
staggering, and will undoubtedly lead to different policy strategies. Although
it is tough to predict exactly what those responses will be, we can safely
make the assumption that governments relying on oil as their main source
of revenue will be forced to adapt to changes in oil markets in order to keep
their countries stable.

Destabilization
My second case study will demonstrate the destabilizing effect oil can
have on OPEC countries and how the countries will suffer due to US energy
independence. The Council on Foreign Relations published a post late this
April, saying Russia and Saudi Arabia are attempting to “…eliminate the
costly boom and bust cycle in oil that both destabilizes Saudi Arabia and

26 James Inhofe, “America’s Combined Energy Resources Largest on Earth,” (press
release, U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Washington D.C.,
October 29, 2009).
27 Robert Pirog, “World Oil Demand and its Effect on Prices,” (online report, U.S.
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 9, 2005).
28 op. cit., fn. 18.
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underpins the historical cycle of the global financial crisis.”29 According
to widely accepted macroeconomic theory, high oil prices destabilize an
economy’s ability to operate at its standard level of efficiency.30 This effect
is so powerful that in extreme cases it can even lead to recessions which
result in massive destabilization within the countries that require high oil
export revenues.31 Conversely, high oil prices for some OPEC countries, such
as Saudi Arabia, which exports massive amounts of the commodity, spell
huge economic benefits.32 However, this cause-and-effect relationship is a
two-way street; when oil prices drop, producer countries suffer from serious
destabilization, undermining their ability to operate as efficiently as they
normally would.33
An article published by The Globalist34 reiterates the benefits of cheap
oil on many economies, but emphasizes “…it is creating a great deal of
political and social volatility in numerous producer countries.”35 This article
provides a new and underreported spin on the destabilization arguing that in
order for OPEC producers to keep up with their youth bulges,36 the countries
rely heavily on their oil revenues.37 The decline in revenues lead to slashes of
funding in malleable areas of the budget, such as education and job training.38
In exporter countries such as Libya and Algeria, this leads to a dangerous
spiraling effect and seriously damages the social fabric of the country.39
In other words, cheap oil leads to a decline in revenue for exporters,
which leads to declines in government spending, and, finally, results in
29 Amy Meyers Jaffe, “Oil Prices and the U.S. Economy: Reading the Tea Leaves of
the Trump Tweet on OPEC,” Council on Foreign Relations (April 23, 2018).
30 op. cit., fn. 6.
31 Ibid.
32 op. cit., fn. 31.
33 Ibid.
34 The Globalist is an online newspaper which advocates for the benefits of
globalization. While this presents a bias, I investigated the author of the article and
found that he is an economic analyst at a respected Spanish think tank. I determined
that the source is reliable to include as all of the facts included in the article are backed
up by the U.S. Energy and Information Administration, which I cite throughout my
paper.
35 Andres Ortega, “The Destabilizing Effect of Cheap Oil,” The Globalist (July 5,
2017).
36 A term used to describe countries with disproportionately large younger populations
(the opposite of the aging population issue currently effecting Japan).
37 op. cit., fn. 37.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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both political and social destabilization. I would like to point out that this
particular example is much more profound in countries such as Libya and
Algeria, which have much lower GDP’s than exporters like Saudi Arabia
(albeit cheap oil still causes destabilization there as well). The destabilizing
effect of cheap oil in a country like the United States is much, much more
complicated, as even though the country is becoming a net energy exporter,
the economy also heavily benefits from low energy prices and should not be
included in this particular example.
Possibly the most pertinent example of the destabilizing effect oil
can have on exporters is the case of Venezuela. An article published by
the Financial Times details how the appointment of political figures to the
country’s state-run oil company, and the lack of expertise in how to run
the company, led to a gradual decline in oil production.40 This decline in
production, and the resulting deterioration of the country’s economy has
caused hyperinflation, food scarcity, and a looming humanitarian crisis.41
The implications of this case are grave. NPR reported an 85% shortage on
medicine in the country making common drugs such as antibiotics nearly
impossible to find.42 This is coupled with severe food shortages that have
caused the deaths of children at alarming rates, according to The New York
Times.43 Both of these issues stem from prolific hyperinflation caused by
the economic catastrophe. All of this connects back to the country’s extreme
dependence on oil. Even though Venezuela boasts some of the largest oil
reserves in the world, it still crumbles in a world where petroleum prices are
determined by factors far out of the country’s control.
OPEC countries reap the benefits of high petroleum prices more
than any other countries, however, this comes at a cost. When prices of
oil decrease, OPEC members suffer from destabilization which can be
debilitating in some cases. As seen in the case of Venezuela, and the cases
of Libya and Algeria, where the economic effects spiral into political and
social ones, destabilization has serious repercussions reaching to the furthest
corners of the countries who are a victim. This same effect is not seen in
40 Nick Butler, “It Is Venezuela’s crisis that is driving the oil price higher,” Financial
Times, (March 25, 2018).
41 Ibid.
42 Samantha Raphelson, “Venezuela’s Health Care System Ready To Collapse Amid
Economic Crisis,” NPR (February 1, 2018).
43 Meredith Kohut and Isayen Herrera, “As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying
of Hunger,” The New York Times (December 17, 2017).
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the case of the United States, where fluctuations in oil prices are certainly
felt, but do not come close to destabilizing the foundation of the country.
When the United States reaches the point of energy independence, it will
become even more resistant to outside influences on oil prices because
oil makes up such a small percentage of its exports. The same cannot be
said for OPEC member countries, who will need to radically change their
policies if they hope to avoid becoming victim to global petroleum problems.
While the authors I have used in this section demonstrate the extremes of
destabilization, I think policy changes will be much more moderate and slow
to take effect. These decisions could manifest themselves in areas such as
increasing investment in other industries, privatizing state-run oil operations
to insulate the government from destabilization, and even rethinking how the
OPEC cartel goes about its business. Regardless, situations like Venezuela
remind us why diversification is valuable not just economically, but
politically as well.

Decline in Influence
My third and final case study will demonstrate how US progress toward
energy independence will lead to a further decline in influence of OPEC
member countries. According to a CRS report cited earlier, “America is
endowed with 167 billion barrels of recoverable oil. This is the equivalent of
replacing America’s current imports from OPEC for more than 75 years.”44
If the United States achieves independence, OPEC would lose a substantial
portion of their exports, as the US currently imports 33% of its petroleum
from OPEC countries.45 This number has been declining and will likely
continue to decline as US production ramps up.46 With OPEC meeting
less and the United States meeting more international demand for oil, the
influence OPEC countries have abroad is sure to lessen, especially in the
smaller OPEC economies that already wield little to no influence abroad.
A concrete example of why this will be the case can be seen by examining
Saudi Arabia.
Currently, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) supply 44.1% of the worlds crude oil production.47 This
44 op. cit., fn. 28.
45 op. cit., fn. 3.
46 Alex Lawler, “OPEC sees lower demand for its oil in 2018, points to surplus,”
Reuters (July 12, 2017).
47 “OPEC Fast Facts.” CNN Library. Report. Updated April 16, 2018.
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indicates OPEC countries have a significant influence on the petroleum
market. It also means that they have the power to manipulate oil prices when
desired through increases or decreases in their supply reserves. Since the oil
shocks of the 1970’s, the US has realized how dependent both its country
and its economy are on OPEC member countries.48 This dependence wreaks
havoc on US productivity when oil prices increase or the US economy enters
a period of downturn.49 However, the increase in US petroleum production
threatens to decrease the hold OPEC has on the oil markets and shakeup the
member countries’ geo-politics as well.
Currently, Saudi Arabia boasts immense influence abroad, especially
in regard to its relationship with the United States. A CRS report notes that
Saudi Arabia provides US companies with $132 billion worth of defense
services and articles since 2009.50 This, combined with Saudi Arabia’s
help in counterintelligence and counterterrorism makes it a key US ally in
the region.51 However, Saudi Arabia is the exception, not the rule, when
examining the level of influence of OPEC countries abroad, and it is
important to acknowledge how and why the country attained the level of
influence it has. The previously referenced CRS report states how “The
kingdom of Saudi Arabia…wields significant global influence through its
administration of the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by virtue of its large
oil reserves.”52 I disagree with the wording the author uses in this report, as I
would argue Saudi Arabia owes nearly all of its “significant global influence”
to its oil reserves. Saudi Arabia and the United States have a relationship
dating back to the country’s founding in 1932, and there is no reason to think
the country would have the level of influence it does today without its oil.53
While Saudi Arabia has utilized its influence to branch out and become a
permanent ally of the United States through means such as arms purchasing,
most other OPEC countries do not enjoy the Saudi’s level of international
influence now, and are unlikely to achieve it ever.
48 “Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations.
Timeline. Assessed on June 1, 2018.
49 Fredrick Mishkin, Macroeconomics: Policy and Practice (Upper Saddle River:
Pearson, 2014), 367-370.
50 Christopher Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” (online
report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 22,
2017).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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A press release issued by OPEC itself, states that the Secretary General
for the cartel met with a Permanent Representative to the Russian Federation
regarding “…the success of the ‘Declaration of Cooperation’ in helping
return balance and stability to the oil market, as well as the ongoing process
to further institutionalize the cooperation in the longer term.”54 This meeting,
as well as the larger recent theme of OPEC countries allying themselves with
non-OPEC countries is confirmed in a CRS report noting “OPEC announced
that 11 non-OPEC countries, led by Russia, had joined the agreement by
pledging to further reduce oil production…”55 The implications of this
recent degree of cooperation between OPEC and non-OPEC countries points
directly to the fact that OPEC is losing its ability to manipulate oil prices due
to its declining influence in the international energy market. After attempting
to increase oil prices for two years, the organization was forced to partner
with 11 non-members in order for their production cuts to be felt in oil
pricing.56
To conclude my research findings, it is important to consider the
implications of the primary sources mentioned in this section. The first is
that America has the largest combined energy reserves in the world, and that
it is increasing oil production to a level that means a significant decline in
OPEC oil imports. 57 58 The second is that while Saudi Arabia enjoys a large
influence abroad, almost every other country that is a member of the cartel
commands little to no influence, and that which they do is due to their ability
to export oil.59 I think it could even be said that if the United States were
to no longer need Saudi Arabia for oil, the US would drastically modify its
relationship with the kingdom because of the litany of humans rights abuses
that occur in the country, a point acknowledged in my CRS report concerning
the history of US-Saudi Arabia relations.60 Finally, and most importantly, this
54 “OPEC Secretary General meets Ambassador of the Russian Federation,” (press
release, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna, April 9, 2018).
55 Phillip Brown, “OPEC and Non-OPEC Crude Oil Production Agreement:
Compliance Status,” (online report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service, November 16, 2017).
56 Ibid.
57 op. cit., fn. 28.
58 op. cit., fn. 3.
59 For reference, the OPEC member countries are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador,
Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea according to the official OPEC website.
60 op. cit., fn. 49.
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section should emphasize the deterioration of the influence OPEC has on oil
prices, as well as abroad. This decline has been demonstrated by the simple,
yet powerful, empirical evidence concerning OPEC requiring the alliance of
11 non-member countries in order to achieve what it previously had complete
control over: international oil prices. I will also reiterate the fact that as the
US gains influence through energy independence and increased oil exports
due to fracking and natural gas revolutions, the layman’s view that the US
in decline has been proven wrong. This domestic energy revolution in the
United States has been a direct contributor to the decline in the influence of
OPEC.61

Implications
Before I conclude my paper I would like to reference one last primary
source, a report issued by the National Intelligence Council, that does an
excellent job of summarizing the ideas brought up in this paper thus far in the
following quotation:
With shale gas, the U.S. will have sufficient natural gas to meet
domestic needs and generate potential global exports for decades
to come. Increased oil production would result in a substantial
reduction in the U.S. net trade balance and faster economic
expansion. Global spare capacity may exceed over 8 million
barrels, at which point OPEC would lose price control and crude
oil prices would collapse, causing a major negative impact on oilexport economies.62
The implications of energy independence for the United States have the
potential to reshape the energy market domestically and internationally on a
fundamental level. Ever since oil became the means to fuel production, the
United States has been dependent on foreign countries to power the immense
economic machine that it is. This is changing as the United States is on the
precipice of attaining a feat that would reshape the country forever: energy
independence. Throughout this paper, I have used empirical facts backed by
primary sources to show how energy independence in the United States will
lead to financial loss, destabilization, and a decline in the influence of OPEC
61 op. cit., fn. 22.
62 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. National Intelligence Council.
Report. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. December 2012.
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member countries. Financial losses were demonstrated by examining how
OPEC revenues declined by 46% in the span of one year due to a drop in
the price of oil,63 with the implications of this being a huge loss of revenue
for oil-exporting governments. Destabilization is a direct consequence of
financial loss, and was demonstrated by examining how Venezuela was
decimated economically, politically, and socially by the mismanagement of
their state-run oil production company.64 Destabilization results in a huge
decline in influence as we saw when OPEC lost its ability to manipulate the
price of oil, and was forced to ally itself with 11 non-OPEC states.65
These changes matter because it means that, contrary to popular belief,
the United States is not in decline. The reigning hegemon is only continuing
its rule atop the international hierarchy, and while energy independence does
not mean it gets to set its own gas prices, it does mean that the economy
will be far better off in the long-run. These changes also matter because they
signify a departure from the previous international energy system where
OPEC was able to manipulate oil prices at will. While the cartel certainly
still has the ability to manipulate prices, the extent of the manipulation is
much, much less, and requires they associate themselves with non-OPEC
exporters in order to achieve the same goals they used to achieve on their
own. While it is impossible to fully answer the question of how United States
energy independence will alter OPEC member countries foreign policy
decisions, after examining the topic we know three specific areas warranting
answers.
I think that the United States achieving energy independence will
cause OPEC member countries to first, start privatizing their state-run oil
companies for the purpose of waning their financial reliance away from oil
and towards industries they will have more control over in the long-run. It
will also cause OPEC countries to liberalize their foreign trade policies since
they will no longer be able to get away with excusing their actions using oil,
and will require other means of trade with other countries to make up for
the hole decreased oil revenue leaves. I think that ultimately, the decline in
influence can only be combatted if the countries figure out ways to fit into
the international system by a means other than oil. While the commodity is
undoubtedly here to stay and while “peak oil” is no where in the foreseeable
63 op. cit., fn. 22.
64 op. cit., fn. 42.
65 op. cit., fn. 54.
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future, OPEC countries will have to adapt their foreign policy to work in
a world where the United States can supply a much larger share of its own
petroleum needs, as well as the rest of the worlds.
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By Isaias Diaz

Shannon Brown graduated Cal Poly with a bachelor’s degree in
Political Science in 1994. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at the Center for
Homeland Defense and Security, a FEMA sponsored academic program for
those working in the Homeland Security sector.
Shannon originally applied to the Cal Poly Political science program
as a first-year student but was rejected due to the major being impacted. Cal
Poly was the only college Shannon had applied to, essentially putting all his
eggs in one basket. Still determined, Shannon was accepted into Cal Poly in
1992 as a transfer student. Shannon first visited Cal Poly as a junior in high
school, and immediately knew it was the school for him.
During his time at Cal Poly, Shannon was able to hone valuable skills which
he believes are very useful in the real world. Skills such as learning how to
present in front of large groups, how to use research methodologies, and how
to run a budget. The critical thinking Shannon developed as an undergraduate
has helped him to distinguish valid information from nonvalid or nonfactual
information.
Shannon had no idea what he was going to do post-graduation,
aside from a general idea of staying in school. He initially went into
political science thinking he was going to do pre-law, but it was during an
international relations course that he changed his mind and decided that he
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was more interested in attending graduate school for either political science
or history. In 1994, Shannon graduated from Cal Poly and immediately
began a master’s degree in history at the University of California Santa Cruz.
While at UCSC, Shannon got a PhD in history, with a focus on history of
technology. While studying in a program with a very heavy European and
world history focus, Shannon discovered that there was an entire other side
of history that was focused on technology, how technology changes the
world, and how people interact with technology. Shannon then left California
to take a fellowship at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C., while
writing his dissertation.
Following his experience at the Smithsonian Institute, Shannon took
a position with Science Applications International Corporation, working
as a defense contractor. After this position he transitioned to doing history
research writing and consulting for a short period of time before being
introduced to an opportunity at National Defense University, within the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, (now called the Eisenhower School
for National Security and Resource Strategy). He taught at this institution
for a span of fourteen years and credits his success within the role to his
background in technology, history, and political science. After serving
in several positions within the college and teaching for most of the time,
Shannon came upon an opportunity in 2017 to become a Senior Lecturer at
the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, where he is today.
Shannon cannot say if there is any one specific moment that he is most
proud of in his career, but rather that he is proud of having had the honor
of working with some very distinguished individuals. He is proud to have
had the opportunity over the past fifteen to sixteen years, to interact and be
a small part of the lives of people who have gone ahead and done amazing
things in their careers, including military officers and those in the civil
service. Shannon credits a lot of what he has learned to those whom he has
worked with, and it is those interactions that mark as one of the best parts of
his career. If he had to choose again, he would not change the trajectory of
his career or the direction it has taken. Shannon went from teaching defense
policy and international relations to something that’s much more focused on
homeland security and domestic policy in recent years.
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Shannon’s advice to current Cal Poly political science students:
Shannon contributes a lot of his success in his career to networking
and would suggest going out of one’s comfort zone to make connections,
as making these connections and interactions sometimes opens a world of
career opportunities that may have not been there beforehand. “To always
focus on keeping an open mind, since you may be introduced to someone at
an event or at a dinner or at a career fair who may make a reference to a job
or an occupation you have never heard about before and that may interest
you. And after that it’s up to you to do some research, explore what that job
or that career is. The tools that are available today to do career research, you
can do a lot of upfront research on and see if it appeals to you. And if it does,
follow up, and jump on it!”
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A Vegan Exploration of Social Movement Theory
Abby Ahlgrim

Abstract
This paper was written as a final project for POLS 419 Social
Movements and Political Protests with Dr. Jean Williams in the Spring
of 2018. This paper aims to explore veganism within the context of
social movement theory, examine the ideological boundary found at the
intersection of private action and movement participation, and look at the
relationship between personal and collective identity and change. First,
through defining Suzanne Stagenborg’s Theories of Social Movements
and Collective Action, this paper establishes veganism within the context
of existent social movement theories such as collective behavior, resource
mobilization, political process, synthetic approach, and new social movement
theories. It then goes on to explore veganism within the frameworks of a
lifestyle movement, the relationship between private action and movement
participation, and the importance and implication of personal and social
change. This paper then concludes with a synthesis of movement theories.

Introduction
Although veganism is often conceptualized as simply a trending
lifestyle movement, many people would argue that it may be a part of a
much larger social movement focused on the value alignment of consumer
choice within social, political, and environmental infrastructures. With
aspects of both a seemingly individualistic cultural movement and more
overt politically-oriented collective action focused movements, veganism is
challenging to contextualize within existent theoretical frameworks. As the
Vegan Society website explains, “veganism is a way of living which seeks
to exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of exploitation of,
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and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose.”1 Although
veganism is applicable and relevant to a variety of consumer and lifestyle
choices, it is perhaps most commonly and consistently conceptualized within
the context of food.
While many people approach veganism with the goal of eradicating
animal exploitation, other agendas may be grounded within desires for
improved personal health, or a sense of obligation to explore and mitigate
the environmentally negative impacts of consumer choices. Although some
vegans do so for personal reasons, many approach veganism as a tactic in
divesting consumer dollars by economically voting for a future food culture
that ethically aligns with personal and collective value structures. Some
vegans extend their participation and advocacy within the vegan community
to include more politically-oriented direct action through protesting and
marching, while others may consider their dollar vote and individual
consumer choice as a form of activism in itself.
But is veganism really a social movement? There are certainly aspects
of the vegan movement that function within the frameworks of traditional
social movement theory. However, there are also components of the
movement that might be better understood as an individualistic lifestyle
movement. Veganism is often critiqued as being elitist–founded and upheld
by narratives of superiority and exploitative structures such that it often
functions within constraints of time and access disguised by perceived
understandings of “choice.” Thus, the movement can be understood within a
larger ideological framework of social movement theory. In this paper, I will
explore veganism within the context of social movement theory, examine
the ideological boundary found at the intersection of private action and
movement participation, and look at the relationship between personal and
collective identity and change.

Social Movement Theories
Social movements have functioned as cultural, political, and economic
change agents for decades, and it is through the scholarly development of
social movement theory that we have come to more closely understand,
define, and analyze such movements. In her book, Social Movements,
Staggenborg examines collective behavior, resource mobilization, political
process, synthetic approach, and new social movement theories as a way
1 The Vegan Society, “Definition of Veganism,” (June 3, 2018).
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of understanding and defining the parameters and functioning of social
movements. These analytical frameworks can then be applied to a variety of
different historical and contemporary movements within society.
Staggenborg explains collective behavior theory such that social
movements exist outside of institutional structures and arise out of a
cultural or structural breakdown or strain of some kind.2 Such breakdowns
lead to mobilization through the unification of participants based on
shared collective experiences and beliefs. Such a framework emphasizes
that movement participation is seen as an element of social behavior
arising out of a shared experience within the breakdown. If applied to
the vegan movement we might understand veganism as resulting from
numerous incidences, or changing realities, related to dramatic ethical and
environmental disparities. Such structural or social breakdowns might be
understood as the precarious state and trajectory of climate change on this
planet, the looming ecological implications of continued animal agriculture
practices, and the immensely exploitative ramifications of factory farming
on the lives of both non-human animals and certain social groups of
disproportionately affected humans.3
Collective behavior theory would explain that veganism has perhaps
arisen as a response to such disasters and resulted in the unification of
participants through collective identity and behavioral decisions. Although
many vegans choose veganism as a healthy and desirable privileged lifestyle
choice, there are many who have found solidarity in the vegan identity
through the sobering realization that consumer choices can have detrimental
effects on larger social and environmental systems and structures. Perhaps
many vegans find their identity through the intersection of several factors.
However, if understood within this collective behavior theoretical framework
we can look to the unified identity and collective behavior of vegans as a
response to the severe environmental, ethical, and personal implications of
animal consumption.
Resource mobilization theory, developed in the 1970s, emphasizes
elite support and the necessity of outside resources, organizations, and
opportunities in achieving collective action. This theory looks to understand
what social network structures allow for the success of social movements
2 Suzanne Staggenborg, “Chapter 2: Theories of Social Movements and Collective
Action, Social Movements,” Ed. 2nd. New York Oxford University Press, (2015).
3 Carrie Packwood Freeman, “Framing Animal Rights in the “Go Veg” Campaigns of
U.S. Animal Rights Organizations.” Society & Animal, (2015).
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and seeks to emphasize adaptive and normative behaviors as influential in
unifying group actions. If applying this resource mobilization theory within
the context of the vegan movement, we might look to explore the ways
in which individual choices are made possible based on existing social
structures of oppression and privilege that place limitations and/or liberations
on certain social groups.4 For example, not only are vegan products more
abundant in higher class socio-geographic urban areas and limited in rural
lower class regions or food deserts, but vegan product advertisements are
targeted at affluent communities and continue to rely on customers from
higher status social groups.5
Additionally, there is an important racialized context to experiences
within cultures of consumption and health foods such that affluent white
communities leverage resources and influence towards advancing a vegan
movement that has primarily functioned to cyclically benefit those within
its own community. Although participants may be composed of different
identities and backgrounds, resource mobilization theory enforces the idea
that access, opportunity, and affluence are important if not imperative factors
in the success of such a movement. Not only does this resources mobilization
theory begin to explain how personal choice might be made possible, there
are also other ways in which specific organizations and other relevant outside
resources contribute to the opportunities made possible for participation in
the veganism movement. These opportunities, of course, include access to
vegan-inclusive products and infrastructures, but also include opportunities
to mobilize participants in collective direct action work and activism used to
enforce vegan agendas and demand cultural, political, and economic change.
Building on this idea of resource mobilization theory, Staggenborg
introduces another similar approach known as political process theory.
Political process theory highlights the interaction between social movement
actors and the state by examining the role of political opportunities in the
mobilization and outcomes of social movements.6 Although this theory may
4 C Devine, et. al., “Food choices in three ethnic groups: Interactions of ideals,
identities, and roles,” Journal of Nutrition Education (1999), 31(2):86-93.
5 A Alkon & J Agyeman, “Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability,”
MIT Press (2011).
6 Suzanne Staggenborg, “Chapter 2: Theories of Social Movements and Collective
Action”.
Social Movements, Ed. 2nd. New York Oxford University Press.
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not be as clearly aligned with aspects of veganism specifically associated
with the lifestyle, there are certainly education campaigns and political
legislative avenues leveraged as tactics in pursuing vegan political agendas.
Some examples of political process theory within veganism include
the achievement of certain animal rights laws, legal parameters around
environmental contamination and degradation mitigations, as well as certain
consumer product regulations and package declaration requirements.
Another parallel theory detailed by Staggenborg is the synthetic
approach theory, which views social movements as political entities aimed at
creating social change.7 This lens provides an interesting opportunity to look
at the framing of the vegan movement as not only a way to participate in
economical methods for a sustainable and ethical future food culture, but also
as a way to individually and collectively participate in changing the cultural
meaning of consumption. This theory resembles and reinforces this idea of
veganism as a cultural movement; although vegan agendas and tactics are
somewhat diverse, there is an understanding that participation functions as a
powerful means of uniting people working towards changing and redefining
social and cultural contexts to consumption.
One of the contemporary theories detailed within Staggenborg’s work
is the new social movement theory explained as emerging out of a “‘postindustrial’ or ‘advanced capitalist’ society” of intersectional movements.8
This theory claims that although movements may vary in structure, type
of constitution, and ideology, they are all united by a concern for cultural
and political issues and are reliant on structures of participation rather than
centralized organizations.9 This new social movement theory emphasizes a
focus on a broad range of values related to the quality of life, appealing to
and encouraging diverse participation while working to construct collective
identities through the unification of shared experiences.
Although this theory is easily applied to many of the more politically
focused participatory action movements of the past fifty years, there are also
clear ways that it can be applied to veganism. Just as this theory claims,
the vegan movement varies in structure, constitution, and ideology, but
participants remain united by concerns with cultural and political issues
relevant to the consumption and use of animal products. Additionally, the
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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veganism movement is dependent on new methods of participation, rather
than the power of centralized organizations. Although there are a number
of theories with which to understand veganism, the new social movement
theory certainly reflects veganism as a social movement relevant to larger
collection action and social change.

Private Action and Movement Participation
Veganism as a social movement is multidimensional and involves a
variety of participation tactics. However, most vegans are unified by similar
and overlapping agendas. While some vegans participate solely through their
individual actions, others may engage through more public and provocative
methods. For instance, some vegans simply shift and redefine individual
daily consumer habits, utilizing veganism as a personal divestment tactic
from controversial and problematic consumer cultures. Others extend their
personal participation to include small-scale education initiatives, joining
or collaborating with vegan organizations to collaborate with both likeminded and differently positioned people. However, many vegans have more
radical, politically-oriented agendas and choose to participate through direct
action activism that includes the active participation in and organizing of
protests, marches, and campaigns.10 Such direct-action tactics might also
extend to include governmental and legislative approaches towards changing
consumer industry limitations and liberations. There are clear distinctions
between private action and movement participation. While the former maybe
conceptualized as an individual lifestyle change, there are ways in which
private or personal action is imperative to social movement tactics, and to the
value alignment of participants in general.

Personal and Social Change
Social movements are all grounded within agendas focused on making
cultural, political, and economic change. When looking at veganism, we can
see that it often functions to advance personal change within a participant’s
individual life. While some people might assume that the change ends there,
others might value veganism as a tangible method or even outcome of larger
structural social changes. There is some literature specifically exploring
the ways in which lifestyle movements can function as social networks
leading to connections that make larger collective action possible. Todd
10 Op. cit., fn. 3.
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Nicholas Fuist and his research team explore how “seemingly individualistic
movements can generate cognitive maps and associational ties necessary
for wider mobilization.”11 It is clear that developing and strengthening
social networks can be powerful in the mobilization of people and shifting
movements from individual to collective action. Other researchers have
come to similar understandings about the relationship between lifestyle and
social movements. Researchers Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones discuss three
defining aspects of lifestyle movements: they advance important “identity
work” in which individuals strive to achieve lifestyles of personal integrity
and authenticity, they function through diffuse structures rather than being
more centrally organized, and they emphasize that individual choices operate
as tactics in larger social change.12 Veganism can certainly be understood
as a lifestyle movement, but that does not necessarily exclude it from being
considered a social movement.
Veganism is often focused on the individual or personal relationship
to consumption, though the overarching agenda is often centered on larger
cultural changes necessary to minimize impact. Vegan communities often
grapple with the idea of impact, exploring and mitigating unnecessary
harmful and exploitative consumer outcomes. While we can see that it
takes collective mobilization to impose tangible structural changes, there
is a necessary narrative within the vegan community that focuses on the
importance of independent actions. Though many vegan narratives focus on
the social and environmental impact of singular consumer decisions, and the
assumed power in divesting our privileged choices, there are also cultural
narratives around the impact of sharing, infiltrating, and teaching non-vegans
in an effort to shift greater collective mindsets. Success within the vegan
movement certainly manifests through personal successes in divesting
personal choices from normative consumption habits, however, successes
are also often measured by the ability to infiltrate ideological frameworks of
others and to convince others to make such changes.
Although many of those narratives may be grounded within empirical
evidence, a closer examination exposes the use of those narratives as
both strategic framing tactics within the movement and reinforcements
11 Todd Nicholas Fuist, et al., “Lifestyle Movements as Social Networks: The
Connections between Everyday Politics and Larger Collective Action in an Indian
Feminist Movement,” Sage Journals, Sociological Perspectives (2018).
12 Ross Haenfler, et al., “Lifestyle Movements: Exploring the Intersection of Lifestyle
and Social Movements,” Social Movement Studies. (2015).
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of superiority. Some of these narratives include metrics around personal
consumption habits, and the profound environmental or ethical impact of
opting out of certain food choices. Examples of these narratives include
information about water saved by not eating one hamburger, or that by
shifting to a vegan diet people can save the rainforest. Though these
narratives are perhaps grounded in “scientific research”, we can see the ways
in which these kinds of views may lead to self-righteous attitudes within
vegan communities. While vegan agendas may seem inclusive, there are
certain structures of exclusion beyond just limitations to time and resources
needed to acquire and prepare foods outside of normative food consumption
habits. The social and cultural boundaries created within narratives of
superiority also serve to “other” and exclude people who are unable to
participate or conceptualize vegan agendas for a number of reasons. Agency
over food choice is an immense privilege, unavailable to most people in the
world, and placing obvious limitation on access to the vegan movement, but
there are still ways in which narratives serve to frame movement agendas,
and advance change.

Conclusion
While many people choose to eat a vegan diet for purposes of personal
health and wellbeing, there are many who participate in veganism as a
methodology for aligning their lifestyle with their value structures. Many
vegans use veganism as at least part of their activism, as they feel an
ethical obligation to divest from industries dependent on animal cruelty or
to mitigate their reliance on environmentally degrading and exploitative
industries.
Although veganism is often understood as a seemingly privileged
individualistic lifestyle movement rather than functioning as a more
politically-oriented collective action movement, there are ways in which
the movement perhaps operates within both frameworks. Veganism is
simultaneously a social movement and a lifestyle movement. There
are aspects of individual identity, private action, and personal change
characterized within the vegan lifestyle movement, that inform and influence
collective identities, movement participation, and larger social change.
Veganism can also be defined as a cultural movement, as participants seek
to change the culture of consumption, through both individual and personal
lifestyle choices, and more traditional direct-action social movement tactics.
Veganism is a contemporary movement with variant but defined agendas
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and multiple tactics. It is a movement of social, cultural and political
change localized within both theories of lifestyle and social movement
frameworks, and holding intersections of private individual action, collective
participation, and social change.
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Effects of the RHYA on LGBTQ Homeless Youth
Bailey Barton

Abstract
The United States government passed the Runaway and Homeless
Youth Act (RHYA) in 1974. This piece of legislation provides federal
funding for homeless youth programs, defines who is considered a homeless
youth, and regulates what shelters and government agencies can do for
youth who have run away from home or become homeless. This legislation,
however, makes no mention of LGBT homeless youth, even though they
are disproportionately represented in homeless youth populations. LGBT
homeless youth often experience discrimination and abuse due to their
unique identity, in addition to the other negative effects of homelessness on
youth. Many are discriminated against or abused by police officers, foster
care workers, and shelter staff, in addition to discrimination from other
youth living in group homes. This paper examines the effects of the RHYA
on LGBT youth specifically and the implications of a lack of research or
specific legislation regarding this group. I examine the various ways in which
this group can have fundamentally different experiences than non-LGBT
homeless youth, none of which are considered in existing policy.
In the United States, LGBT homeless youth make up between twenty
to forty percent of all homeless youth and experience unique stressors
and struggles due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity.1 The
Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, passed in 1974, does not go far enough
to be inclusive to the LGBT community. LGBT youth are disproportionately
represented in homeless youth populations, but are not mentioned at all in
1 Brandon Andrew Robinson, “Child Welfare Systems and LGBTQ Youth
Homelessness: Gender Segregation, Instability, and Intersectionality,” Child Welfare,
(March 2018).
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the RHYA, the predominant piece of legislation regarding homeless youth.
This paper ultimately argues that the RHYA is not inclusive of the LGBT
community by investigating how the gaps in the legislation contribute to a
lack of resources and greater difficulties for LGBT homeless youth.
Legislative Background
According to the RHYA, a homeless youth is defined as a person who
is “not more than twenty-one years of age, for whom it is not possible to live
in a safe environment with a relative and who have no other safe alternative
living arrangement.”2 The RHYA provides federal funding for homeless
youth programs, which implement services intended to help youth positively
develop: “safety and structure, belonging and membership, self-worth and
social contribution, independence and control over one’s life, and closeness
in interpersonal relationships.”3 The RHYA is broken into three major parts:
grants for youth shelters, transitional housing for older homeless youth, and
street outreach.
The bulk of the federal funding is allocated to shelter grants, which
must go only to special designated youth shelters. These are both expensive
to run and not well funded by the RHYA, and as a result there exists very
few. This specific type of shelter has strict requirements laid out by the
Federal Government, including “a maximum capacity of not more than
twenty youth” and a maximum stay limit of twenty-one days for those
under eighteen.4 The handful of these shelters that do exist are only in major
cities, which leaves out the many homeless LGBT youth who are from
rural or suburban areas.5 As such, these shelters often fail to provide the
kind of protection for youth that they were intended to. For example, the
main priority of youth shelters is to reunite runaways with their families, so
typically, parents or guardians will be contacted and told the location of their
child.6 However, because abuse is a major reason why youth run away, most
children do not want to be reunited with their families or social services.7 The
scarce amount of these shelters that do exist are often dangerous in the long
2 US Department of Health and Human Services, Family and Youth Services Bureau,
“Runaway and Homeless Youth Program Authorizing Legislation.”
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Sean McCandless, “LGBT Homeless Youth and Policing,” Public Integrity,
(November 2018).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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run and are therefore avoided by youth.
A much better alternative for homeless youth is transitional housing,
which aims to create greater stability for youth. Transitional housing is
intended for youth ages sixteen to twenty-one, however only those eighteen
or older often can utilize these services due to state laws regarding who can
legally rent housing.8 This type of housing is an alternative to other options
and allows homeless youth to live independently with help from the state.
Transitional housing is a good option for youth as it allows them to get out
of an abusive home situation without having to stay in a shelter and move
around frequently. The stability it brings makes it a good option for homeless
youth, but because they are funded even less than shelter grants, there are
very few beds available in transitional housing.
The final part of the RHYA is the Sexual Abuse Prevention Program,
commonly known as street outreach. The intention of street outreach is
to give grants to nonprofit private agencies for the purpose of “providing
street-based services to runaway and street youth who have been subjected
to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual
exploitation, severe forms of trafficking in persons.”9 Many homeless youths
eventually turn to sex work in the form of prostitution or pornography in
exchange for money or critical supplies like food.10 It is apparent that the
RHYA is incredibly problematic for youth because it lacks sufficient funding
and programs. With this legislative background in mind, it is now possible to
further examine the impact of the RHYA in the context of LGBT homeless
youth.

Problems with RHYA
Interactions with Police
There are a variety of reasons why homeless youth have frequent
interactions with law enforcement. For example, youth typically attempt to
blend in and hide their homelessness to avoid being sent home to an abusive
environment by police.11 Youth will often choose to sleep on the street in
order to avoid being forced to stay in shelters where they will be sent back

8 op. cit., fn. 2.
9 Ibid.
10 op. cit., fn. 5.
11 Ensign, “Health and Human Rights of Homeless Youth,” Homelessness in America,
(2008).
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to an abusive situation and may be abused further.12 However, youth can still
get in trouble with the police for a variety of reasons, such as anti-homeless
laws in cities regarding sleeping on the street, parking cars in public places,
or staying in homeless camps.13 Additionally, many homeless youth cannot
obtain a traditional job due to a lack of education, legal identification card,
or access to transportation and other key resources. This forces many to get
involved in illegal ways of earning money, such as “stealing, selling drugs,
and engaging in sex work,” which in turn, leads to more run-ins with law
enforcement.14 Once a crime, such as selling drugs, is on a youth’s permanent
legal record, it becomes much more difficult for them to attain a legal job or
permanent housing later in life. This can lead to a cycle of youth committing
crimes to survive, getting in trouble with the law, not being able to get a
legal, stable job or housing, and then continuing to rely on illegal methods
of earning money to support themselves financially. While the RHYA does
fund its street outreach program that attempts to help youth avoid sex work,
it does not have any similar programs to help youth avoid resorting to
other kinds of crimes in order to survive. Implementing similar programs
to the street outreach program could help to reduce the number of youth
committing crimes in order to obtain essential resources.
While these experiences are common across all homeless youth, LGBT
youth are more likely to face harassment at the hands of law enforcement
officers due to homophobia and transphobia because their gender expression
or partner can make them more visible. Police officers who are homophobic
can present a danger to homeless LGBT youth. Researcher Sean McCandless
conducted a study on a group of formerly homeless LGBT youth (now
adults). The group consisted of two lesbians, one transgender female, and
three gay men, and all six reported both “fear of and harassment from police”
while they were homeless youths.15 One man in the study reported that while
he was living on the street, a police officer saw him holding hands with
his boyfriend in public and reportedly “looked like he wanted to puke.”16
Another example from the study included a transgender woman who was
living in her car and was pulled over for speeding. The police officer that
12 Alex Abramovich, “Preventing, Reducing, and Ending LGBTQ2S Youth
Homelessness: The Need for Targeted Strategies,” Social Inclusion, (2016).
13 op. cit., fn. 5.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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pulled her over reportedly laughed at her and “mocked her” after the sex
listed on her driver’s license did not match her appearance.17 It is clear
that police officers are often biased against LGBT homeless youth. This is
harmful because of the psychological impacts of being discriminated against
that LGBT youth face, and because it also encourages more officers to ignore
the needs of youth who may need help.
Additionally, the RHYA does not address police interactions with LGBT
homeless youth. Police officers also interviewed in McCandless’ study
described difficulty in dealing with LGBT homeless youth. Several officers
described a need for new laws and police department policies that explicitly
address the unique concerns of LGBT homeless youth. For instance, if
youth are caught committing a crime on the streets, they not only have to
face the legal system but also the threat of returning home to an abusive
home environment. As one woman in the study reported, “my mom beat me
when she found out I liked girls” and she continued to be abused after being
sent home by police.18 After that, she began living in her car because she
felt she was better off there than going home and risking being “killed” by
her abusive mother.19 The RHYA makes no mention of these situations that
youth are forced into. The only policy currently is to send youth home who
are caught living on the streets, no matter what kind of situation that means
returning to.
Finally, many departments simply don’t sufficiently train officers
on how to handle these kinds of situations. For example, one officer in
McCandless’ study described “difficulty changing department cultures,”
explaining that, “some officers just don’t know the proper way to talk
to someone who’s gay or transgender” and that can lead to negative,
discriminatory interactions with youth.20 These youth then will grow up to be
distrustful of the police and state institutions in general. If the RHYA were to
implement required training for police officers who interact with homeless
LGBT youth, it could help youth have fewer negative interactions with
police and potentially be more trusting and cooperative with law enforcement
officials. Researcher Sean McCandless suggests several changes to existing
law, such as “reduced criminal penalties for LGBT homeless youth engaging

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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in crimes used to survive or that occur as part of victimhood.”21 New laws
could help youth get back on their feet after an arrest so they can move
forward without the burden of a criminal record holding them back from
housing or employment opportunities.

Transgender Youth Experiences
Transgender youth in particular face discrimination at shelters in various
ways. Many shelters ask a series of questions via forms and interviews to
determine who gets to stay in the shelter. Things as simple as the wording
on these intake forms at shelters can be problematic, as these forms typically
only offer options to check male or female, and do not offer any specific
area to disclose information regarding gender identity.22 One individual
interviewed as part of a study of transgender youth described that they
attempted to explain to shelter workers that they needed subway passes to
get to their doctors’ appointments for hormone replacement therapy, their
requests were ignored.23 The RHYA makes no mention of transgender
homeless youth or their unique mental and physical health needs. Something
as simple as requiring youth shelters to offer a third option or box to disclose
information regarding gender identity could go a long way to helping
transgender youth feel more respected and understood in shelters.
Additionally, transgender youth specifically can have higher rates of
discrimination and violence compared to other homeless LGB youth.24
Transgender homeless youth are often especially unsafe at shelters which
require them to be assigned to beds according to their sex assigned at birth
and not their gender identity. These kinds of insensitive shelter policies can
put youth at increased risk of discrimination, abuse, and rape. Sex-segregated
bathrooms, locker rooms, and dressing areas within these facilities are also
inappropriate and often dangerous for transgender youth.25 The RHYA does
not consider the safety of transgender homeless youth and the dangers they
often face when staying in youth shelters. Rules that would force shelters
to allow youth to utilize facilities matching their gender identity could help
make trans youth much safer.

21 Ibid.
22 op. cit., fn. 12.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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Health Concerns
Access to safe and affordable medical and mental health care is
extremely difficult for homeless youth to attain. This is due in part to their
age: those under eighteen years of age cannot legally consent to medical care
without the permission of their parent or legal guardian. Many youths are
either uninsured or underinsured and thus do not have access to health care
services, as they cannot afford to pay for them out of pocket.26 Even those
able to access care may have trouble contacting and scheduling appointments
with doctors, due to how the hours during which doctors operate often
conflict with school or work.27 Finally, youth are often afraid of their parents
or guardians being contacted regarding their condition, since youth under
eighteen cannot revoke their parents right to view their medical records.28
This leaves youth in a position where they must decide between receiving
treatment, if they have access to it at all, or retaining their anonymity in order
to avoid suffering abuse from their family. This is a common problem across
all homeless youth, not just LGBT youth specifically. However, LGBT youth
are particularly disadvantaged because of the discrimination and bias they
can experience in the medical field.
Additionally, in comparison to the general homeless youth population,
LGBT homeless youth have distinct and unique health concerns, which
the RHYA makes no effort to address. For example, mental health care
is critically important for this subgroup specifically, even compared to
other homeless youth. While the experience of being homeless at a young
age is incredibly stressful, it becomes even more problematic when it is
caused by something fundamental to the person, such as sexual orientation
or gender identification. Youth often feel guilt and shame regarding their
sexuality because it is often the cause of much of their troubles. One study
estimated that the LGBT youth population (age group ten to twenty-four)
is two-point-five to three times more likely to suffer from a mental health
condition such as major depression or generalized anxiety disorder, and four
times more likely to attempt suicide than their heterosexual peers.29 Youth
are discriminated against and often kicked out of their homes because of
26 op. cit., fn. 11.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Stephanie Dolamore and Lorenda A. Naylor, “Providing Solutions to LGBT
Homeless Youth: Lessons from Baltimore’s Youth Empowered Society,” Public
Integrity, (November 2018).
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their sexuality, and the effect of these traumatic events on their developing
emotional and cognitive processes is often detrimental to their mental
health. For instance, researchers found that LGBT youth had “worse health
outcomes than their heterosexual counterparts in almost every category,”
which they theorized was due to “ostracism, discrimination, and stigma.”30
The RHYA does not address the unique mental health concerns that LGBT
homeless youth face. The addition of programs that would provide free
counseling to youth could significantly improve mental health outcomes of
youth.
The RHYA fails to address the unique physical and mental health
concerns of LGBT homeless youth, which can make them more likely to take
matters into their own hands. For example, on the streets transgender youth
are often able to purchase hormones, silicone injections, and other medical
procedures through the underground market which allow youth to “align
their bodies to their gender identities.”31Additionally, many youths who have
yet to complete proper sexual education through school or other resources
may be uninformed on how to avoid pregnancy, STI’s/STD’s, and be
knowledgeable about the warning signs of abusive relationships. This lack of
education can lead to greater sexual health problems for youth. Additionally,
youth who are lesbian-identified and experiencing homelessness have
“higher rates of unprotected sex than lesbians who were housed.”32 Even
youth who are old enough and fortunate enough to have completed sexual
education through a public high school are often not exposed to LGBTspecific sex ed. Adding additional sex education programs to the street
outreach component of the RHYA could go a long way to preventing serious
and negative health outcomes for youth. Furthermore, the addition of
programs that provide free or extremely low cost physical and mental health
services, such as clinics, could significantly improve the health and wellbeing
of homeless LGBT youth.

Conclusion
The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act fails to address LGBT homeless
youth and as such, the gaps in this law harm the mental and physical health
30 Ibid.
31 op. cit., fn. 12.
32 Nicholas Forge, et al., “Out of the System and onto the Streets: LGBTQ-Identified
Youth Experiencing Homelessness with Past Child Welfare System Involvement,”
Child Welfare, (March 2018).
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of these youth. LGBT homeless youth experience discrimination and
abuse in addition to the other negative effects of homelessness on youth,
due to their unique identity. This group can have fundamentally different
experiences than non-LGBT homeless youth due to the socially-ingrained
perceptions that being LGBT is somehow fundamentally bad, which is not
considered in existing policy. Many are discriminated against or abused by
police officers and shelter workers. The gaps in the RHYA need to be filled to
include the unique concerns and needs of LGBT homeless youth. This could
help to prevent unnecessary discriminatory encounters with police, violence
in shelters, having to commit crimes in order to survive, and other negative
consequences of homelessness. Without any future changes, the kinds of bias
and discrimination evidenced in this paper will simply continue. By updating
the RHYA to consider the needs of LGBT homeless youth, the federal
government could better the lives of hundreds of thousands of youth who are
struggling across the country.
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Alumni Spotlight: Ana Victoria Fortes
By Camden Belliveau

Many people aspire to advocate for the causes they consider important
in a professional capacity. Ana Victoria Fortes has made that dream a
reality. As a graduate from Cal Poly in 2012, with a Master’s in Public
Policy emphasizing social welfare policies and entitlements, Ana Victoria
put herself in a position to represent the interests of those who are often
neglected or unrepresented. As a Civil Rights Analyst at the US Commission
on Civil Rights, she has acted on that that dream. Hands on experience
influenced her decision to choose political science prior to grad school.
“While teaching English for 6 months at a Thai non-profit in Nong Khai a
year before applying for graduate school, I observed the importance of public
policy and its impact on every day people. Isara, which unfortunately went
under a few years ago, was focused on providing English language classes
to the community while also engaging in various community initiatives like
their public safety helmet campaigns and conservation and recycling efforts.
I witnessed collaboration among local officials and Isara to promote the
helmet campaign specifically to promote public safety among families in our
neighborhood which bordered one of the busiest streets. I was fascinated by the
democratic process being used in local communities to enact laws and wanted
to learn more about this process through a formal education and hopefully find
my way into a profession that has a similar component.”
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During her time at Cal Poly, Ana Vi credits “Jean Williams because she
oversaw my thesis which focused on examining the effectiveness of federal
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. I appreciated that she
was/is a faculty member because there were so few professors who focused
on social welfare policies. The Politics of Poverty class was incredibly
substantive, and I will forever remember her for that course.” She also credits
Michael Latner for reigniting her enjoyment of statistics, and Elizabeth
Lowham for helping navigate through a difficult graduate program.
Ana Vi is passionate about civil rights and wanted to work to better
civil rights at an agency that is “not subject to the political changes that
other federal agencies experience;” working as Civil Rights Analyst at the
US Commission on Civil Rights actualizes that desire. Her work consists
of “documenting civil rights issues and developing recommendations
for addressing them. The US Commission on Civil Rights conducts
research on various civil rights issues across the US and communicates
these recommendations to the President, Congress, and various federal
enforcement agencies.”
Her advice to Political Science students is to network in the fields
you are interested in and pick the brain of professionals who are more
experienced than you. Also, take a contract negotiation class so you know
your worth! Lastly, she strongly encourages women, and women of color
specifically to use their unique experiences as leverage in the workplace.
She has found that being honest about unique experiences, especially in
homogeneous environments, can truly influence decision-making in the
workplace and in school, and be a catalyst for change.
Her hobbies include being politically active and engaging in local
campaigns, reading, lifting at the gym, spending quality time with her
partner, friends, family, and her 13-year-old half Shiba Inu- half Shih Tzu
Biggie Smalls, and lastly making time for international and domestic travel.
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Nature vs. History: The Fight for National Park Designation
Kieran Althus

Abstract
National Parks are a pinnacle of the United States recreation scene.
Providing the U.S. with over 52.2 million acres protected for the use of the
public and for conservation and scientific research. National Parks are not
the only entity in the National Park System that provides protections for land
deemed valuable by Congress. There are National Monuments and National
Historic Landmarks that are tasked with maintaining historic or natural
areas for the sake of education and science. Within these three types of Park,
there are to implicit types of locations someone can visit: one protected for
its natural scenic/ scientific interest, and the other protected for its historic
significance. This paper delves into the distinction between these two types
of Parks, all of which are dubbed “National Park” for the sake of this paper.
This paper explores the differences and similarities between the two, and
whether or not there is a discrepancy as to which type of park is more
attractive to California legislators when deliberating between park-types.
This paper suggests that nature-based Parks are more attractive to legislators
and therefore more likely to occur in California.

Introduction
Americans grow up with stories of the grandeur of National Parks.
Yosemite, Yellowstone, and Grand Canyon all come immediately to mind
when thinking about our great parks. Yosemite was the park that created
the framework for the whole National Park System (NPS) after Hutchings
v. Low solidified its status as protected land.1 However, it wasn’t until
several years later that the first real National Park, Yellowstone, was created.
1 Alfred Runte, “The California National Parks centennial: Introduction to the Special
Issue,” California History, Vol. 69, no. 2 (Summer, 1990): 69-91.
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Now, the NPS manages 7.6 million acres of land out of 100 million acres
in California.2 These lands are divided into National Parks, Monuments,
Historic Landmarks, and many more designations.
The three types of designation explored throughout this paper are:
National Parks, National Monuments, and National Historic Landmarks
(NHL’s). National Parks are usually large, remote stretches of wilderness
scattered throughout the country that serve to highlight and protect beautiful
and scenic locations. These parks are designated through the Legislature-presented as a Bill just like any other piece of legislation. National
Monuments are typically smaller locales that either emphasize a set of
buildings or property, or a natural location with scientific or historical value.
These sites are designated through Executive orders from the President.
Finally, there are NHL’s, which highlight buildings or smaller locations
throughout the country. These are designated by the Department of the
Interior and do not require congressional approval. The designation system
of these sites, however, is lacking and inconsistent. After examining all
current National Parks, National Monuments and NHL’s in California, I
contend that there are only two criteria that should determine the designation
of a park: historical/ cultural reasons and natural/scientific reasons.
To explore this point, I will look at four sites in California that represent
the various types of parks and justify the two reasons for designation. I will
explore Yosemite National Park, Devils Postpile National Monument, Cesar
E. Chávez National Monument and Manzanar National Historic Landmark.
Literature regarding the establishment of National Parks hasn’t changed
much in recent years, especially literature regarding California’s parks. There
is a myriad of literature on Yosemite, Redwood, Sequoia and Yellowstone, as
those are some of the “crown jewels” of the park system. However, general
literature exploring the establishment and history of parks and monuments is
lacking.
This paper will first go into detail about the different protected sites (ie.
National Park, Monument, etc.). Then, I will discuss the current legal criteria
for the types of designations, the general economic effect of the different
designations and finally criticism of the process and consequences of a park.
After, the case studies will be explored in detail, highlighting their political
process, economic effects and their respective criticism. Finally, I will
2 Vincent and Laura Hanson and Carla Argueta “Federal Land Ownership: Overview
and Data,” (Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2017).
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discuss the implications of the research, and what this could mean for the
future of the National Park System.

Key Words & Definitions
Before I proceed, it is important that the two factors that warrant
designation are defined; historic-based site and nature-based site. It is
important for me to make this distinction because simply relying on the
given designation of the protected site is unreliable. There tends to be a lot of
overlap in the kinds of sites that are designated under a single Unit type.
A nature-based site is a sufficient designation for those parks which
hold scenic, natural and/or scientific value. All National Parks are designated
because of their scenic or recreational value. However, almost half of
National Monuments are designated because they hold scientific or natural
value. These sites include fossil beds, interesting geological formations, coral
reefs and some natural sites that belong or belonged to Native American
tribes, and lack any physical structure or artifacts. Historic-based sites are
ones that hold cultural or historical value. If the site is located in a natural or
scenic area but holds historic or cultural significance outside of the natural
environment, then I designated it as a historic site. I made this decision
because the primary purpose for its protected status is their historic or
cultural significance. These mostly contain archeological ruins, buildings, old
military forts, homes of past presidents and other nationally important sites.
Protected sites are specifically sites that the National Park Service
designated and maintains. There are a number of monuments, historic sites,
national historic trails and recreation sites that are managed by agencies other
than the NPS, such as the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife
Service and the U.S. Forest Service. For the sake of this paper, I will be
focusing on sites that have been designated and are managed or co-managed
by the National Park Service.

Types of Protected Sites
The National Park System is an expansive program. Many types of
designations aren’t specific to whether the park focuses on nature or history/
culture. There are over twenty different types of protected sites, without
any formal definitions ever having been established.3 The designation of
3 Carol Vincent, “National Park System: Establishing New Units,” (Congressional
Research Service, 2013).
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“National Park” applies to sixty parks throughout the United States. Of these
sixty parks, three are heralded as “crown jewel[s]” of the United States,
including the Grand Canyon, Yosemite and Yellowstone.4 All sixty of these
parks are scenic or are valued because of their natural splendor and outdoor
recreation. In California, there are nine National Parks including: Joshua
Tree, Channel Islands, Kings Canyon, Sequoia, Lassen Volcanic, Pinnacles,
Redwood, Yosemite and Death Valley.
National Parks are created by legislators that consider the best use for
a proposed resource.5 National Parks must be approved by Congress, and
Congress typically explains and justifies the park’s purpose, size, directions
for land acquisition and, most importantly, how to allocate funds.6 However,
the National Park Service (NPS) must first prove to Congress that the site
of the proposed park meets several criteria: it is nationally significant, it
constitutes one of the most important or sole examples of a resource, and
its incorporation into the Park System is feasible.7 These Bills are under
the jurisdiction of several Congressional Committees, including the House
Committee on Natural Resources and the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources. The Department of the Interior and the NPS are always
evaluating new sites to be reviewed for National Park designation, and the
Secretary of the Interior submits a yearly report to Congress, in which the
Secretary recommends areas for inclusion.8
National Monuments are similar to National Parks. However, they are
designated differently than National Parks. There are currently eighty-seven
National Monuments in the United States, six of which are in California.
National Monuments are designated via an Executive Order through The
Antiquities Act of 1906. The Antiquities Act allows a president to create
monuments on federally owned or controlled land that contains “historic
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic
or scientific interest,” as long as the monument is confined to the smallest
area possible for the upkeep of the site.9 The Antiquities Act was originally
4 Betty Martin, “America’s Three ‘Crown Jewel’ National Parks.” Los Angeles Times
(May 16, 1993).
5 Tiffany Espinosa. Et al., “The Politics of U.S. National Park Unit Creation: The
Influence of Electoral Competition, Political Control, and Presidential Election Years,”
Journal of Park and Recreation Administration, Vol. 35, no. 3 (Fall, 2017): 112-121.
6 op. cit., fn. 1.
7Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 National Monuments - 54 U.S.C. §320301 (a).
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established to protect archeological ruins in the Southwest, and gave the
president unchecked power to do so.10
In theory, the National Monument program wants to protect historic and
cultural sites in the United States, similar to the National Historic Landmark
program.11 However, many of the National Monuments in the country are
not history-focused at all. National Monuments were historically used by the
President to hold or protect a natural or scenic site in order to give the NPS
and Congress time to designate it as a National Park.12 For example, Bryce
Canyon and Carlsbad Cave were both originally National Monuments, and
were then “upgraded” to National Parks.13 The designation of National Parks
is inherently unorganized due to the lack of specificity in their designations.
National Historic Landmarks are the final National Park Unit that I
will be analyzing in this paper. The Historic Sites Act of 1935 established
the powers for the Department of the Interior to name National Historic
Landmarks.14 The Historic Sites Act allows the U.S. to acquire property using
eminent domain.15 However, this doesn’t mean that all NHL’s are acquired
through eminent domain. According to a report by the Department of the
Interior to Congress in 2001, about half of all NHL’s are privately owned.16
The process for designating these Landmarks is more difficult than other
historic properties. The agency needs to, “to the maximum extent possible,
undertake such planning and actions as may be necessary to minimize harm
to such landmark.”17
There are 2,596 NHL’s in the U.S., with 145 in California. Some of
these sites are located in places of nature, but their designation is based
around its historical context, so they are all counted as history-based sites.
Thus, broadly speaking, nature-based sites refer to all National Parks and
some National Monuments, and history-based sites refer to some National
10 Hal Rothman, “Second-Class Sites: National Monuments and the Growth of the
National Park System,” Environmental Review, Vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring, 1986): 44-56.
11 National Historic Landmarks Program- 16 U.S.C. §470H-2(J). 36 C.F.R.
§800.10(A.).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Kristina Alexander, “A Section 106 Review Under the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA): How It Works,” (Congressional Research Service, 2012).
15 Ibid.
16 U.S. Dept. of the Interior. National Park Service. 2000. National Historic
Landmarks at the Millennium: A Report to Congress and the American People.
17 op. ct., fn. 11.
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Monuments and all National Historic Landmarks. Next, I will be analyzing
the designation of history and nature-based parks based on the legal process
of creating them and the economic impact they have on their surrounding
communities.

Designation of Protected Sites
I will analyze the designation of National Parks, National Monuments
and National Historic Landmarks in California based on the political or legal
process of creating them, the economic impact they are expected to make,
and the type of criticism they receive during the designation process.

The Legal Criteria
There are three criteria to establish a National Park: National
significance, Feasibility, and Suitability.18 A number of considerations arise
when thinking about the different criteria for parks. True for all nature-based
parks, showing a site has national significance is paramount to its success in
the designation process. Of the known 143 proposed National Parks, we have
data on ninety-five proposals, and of those, forty-four were rejected because
they lacked significance to the nation as a whole.19 This first step is important
for preventing special interests from exploiting the land. The second criterion
is feasibility, which is measured by scope and public feedback. If the land is
too large, and the project faces intense local opposition, it is not feasible.20
Part of the reason why California has such high numbers of nature-based
sites is due to its public support for environmental protection. The final
criterion, suitability, “includes the ecological or historical integrity of the
proposed site, its accessibility, and whether it was or could be protected by
another organization.”21 Fundamentally, California’s numerous National
Parks are a product of the state’s geography. As one of the last states to be
settled, there was plenty of untouched land to protect. Further, California
boasts around 5,000 species of native plants and the most diverse climate
and terrain within the forty-eight contiguous states.22 This allows for many
different choices regarding the natural zones to encompass, furthering the
18 Lary Dilsaver, “Not of National Significance: Failed National Park Proposals in
California,” California History, Vol. 85, no. 2 (2008): 4-23.
19 Ibid.
20 op. cit., fn. 16.
21 Ibid.
22 Flora and fauna – California.” City-data.com. (2017).
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goal of the third criterion, which is to distinguish ecological integrity. The
final criterion is whether or not the land could be protected by another
organization. Thinking about the purpose of a nature-based park in
California, the NPS’s mission to protect, educate and promote the use of
those natural parks is exactly what Californians want.
The criteria Historic parks need to meet bares some difference to
that of nature-based parks. Historic parks still must maintain some level
of national significance.23 Similar to nature-based parks, there is some
overlap in the type of designation a historic park receives. The two that I
will cover are National Monuments, as mentioned before, and National
Historic Landmarks. To recap, the Antiquities Act was created as a way to
protect archeological ruins and other places of historic significance. National
Historic Landmarks, however, are enumerated through the National Historic
Preservation Act, which helped define standards for landmark eligibility.24
The main criteria for designation as a Landmark is being considered
a place of cultural significance. These culturally significant places exclude
anywhere that has gained significance within the past 50 years.25 This rule
came about because in the 1930s, the NPS was flooded with requests for
Landmark designation and protections.26 The other reason is because history
is inherently controversial. The most controversial aspects of history are
the parts that we can remember and those that are closest to us; therefore,
those sites are intentionally omitted from the Historic Landmark program.
Throughout the country, there are a variety of other kinds of landmark types,
and all are arranged by themes that are determined by the NPS. The National
Monument and the National Historic Landmark program share a similar
designation process, in that they’re designated unilaterally by the President
of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior respectively.
The objective criteria stated by law is: 1. The area is associated with
events that are significant and represent the patterns of U.S. history, 2. The
area is associated with the lives of people nationally significant in history,
3. The areas represents some American ideals, 4. The area embodies
23 Ibid.
24 Samuel Otterstorm and James Davis, “The Uneven Landscape of California’s
Historical Landmarks,” Geographical Review, Vol. 106, no. 1 (October, 6, 2015):
28-53.
25 John Sprinkle, “‘Of Exceptional Importance’: The Origins of the ‘Fifty-Year Rule’
in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian, Vol. 29, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 871-103.
26 Ibid.
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characteristics of an architectural specimen that is exceptional, 5. The area is
made up of parts not significant individually but collectively create an entity
of historical or artistic value, and 6. The area yields or may yield information
of scientific value about cultures, or uncover new information about U.S.
History.27 The first, fourth and sixth criteria are consistent with designating a
National Monument, in that the area should be significant to the country, be
architecturally significant, and/or yield new information of use for the United
States. The biggest difference between the two designations is that the NHL
program is inherently people-centric. While Monuments highlight general
spaces, NHL programs highlight the accomplishments of individual people.
My proposed method of designation is much simpler. The first question
the National Park Service should ask themselves is: What are we trying to
protect or accomplish with the establishment of this park? If the answer is
nature, scenery, or some scientific resource, then the park would be designed
as a nature-based park. Alternatively, if the answer is a historical building,
culturally significant landmark or ruin, then the park would be designated
as a history-based park. The current criteria that is laid out for establishing
National Parks is effective for creating nature-based parks as a whole. Only
parks that are nationally significant, suitable and feasible should become
nature-based parks. For history-based parks, it is not only important to have
national significance, but important to tailor the park as narrowly as possible.
The park should be as small as possible, and not much larger than the site
that it is attempting to protect. This is to ensure that the least amount of other
buildings, if the site is in a city, are affected in the process.

Economic Effects
Large, nature-based parks are highly sought after for their economic
value as well. Economic interests based in or around natural National
Monuments is scanty, mostly because visitation is lower and the parks
themselves are smaller than large National Parks. In other regards, large
natural parks represent varying economical costs and benefits.28 I say
“large” because all nature-based parks in California are significantly larger
than any history-based park, and it is important to distinguish between the
two. Therefore, nature-based parks are more profitable than the alternative
kinds of parks. Senators and Representatives understand that nature-based
27 36 CFR § 65.4.
28 op. cit., fn. 3.
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parks, but more specifically, National Parks, are economically stimulating
and help create growth within their districts, so they push to create parks
for their districts.29 This practice has died down since the end of WWII,
mostly because the “crown jewel” parks had already been created.30 Thus,
the development of large-scale nature-based parks has slowed, but it has not
stymied the growth of small natural preserves, such as those represented in
the National Monument program.
It is interesting to note the disparity between the funding for the
National Park System, and just how economically important the system can
be for surrounding communities. Communities that surround National Parks
and nature-based parks are called “gateway communities,” a title worn like
a badge of honor.31 Pinnacles National Park, the newest Park in California,
is surrounded by the small agricultural towns of Soledad and King’s City.
Soledad has proudly branded itself as the “Gateway to the Pinnacles,” while
King’s City has branded itself as “Entrance to West & East Pinnacles.”32
This trend reflects the ideas that there is a symbiotic relationship between
gateway communities and nature-based parks. Large nature-based parks are
economically stimulating for their surrounding communities, and, in turn this
leads to an increase in tourism to the parks themselves.33 The NPS estimates
that gateway communities generated $18.4 billion from tourist spending in
2016 alone.34
Many people believe historic parks to be a waste of space and money
for the national government.35 However, historic-based sites come with
their own challenges. Nature-based parks are generally more removed and
out-of-the-way, whereas we interact with historic sites every day because
they are often located within our cities and streets. There have been many
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Richard Ansson., “Our National Parks—Overcrowded, Underfunded, and Besieged
with a Myriad of Vexing Problems: How Can We Best Fund our Imperiled National
Park System?” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, Vol. 14, no. 1 (Fall, 1998):
1
32 Lee Romney, “Soledad re-brands itself as the ‘Gateway to the Pinnacles’,” Los
Angeles Times (February 16, 2013); Felix Cortez, “New Pinnacles sign goes up in
King City,” KSBW8 (December 19, 2014).
33 op. cit., fn. 31
34 Catherine Thomas and Lynne Koontz, “2016 National Park Visitor Spending
Effects: Economic Contributions to Local Communities, States and the Nations,”
(Natural Resource Report, U.S. Department of the Interior, 2017).
35 op. ct., fn. 3
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efforts to encourage historic preservation through economic means, for
example, the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 that created tax deductions
for rehabilitation.36 The idea behind the Act wasn’t geared toward preserving
history; it was meant to preserve the integrity of neighborhoods. In spite
of that, it evolved to pertain to historical buildings. Even without federal
intervention, historic preservation of land became increasingly popular at
the federal, state and city levels. In fact, most landmark preservation occurs
on the local, city level.37 This is because preservation is controversial, and
because there are probably more sites that are important to the local history
than national history in a given town. In a small, low-density city or town,
such as San Luis Obispo, California, designation as a historic-based site
might be welcome by an owner.38 While in big cities where landowners
are pressed to utilize every square foot, building owners tend to prevent
historical preservation of their buildings.39 In fact, the early development
of parks was directly linked to their perceived economic benefits. Barry
Mackintosh, a National Parks historian in Washington D.C., wrote that the
first Directors of the National Park Service, “Mather and Albright blurred the
distinction between utilitarian conservation and preservation by emphasizing
the economic potential of parks as tourist meccas.”40

Criticism
Common criticism of nature-based parks is that they’re an inefficient
use of natural resources.41 Hetch Hetchy Valley, located in the Northernmost
part of Yosemite immediately comes to mind when deliberating this claim,
as Hetch Hetchy was dammed in 1923, flooding the entire valley. However,
designation provides similar benefits to surrounding communities as
exploitation does, in theory making jobs available to locals in surrounding
communities in much the same way. Additionally, the expense of National
Parks is well worth it. The NPS usually receives and requests somewhere
36 Glenn Gerstell, “Needed: A Landmark Decision: Takings, Landmark Preservation,
and Social Cost,” The Urban Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1976): 213-278.
37 Felipe Núñez and Eric Sidman, “California’s Statutory Exemption for Religious
Properties from Landmark Ordinances: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis,” Journal
of Law and Religion, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1995-1996): 271-322.
38 op. cit., fn. 36
39 Ibid.
40 Barry Mackintosh and Dept. of the Interior. Washington, DC. National Park
Service. “The National Parks: Shaping the System,” January 1, 1985.
41 op. cit., fn. 3
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between $2 billion and $3 billion, which is a fraction of how much those
large natural parks help surrounding communities. That is an even smaller
fraction of how much National Parks are estimated to be worth, which is a
whopping $92 billion.42
There is additional criticism in the simple practice of adding parks
to the system at all, with people saying that the system is “mature,” and
that the NPS should focus its attention on preserving the nature it has.43 In
conjunction with that, it may be time for the natural side of the park system
to slow, letting historic sites, which were historically seen as second-tier, to
flourish.
Available literature had a more critical response towards historic
preservation. A common criticism is that all historic districts are designated
unilaterally, circumventing all democratic checks. The President has
authority to designate Monuments and the Secretary of the Interior has the
power to designate NHL’s. In regards to the President, the designation of
Monuments as historic sites can be seen as political in nature, used to prevent
other interests from getting ahold of an otherwise unimportant site.44 The
major concern with historic sites is the lack of opportunity for the community
to participate in the designation process.45
Additionally, historic-sites are created to present history as it is, and
sometimes history is remembered alternatively to how it actually occurred.
So, collective memory can shape the history that is presented, which is
detrimental to the primary purpose of the sites.46 Another issue is the lack of
representation in historical sites. Culture and heritage sites tends to highlight
famous, wealthy and politically powerful people, oftentimes neglecting
minorities and women.47

42 Bourree Lam, “How Much Are America’s National Parks Worth?” The Atlantic,
(July 19, 2016).
43 op. cit., fn. 1.
44 Hope Babcock, “Recession of a Previously Designated National Monument: A Bad
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 37, no, 1
(December, 2017): 3-74.
45 Ibid.
46 Robert Stipe, A Richer Heritage: Historic Preservation in 21st Century (Chapel Hill:
University of Chapel Hill Press, 2003), 35.
47 Ibid.
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Case Studies
Yosemite National Park
The opening of Yosemite in 1855 to the public was met with little
fanfare, as the beauty of the valley was yet unknown to the camera-less
world. After initial sketches and lithographs of the landscape were published
in newspapers in 1856, the nation became ensconced with Yosemite, and,
year-by-year, people began visiting the area.48 As interest and tourism rose,
the concern over its preservation increased as commercial interests began
to vie for positions in the Valley. Israel Ward Raymond, the California state
representative of the Central American Steamship Transit Company of
New York, was credited as the one to write to John Conness, a senator from
California, urging him to preserve the Mariposa Grove of Giant Sequoias.
In Raymond’s letter, he explicitly noted that the area “[could] never be of
much value,” preemptively preventing outside interests from establishing
themselves within the valley.49 The Senate Committee on Public Lands voted
in favor of Conness’ bill in 1864, with Conness expressing the economic
infertility of the land, as well as stoking American patriotism through the
Giant Sequoias that the British didn’t believe to be of American origin, which
was a point of pride for Americans.50 One of the most important provisions
of the grant was that Conness’ assurance that the park wouldn’t cost money
to maintain or preserve, which was important in the wake of the Civil War.
Thus, on June 30, 1864, President Lincoln signed the Yosemite Park Act into
law, effectively establishing the first National Park.51 To this day, Yosemite is
one of the most visited parks in the Country, with 5 million visitors in 2016.52
The motivation for creating a park protecting Yosemite is purely for
scenic and natural reasons, placing Yosemite in the “nature-based park”
category. If I apply my adapted standards, Yosemite passes with flying colors.
Because my set of criteria is taken from the National Park standards, it makes
sense that Yosemite meets the standards. First is national significance, which
can be explained through Yosemite’s sheer natural grandeur. The park is
one of the few places in the world with groves of Giant Sequoias and sheer

48 Huth, Hans, Yosemite: The Story of an Idea (Literary Licensing, LLC, 2011).
49 Raymond to Conness, February 20, 1864, Yosemite-Legislation, File 979.447, Y-7,
Yosemite National Park Research Library.
50 Ibid.
51 Yosemite Grant Act of 1864, 13 U.S.C., §48 (1864).
52 National Park Service, “Park Statistics,” (Yosemite Park Statistics, April 5, 2018).
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exposed granite rock formations.53 The question of feasibility is simple; what
did the public think? While there are no direct records of public feedback
regarding the establishment of Yosemite, Raymond made it abundantly
clear in his letter that the valley holds no practical value to Americans other
than its recreational feasibility. Lastly, is suitability. John Muir, credited
as being the Father of the National Parks, believed that Yosemite was too
important a natural landmark not to protect and convinced Roosevelt during
a 3-day camping trip with the President.54 Yosemite had no other hope in the
early 1900’s of being protected from another Government agency because
there was none. Based on these considerations, I believe the designation
as a nature-based park is most applicable to Yosemite. The purpose of its
designation is purely for that of natural grandeur. Not only was that its
original purpose, but that is how it is currently used and why it continues to
be maintained. Not only was Yosemite created to protect its natural beauty,
but its effects on the community are homologous to how I define a naturebased park. Ultimately I will use the criteria that Yosemite put in place to
define a nature-based park later in this paper.
Yosemite is a prolific economic force for its surrounding communities,
or gateway communities. Gateway communities benefit immensely from the
popularity of the parks that they surround, creating a symbiotic relationship
between park and community. The National Park Service estimates that
visitors in 2017 spent $452,782,000 in “communities near the park.”55 Those
communities include Mariposa, Mammoth Lakes, Merced, Groveland and
Fresno. Additionally, visitor spending is estimate to support 6,666 jobs in
those communities.56 Yosemite’s economic fitness hasn’t even been fully
explored yet, with commercial influence inside the Park being increasingly
likely. In 2017, more than 25,000 people petitioned against the establishment
of this Starbucks in the park.57 Widely interpreted as a sign of our evolving
consumer-based culture, the implementation of Starbucks comes with other
renovations to dining and lodging options within the park. In an effort to
fight for money to satisfy a $12 billion backlogged maintenance, food and
53 op. ct., fn. 49.
54 op. ct., fn. 1.
55 Dept. of the Interior. National Park Service. “Tourism to Yosemite National Park
creates $589,343,700 in Economic Benefits.” (April 20, 2017).
56 Ibid.
57 Grace Donnelly, “Starbucks Opened a Location in Yosemite. Not Everyone is
Excited,” Fortune (March 29, 2018).
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beverage purchase and contracts with private companies can help pave the
way to satisfy financial needs.58

Devils Postpile National Monument
Devils Postpile is a National Monument near Mammoth Mountain
in east California and was established in 1911.59 It was once a part of
Yosemite National Park, but when gold was discovered in Mammoth
Lakes, boundaries were redrawn leaving the Postpile on the public land.60
The main threat to the area was a proposal to blast the area into the nearby
river, to make room for a hydroelectric dam. In 1905, mining and timber
companies were successful in removing the area from the park. John Muir
then convinced the federal government to stop its development effort,
and in 1911, President Taft designated it as a National Monument.61 This
designation came just as the battle to preserve Hetch Hetchy was reaching its
climax, and thus Devils Postpile symbolized a compromise of commercial
interests and preservation.
Devil Postpile’s three-point criteria for designation is similar to
that of other nature-based sites. First, it’s creation is strictly to protect a
natural space with interesting geological features, and therefore it should
be considered for designation as a nature-based site. Devil Postpile is a
significant landmark in America because of the Postpiles, which represent an
interesting geological phenomenon resulting in standing pillars of hexagonal
stone. Now, is the creation of Devils Postpile feasible? Devils Postpile’s
close proximity to Yosemite meant it wouldn’t have been too difficult to
create the proper infrastructure for the park. In relation to suitability, I
believe that Devils could have stayed in Yosemite. A lot of future troubles
with maintenance and staffing could have been solved by lumping Devils
back in Yosemite with newly redrawn boundary lines.62 Nonetheless,
according to my standards for park designation, Devils Postpile is a naturebased park that belongs in the program.
58 Ibid.
59 “A Proclamation.” (1911) Statutes of the United States of America. (Creation of
Devil Postpile Proclamation)
60 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture and Dept. of the Interior. National Park Service. National
Forest Service. 2009-2010. Visitor Guide to Devils Postpile and the Reds Meadow
Valley.
61 Ibid.
62 Christopher Johnson, “Nature and the History of the Sierra Crest Devils Postpile
and the Mammoth Lakes Sierra,” United States National Park Service, (July 29, 2013).
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Devils Postpile was created for its scientific interest to the nation, and
thus was not expected to generate much income. However, the park slowly
became connected to the region and grew in significance usurping the
reason for designation as scientifically important to emphasizing its natural
and “rustic camping” opportunities.63 As the NPS budget decreased and
visitation increased, the lean toward promoting tourism over the protection of
nature became readily apparent. This led to a drain of resources from Devils
Postpile in order to better fund Yosemite. These decisions in the early days
of the park inevitably led to Postpiles becoming an independent park. The
park averages over 100,000 visitors a year, which is among the lowest of the
National Monuments in California, and the lowest of the nature-based parks
in California.
The existence of the Postpile is not without criticism and conflict. A
most notable conflict arose was when President Roosevelt was transferring
National Monuments over to Park Service control within the Forest Service.
The two agencies began to conflict with each other, fighting over control of
the monument in Yosemite.64 This conflict eventually spread to the public.
Those living in the Mammoth Lakes area were apprehensive that the transfer
of management to the NPS would expand the monument’s borders, confusing
business owners and public visitors. Their concerns stemmed from the idea
that the Park Service could extend the Yosemite boundary to meet with
the Devils Postpile boundary, and that the National Park Concessionaire
Company would prove too competitive for the Mammoth Lakes businesses.65
Despite the typical shortcomings of nature-based parks, Devils Postpile has
remained uncontroversial in the recent years. A better understanding of the
ecosystem and geology has led to better management practices. Additionally,
the park has gone to great lengths to establish relationships with local
Indian tribes that were known to have inhabited the area before Yosemite
was established.66 Nonetheless, Devils Postpile still meets my criteria
for a nature-based parks because it holds immense scientific and natural
importance, and is one of the few places in the U.S. with this phenomenon.

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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César E. Chávez National Monument
The César E. Chávez National Monument was established on October
8, 2012 by President Obama. The monument was established to recognize
and memorialize the monumental role Chávez played in the farm workers’
and civil rights movements of the 1960s.67 The site where the monument
now rests is known as Nuestra Senora Reina de la Paz (“Our Lady Queen of
Peace”), and was an incredibly important location for the labor movement.
“Nuestra Senora Reina de la Paz” was the headquarters for the United Farm
Workers. It became Chávez’s home until his death in 1993 and is now the
location of his gravesite.68 The history of Chávez and his contributions as
a leader of the farm workers labor movement is incredibly important to
that of California because it is the most productive agricultural state in
all of the country. Although widely seen as an advocate for all American
laborers, Chávez was primarily credited with his role in the Latino American
community, where he promoted the hiring of Hispanics and their inclusion
into the American labor force.
The Cesar Chávez National Monument was established in order to
commemorate the historical role Chávez had in farmers’ rights. As I stated
above, the location was the headquarters for the Farm Worker’s movement,
making it an incredibly important site. Therefore, the criteria the site is
subject to is that of a history-based park. Therefore, the first criterion is
national significance. Cesar Chávez is certainly a character of national
importance; his advocacy for the workers’ union is now significant to every
unionized worker in America. The second criterion is that a site should be
narrowly tailored. For Chávez, this is not difficult, as the location of the
movement is a small property in an uninhabited area of California. With
these two points considered, Cesar Chávez deserves national protection as a
history-based park.
It is difficult to measure the economic impact of a historic site as small
and sparsely visited as this one. However, it is safe to assume that the lack
of documentation, the scope of the site, and the amount of other economic
prosperity in the surrounding areas show how little impact the historic site
has. The location of Bakersfield is most likely of more economic benefit
to the Monument than the Monument is to Bakersfield. The historic site is
67 Barack Obama, Proclamation 8884—Establishment of the Cesar E. Chavez
National Monument, (October 8, 2012).
68 Ibid.
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the least visited national monument in California, only racking up just over
15,000 visits in 2017.69 Therefore, the revenue produced by this Monument is
negligible.

Manzanar National Historic Landmark
Manzanar is the site of one of the two war relocation centers, or
concentration camps, in California. Thus, Manzanar was the exact location
where Japanese Americans were forcibly moved during World War II under
the rationale of protection against supposed espionage.70 American and
Japanese immigrants were interned between December of 1942 and 1945.
The attack on Pearl Harbor was the catalyst in creating Manzanar’s War
relocation center. The United States worked fast to solve the “Japanese
problem” on the west coast, and on February 19, 1942, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the military to designate
exclusion areas where they could effectively remove Japanese Americans
to relocation centers.71 120,000 people were relocated in total, two-thirds of
whom were American citizens. Of these 120,000, Manzanar housed 10,000
individuals in its small barracks.72
A majority of the people incarcerated at Manzanar were from the Los
Angeles area, along with others coming from other places throughout
California and Washington.73 On November 21, 1945, Manzanar was closed,
which in effect led to the removal of Americans again, but this time from
Manzanar. Many people left willingly, and were each given $25, meals,
and transportation to Owens Valley. From there, they were left to find their
own way.74 Because there was no longer any home for them to return to,
some individuals did not leave willingly and were forced from the camp.75
In all, 146 of the people incarcerated died at Manzanar, two of those being
confirmed killings.76 In February 1985, Manzanar was designated a National
69 op. ct., fn. 52.
70 Frank Hays, “The National Park Service: Groveling Sycophant or Social
Conscience: Telling the Story of Mountains, Valley, and Barbed Wire at Manzanar
National Historic Site,” The Public Historian, Vol. 25, no. 4 (Fall, 2003): 73-80.
71 The National Park Service. “Japanese Americans at Manzanar.” (February 28,
2015).
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 U.S. Dept. of the Interior. National Park Service. Cultural Landscape Report:
Manzanar National Historic Site. (2006).
75 Ibid.
76 U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service Jeffery Burton, Jeremy
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Historic Landmark, and, on March 3rd, 1992, was further designated as a
National Historic Site by George H.W. Bush.77
The real process for NHL’s is different than that of the other two types
of protected sites. Manzanar National Historic Site is nationally significant
and culturally significant because it symbolizes a moment in U.S. History
when citizens were incarcerated out of fear. In addition to being significant
to the Japanese-American community, it was a significant blunder on the end
of the United States government and serves as reminder of our past failures.
This is enough to satisfy the first criteria in being nationally significant.
Next is whether it is a narrowly tailored site. In locations trying to preserve
historic buildings, active steps need to be taken in order to preserve these
buildings and physical structures. At Manzanar there aren’t many standing
buildings left, and the only other structures that require maintenance are
the main hall and the gravesites. Although it is quite a bit of land, the park
would be the minimum size that still encompasses the entirety of the original
relocation center.
Manzanar is located at the foothills of the Eastern Sierra Nevada in
Owens Valley by Lone Pine, California. It is about 200 miles North of L.A.,
and is on the 395 Highway. The route is commonly used to get to and from
Mammoth Mountain from Los Angeles and Southern California. The average
annual visitation is 86,691, with 2017 breaking visitation records with a
whopping 114,461 visitors.78 That makes it one of the most visited historicbased sites in California. However, there is no information about the direct
economic impact of Manzanar on the surrounding community.
For such a small and seldom visited historic site, there is a lot of
criticism surrounding the creation and the continued existence of Manzanar.
It’s not surprising that there is a lot of criticism and controversy for a
historic-based park that has such a controversial past. One of the main
points of contention is determining how to tell the story of Manzanar.79
Understandably, the Japanese community wanted the history of Manzanar
presented in a way that would highlight the history without sugarcoating
Haines, Mary Farrell. 2001., “I Rei To: Archaeological Investigations at the Manzanar
Relocation Center Cemetery, Manzanar National Historic Site, California,” Western
Archeological and Conservation Center.
77 H.R. Res. 543, Sess. of 1992.
78 Department of the Interior. National Park Service. “Annual Visitation by Park
(1979-Last Calendar Year),” (2017).
79 op. ct., fn. 70.
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what happened. The community wanted several structures reconstructed,
such as the guard tower an entrance gate resembling the original, and a
barrack.80 Reconstruction is not the preferred method of preserving history,
being that it only attempts to recreate something historical and is inherently
inauthentic. The NPS says that “the public [can be] misled by many
reconstructions that have not been absolutely verified by archaeology and
documentary records,” hence the hesitation of rebuilding sites.81
Additionally, other older interests in the area were brought up when
discussion for preserving Manzanar started.82 In 1991, when hearing public
testimony in regards to establishing a monument there, the Inyo County
Assistant Administrator Paul Morrison expressed concerns that Manzanar’s
designation could complicate other histories associated with the area.83
Morrison is presumably referring to the cattle ranching and Native American
association with the land prior to the establishment of the Relocation Center.
Or, possibly, he was referring to the town that existed before the Camp was
established. Either way, Paul Morrison makes the insightful point that history
is often contested and complicated, and that different unrelated histories can
belong to a single location thus making it difficult to present one without
stomping out the others.
With Manzanar located in the beautiful Sierra foothills, its location
can distance people away from the atrocities that went on in the relocation
center, adding to the difficulty in accurately portraying what occurred at
the camp. And while the National Park System inevitably called it a “War
Relocation Center,” the Japanese American Citizens League wanted the
Landmark called a “concentration camp,” to highlight the cruelty of the
action.84 Historic portrayal is the most crucial aspect of creating a historybased park and greatly affects the communities that are represented by
the site. Manzanar attempts to do exactly that, and therefore deserves the
protection as a history-based park.

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Robert Hayashi, “Transfigured Patterns: Contesting Memories at the Manzanar
National Historic Site.” The Public Historian, Vol. 25, no. 4 (Fall, 2003): 51-71.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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Discussion
The four case studies described above are a comprehensive
representation of the different historic and natural sites that exist in
California. These examples were discussed in order to demonstrate how a
site should be examined in order to designate it as historic or nature-based.
Currently, overlapping designation occurs often in the Park System. Out of
the eighty-seven monuments that are managed or co-managed by the NPS,
I find forty-eight that are monuments of historical or cultural value, with the
remaining thirty-nine of natural, scenic and/or scientific value. In California,
there are six National Monuments, four of which are nature-based, with the
last two being historical. I made these conclusions using the criteria I set in
the earlier section, and applying them to a list of National Monuments. The
four nature-based parks are: Lava Beds, Devils Postpiles, Muir Woods and
Castle Mountains. The two historic parks are Cabrillo and Cesar Chávez
National Monuments.
The designation of a site is significant due to the various implications
that come with a specific type of designation. Across the board, naturebased sites do a much better job at stimulating their local economies. There
are no “gateway communities” that surround remote historic landmarks, or
even businesses that directly benefit by being next to a historic site in the
middle of a city. It is important in realizing the economic role and variation
between historic-based and nature-based sites. Whereas if you look at the
case studies surrounding nature-based parks, whole towns and thousands
of people depend on the existence of well visited natural parks. And while
the existence of economic interests is dependent solely on public interest in
visiting a park, California’s natural parks are known throughout the country
for having some of the greatest views and recreational opportunities. It
seems across the board, that historic-sites benefit more from what’s around
it than vice versa, while nature-based sites share a symbiotic relationship
with their surrounding communities. The characteristics that sort parks into
my two categories are undeniable. Therefore, I do not believe the current
system for sorting parks is adequate, and has clearly led to confusion and
mismanagement on several occasions. The National Park Service should
focus solely on protecting places of National significance. Therefore, that
piece of the criteria is universal to establishing sites for protecting. However,
that is where the similarities between my two categories divert. The method
for protecting natural lands and historic buildings is inherently different, and
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therefore need to be treated as such. Distinguishing these two types of parks
will aid in future designations, maintenance and budgeting.
There is still a wealth of material that needs to be studied surrounding
the National Park System and the entire system that revolves around
protected sites. Further nuance can be placed on the system of designation
that I have put in place. I understand that there are always exceptions to the
rule, and those exceptions need be studied more in-depth. Additionally, my
research has generated many questions left unanswered. For instance, should
other states adopt a similar dichotomous system of nature and history-based
parks? Can this system apply to other protected sites managed by other
governmental agencies? Should all protected land be consolidated into one
agency? I hope that this research fuels further research into the United States’
protected sites, and more can be done to protect the parks that Americans
love and admire.
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Alumni Spotlight: Andrew Robinson
By Isaias Diaz

Andrew Robinson graduated from Cal Poly in 2016 with a bachelor’s
degree in Political Science and Global Politics. Currently he is the executive
assistant for Boundary Stone Partners, a small government affairs consulting
firm that also does strategic communication. His particular job deals with
anything from scheduling to research, partner support, intern management,
office management, accounting, billing, and human resources. Basically,
Andrew’s responsibilities include anything necessary to make a six-member
consulting firm work.
As an undergraduate at Cal Poly, Andrew started off as a political
science major focusing on global politics. He never really considered
switching degrees, but he did consider double majoring in astrophysics.
Andrew decided against it since it would’ve added an extra year to his
timeline. He decided that he wanted to create his own academic experience
and forge his own path. He was very passionate about outer space and
decided to take a crack at viewing public opinion for NASA and aerospace
from a political science perspective for his senior project. These experiences
are what gave him a familiarity and expertise on the topic, which in turn have
made his profile and background a bit more unique.
While at Cal Poly, Andrew credits the most valuable skills he learned
as being able to conduct basic research, like knowing where to look for
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information, how to look for it, and knowing which sources to trust. These
lessons taught him lasting skills that he still uses today. The Cal Poly “Learn
by Doing” motto was very helpful for Andrew, since it really helped him
think about what he wanted to do and where he wanted to go.
Beyond the basic grocery store and lifeguarding jobs that got him
started, Andrew held a few internships in college with the U.S. Department
of State. In addition, he held an internship with Congress in Washington D.C.
Those internships gave him an idea of what he didn’t want to do, since entry
positions in the government sector, to him, felt like a cut-throat and grinding
experience. Working for ASI gave Andrew an abundance of leadership skills.
He loves working with others and doing outreach and working for ASI made
Andrew realize that was the type of work he wanted to do.
Andrew credits becoming ASI chief of staff at Cal Poly as one of his
most memorable and rewarding experiences. After losing the election his
first time running, when the opportunity arose again, he decided to seize it.
The activities that he did outside his curriculum and in conjunction with his
academics.
In a sense, Andrew has always been confident about what he wanted to
do even though his path evolved over time. He believes that as he takes each
step on the path, his destination becomes clearer. Initially, Andrew thought
he would go into the state department, but after working there, he decided
against it. He started looking for some clean energy environmental consulting
firms to work with and stumbled on a company that was 3-D printing rockets
and he was sold. Andrew is really excited about being at the forefront of
emerging commercial space policy. Andrew’s position involves working with
cutting edge companies, new technologies, government affairs, and helping
them reach their deadlines.
Andrew has dealt with self-doubt throughout his life. His time at Cal
poly helped him to overcome that fear. Andrew realized that being involved
with groups and people really helped counteract the feelings of hesitance and
self-doubt. His message now is, “Face your obstacles head on, learn from it
and conquer it.”
Andrew’s advice to current and graduating political science students:
“To the graduating students specifically, test out internships if it’s
financially possible. Talk to professionals in your field; LinkedIn and alumni
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groups are great resources. As far as internships go, that’s how you figure
out what you don’t want to do. Learning what you don’t want to do can be as
valuable as figuring out what you do want to do. This gives you a chance to
test out the position without locking yourself in.”
Andrew also suggests asking yourself these two questions:
What are you most passionate about?
What are you good at?
Once you answer this, try to figure out how to connect those two things.
For example, Andrew was very good at talking and collaborating
with people to solve complex issues, which is what inspired his political
aspirations. He also liked space, so he thought, “how can I combine these
two?” This merging of passions ended up taking him to where he is today,
working on commercial space policy.
“To both graduating and current students: the world around you is not
defined by what is but what can be. So, this goes back to thinking about
what you’re good at and what your passionate about. Find a way to connect
those, even if it’s something that doesn’t exist yet. Think creatively and think
outside the box. Take your skills and your passions and find a way to bring
them together. Challenge yourself, think about what you can do to improve
your community. Think about what you can do to improve yourself. Listen,
always be growing and never be complacent.”
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The United States' Pursuit of Regime Change in Venezuela
Robin Sawka

Abstract
Since its first mass protest in 2016, Venezuela has been in a state of
crisis, facing public protest, inflation rates, and diminishing access to basic
necessities. Many of these issues can be tied to the decline of Venezuela’s
once successful oil industry, which had created an economic-bubble until
recent years. This paper uncovers the historical context of the issues faced by
Venezuela’s oil industry and analyzes the role the United States has played in
promoting its own influence within it. Furthermore, this paper examines the
specific methods the United States has used to assert this influence and the
motives and incentives it has in doing so.

Introduction
On March 2, 2018, The Washington Post published an describing
the Venezuelan diaspora into neighboring Latin American countries and
throughout the Western Hemisphere.1 Since political protests began in
early 2016, Venezuelans have experienced food shortages, medical supply
shortages, and a sharp increase in violence.2 Additionally, the world has
heard read news stories about prison inmates foraging rats for food, zoo
animals starving, and mothers crossing national borders to secure medicine
for their children.3 The world has also seen emotional selfie-styled videos of
rebel fighters facing their last hours as they stand off against the Venezuelan
military.4 In response, roughly 600,000 Venezuelans have fled to Colombia,
1 Ishaan Tharoor, “Venezuela’s Maduro hollows out his nation,” The Washington Post
(March 1, 2018).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Nicholas Casey, “Venezuela’s Most-Wanted Rebel Shared His Story, Just Before
Death,” The New York Times (January 21, 2018).
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40,000 to Trinidad and Tobago, 30,000 to Brazil, 20,000 to Aruba, and 5,000
to the Caribbean isle of Curacao since August of 2017.5 The Colombian
border also continues to see up to 3,000 new migrants per day.6
The humanitarian crisis that faces Venezuela is the result of an intense
ongoing political crisis. In the United States, media has painted the crisis as
a one-sided affair – and President Nicolas Maduro as the malicious dictator
-- while the United States fights to promote and support democracy in the
country. Since the early 2000s, the United States has funded opposition
forces in Venezuela, hoping to secure a political outcome that would create
favorable business conditions in Venezuela. It addition to this, they have
supported uprisings and protests, and have sanctioned Venezuela, hoping to
revolutionize its political order. While establishment forces may argue that
the United States is doing so only in support of developing a democracy, its
involvement has contributed to political instability and to the development of
a humanitarian crisis.
The events in Venezuela are relevant to the international community
and to the discussion surrounding international law due to the role that other
states have played in Venezuela’s political upheaval. Venezuela, controlling a
large supply of oil, is significant to the world’s most powerful states who rely
on imports of this resource to support their own infrastructures. The United
States has enjoyed a long relationship with Venezuela based their historical
dependence on the country as a reliable oil supplier. As a different political
order begins to emerge in Venezuela -- one which threatens the capitalist
economic system established by the West -- the United States has begun
pursuing regime change, hoping to disrupt this process. Questioning the role
that the United States plays in Venezuela has led me to the following research
question: How has the United States pushed for regime change in Venezuela,
and for what reasons has it done so?

Conventional Wisdom
Both American and Latin American publics are skeptical of the United
States’ role in supporting democracy abroad. A 2013 poll conducted by
CBS News / New York Times Poll indicated that almost 3 in 4 Americans
believe America should not intervene in foreign dictatorships to install
democracy.7 Another 2013 poll conducted by NBC News / Wall Street
5 Op. cit., fn. 1.
6 Op. cit., fn. 1.
7 “America’s Role in World Affairs,” CBS News / New York Times Poll (September 6-8, 2013).

87

Robin Sawka

Journal Poll indicated that only 22% of Americans believe America should
continue promoting democracy abroad.8 Other polls which have studied the
opinions of Latin American publics have found a similar disapproval for the
United States’ promotion of democracy abroad. A poll conducted by BBC
World Survey indicated that while a majority of Latin Americans support
democracy in their country, a large portion of them share a distrust for the
role of U.S. actions in supporting such democracies.9
This conventional wisdom is misleading, however, as it fails to address
ulterior motives for the United States’ role in pursuing regime change.
Current conventional wisdom views the United States’ purpose as one of
pure intentions to support fledgling democracies, but my analysis will create
a more accurate picture of the United States’ pursuits of regime change. I
will analyze how the United States might stand to benefit from influencing
Venezuelan politics, in addition to the methods they have used for doing so.
This research paper will make the conventional wisdom more complete by
framing regime change using the theoretical paradigm of realism to construct
a more accurate portrayal of the United States’ relationship with Venezuela.

Methodology and Evidence
I employ qualitative methodology to examine the theoretical paradigm
of realism as it applies to my research and use three case studies to answer
my research question. The first case study examines the culture surrounding
oil in Venezuela, addressing how political leadership influences the
Venezuelan oil market and who is able to invest in it. The second case
study examines the U.S.’s pursuits of regime change under President Hugo
Chavez and how Chavez’s presidency threatened the U.S’s access to oil.
Lastly, my third case study examines the U.S.’s pursuits of regime change
under President Nicolas Maduro and how Maduro’s changing policies have
further threatened the U.S., giving an advantage to its global competitors. I
use primary evidence to research my case studies and secondary evidence
to enrich my understanding of the context surrounding these sources.
Examples of primary sources include U.S. State Department documents,
C.I.A documents, presidential executive orders, congressional bills, fiscal
reports by the N.E.D, U.S. energy statistics, and C.R.S reports. Examples of
8 “America’s Role in World Affairs,” NBC News / Wall Street Journal Poll (September
5-8, 2013).
9 “Latin American Publics are Skeptical About U.S. - But Not About Democracy,”
World Public Opinion (March 7, 2007).
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secondary sources used includes news articles, publications from non-profit
organizations like the NACLA, publications from universities like Columbia
- SIPA, and scholarly articles from journals like Foreign Affairs.

Theoretical Paradigm
At first glance, it is understandable why the conventional view is that
the United States’ motives in Venezuela are aimed at promoting democracy
rather than Venezuelan regime change. However, by using realism to analyze
research, one can form a more complete understanding of the United States’
ulterior motives. There are two core assumptions of realism that direct my
research. The first of these is that, in the international system, there exists no
higher actor than the state.10 This means that states are the highest actors, and
that states are most loyal to themselves even if they appear to have strong
alliances with other states. The second core assumption of realism is that
the behavior of a state can best be understood by the relative power it stands
to gain from its actions.11 This means that states behave in order to increase
their power in a global competition against others.
Realism best frames and explains the answer to my research question
because by pursuing regime change in Venezuela, the United States is
seeking to increase its own power. Realism allows us to see past the facade
of ‘democratic development’ that U.S regime change takes on and is useful
in understanding why such pursuits take place and the means through which
they are executed. In understanding that states often behave in ways that will
increase their own power, realism gives us the ability to detect disguised,
realist grasps of power that permeate the international system for what they
are.

Research Findings
To explain the United States’ true motives in pursuing regime change in
Venezuela, one must first have an understanding of the culture surrounding
oil in Venezuela. Venezuela is a region that is incredibly rich in oil.
Indigenous tribes are said to have used naturally flowing oil and asphalt
for medicinal purposes centuries ago.12 It was not until 1912, however, that
Venezuela first began drilling for this oil, triggering many foreign companies
10 Sean D. Murphy, Principles of International Law (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West,
2012).
11 Ibid.
12 Erik Bakke, “US-Venezuelan Relations,” Harvard Model Congress (2014).
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to begin investing in the country.13 The early 20th-century oil boom would
completely rearrange Venezuelan society, as oil became the center of
Venezuelan industrialization. Agricultural production became an afterthought
almost overnight as it was overwhelmed by profits from the oil industry.14
The old elites of Venezuela who had become powerful through such
agriculture lost their grip on politics, and the Democratic Action party rose to
power, replacing Venezuela’s old economic order with one centered around
oil.15 This party was a populist party, and employed promises of land reform,
democratization, and welfare expansion to create a supporter base among the
lower and middle classes.16
The Democratic Action coalition became the dominant force in politics
in 1958, focusing Venezuelan policies around the industrialization of oil
for the following decades. It did so in an obsessive way, spending large
proportions of its money developing oil infrastructures, while ignoring other
parts of the economy.17 While this created an economic boom in Venezuela,
the boom was concentrated in urban upper class involved with oil business.18
The rural poor, along with the majority of Venezuela’s population, had little
access to these new-found riches and had to face weakened infrastructures as
oil drained funds from other sectors. This centralization of wealth also made
the Democratic Action party very powerful, turning Venezuela into a oneparty government.19 While enriching Venezuela, the country’s economy and
currency became dependent on oil, making it vulnerable to a volatile global
market. Through its development of oil infrastructures, the Democratic
Action party allowed Venezuela to become one of the world’s largest oil
producers, but did so in an unsustainable way, angering a large class of
people who had not been able to access the economic benefits of Venezuela’s
oil boom.
The face of this populist movement was Hugo Chavez, elected in
1998 on promises to destroy Venezuela’s system of oil centralization and

13 Ibid.
14 Gregory Wilpert, “The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela,”
Venezuelanalysis.com, August 30, 2013, , accessed March 23, 2018, https://
venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/74.
15 Op. cit., fn. 11.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Op. cit., fn. 11.

90

PAIDEIA

replace it with one that would fund social projects.20 Chavez wanted to
target Venezuela’s policy of “Oil Opening” which had dominated oil policy
since the early 1990s.21 Under this policy, transnational oil companies had
been invited to invest in the industry in hopes that this would cheapen the
development of oil infrastructures.22 “Oil Opening” diluted ownership of oil
in Venezuela and made foreign interests powerful in influencing Venezuelan
policy. It had also diverted oil profits away from the people and into foreign
bank accounts. Because Chavez’s reforms threatened a powerful, entrenched
system, and because he had no political allies, he faced barriers for policy
reforms. This prompted him to create a new constitution in 1999, giving
the presidency stronger powers.23 He used his presidential powers to pass
three major reforms to Venezuela’s oil industry meant to give the presidency
more power over its ownership. Chavez strengthened Venezuela’s role in the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (or “OPEC”) and targeted
the enforcement of production quotas for all of its members.24 He did this to
increase the global price of oil barrels, which had reached a low of $8.43 per
barrel when he took office.25
Chavez also passed reforms to the Energy Ministry, giving it stronger
powers as an agency of the executive branch.26 Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s state oil company, had directors with strong
business and political affiliations that allowed them to establish a degree of
independence in dealing with its structure and the transnational investments
it received.27 Reforms to the Energy Ministry were meant to disable PDVSA
from continuing this path of independence and to reinstall control over the
company. In seeking to obtain higher governmental profits, Chavez also
replaced Venezuelan oil taxation with a system of royalties.28 The tax system
surrounding the oil industry had grown too complex and the government had

20 Luis Lander and Margarita Lopez-Maya, “Venezuela’s Oil Reform and Chavismo,”
NACLA, September 25, 2007, , accessed March 23, 2018, https://nacla.org/article/
venezuelas-oil-reform-and-chavismo.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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begun to see weakening revenues based on its taxation of oil.29 The collection
of royalties was meant to be a more direct system of revenue collection that
could end this problem.30 Taken together, these reforms were meant to end
the privatization of Venezuela’s oil and push the country in the direction
of oil nationalization so that Venezuela could utilize this wealth for social
policies. While the reforms Chavez made created many benefits for his
society, the way in which Chavez secured them would become a source of
agitation for countries like the United States, who had profited off reliable
access to Venezuelan oil.
When Hugo Chavez died in 2013, he was replaced by Nicolas Maduro
to continue his legacy of the political ideology, Chavismo. Under Maduro,
the mismanagement of PDVSA funds that began under Chavez continued,
and this caused a crisis in the Venezuela’s oil market. Under Chavismo,
PDVSA began losing many of its profits to the funding of social programs.
Because it was spending a majority of its funds on such programs, it was
unable to invest in its own infrastructure.31 This led to a degradation of
oil technologies in Venezuela which has caused the country to lose its
competitive advantage against other exporters in OPEC. Now, Venezuela can
only drill low-quality oil and must mix it with the higher quality oil from
companies like B.P., to make its oil commercializable.32 This process has
made Venezuela’s industry especially uncompetitive-- when the government
lacks the funds to pay for the importation of high quality oil to mix with
its own, its oil industry is brought to a standstill as its oil is unable to be
brought to the global market. Chavismo has also created a law which restricts
the price of oil in Venezuela to stay under one cent per liter.33 This policy
was effective when Venezuela was still one of the world’s largest suppliers
of oil, but now that it is reaching its historically low levels of production,
the policy forces PDVSA to run oil fields at a loss and thus contributes to
a critical loss of funds.34 PDVSA’s massive debts have forced it to look
towards international investors to help keep it running.35 Maduro has created
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Lisa Viscidi, “Venezuela on the Brink: How the State Wrecked the Oil Sector--and
How to save It,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Antoine Halff et al., “Apocalypse Now: Venezuela, Oil, and Reconstruction,”
Columbia - SIPA (accessed March 23, 2018).
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a cryptocurrency based around the value of a single crude barrel and has
allowed China and Russia to invest billions in the company.36 These policies
allow foreign interests to gain influence in Venezuela’s oil market, creating
a strong source of friction for the United States who is being excluded from
this opportunity.
The political crisis currently facing Venezuela is a direct result of the
mismanagement of PDVSA by Chavismo. Venezuela has built an empire
around its oil, basing its currency around the production of oil, and basing
the success of its economy on the competitive advantage it has against other
OPEC exporters. Despite this, mismanagement has allowed the company
to lose access to funds that would go towards investment, resulting in a
company which is incredibly indebted and yet must work within its unableto-upgrade infrastructures to repay Venezuela’s large debt. This process has
halted the once supreme production of oil in Venezuela and has severely
damaged the value of its currency. This has created a humanitarian crisis for
Venezuelans and has prompted the United States to seek out regime change
in the country.
When Hugo Chavez became President of Venezuela in 1999, the United
States was immediately threatened. Chavez had grown famous in Latin
America for his anti-American viewpoints, variously referring to thenPresident George W. Bush as a donkey, Mr. Danger, and the devil.37 One of
Chavez’s sources for his anger towards the United States was his distaste of
American companies’ access to Venezuelan oil. When Chavez talked about
removing foreign interests from Venezuela’s oil industry, he was referring
to foreign companies, many of which were American. This presented a
clear threat to the United States’ steady supply of Venezuelan oil, which
accounted for a large portion of its imports.38 Hugo Chavez threatened the
United States’ access to a resource it was becoming dependent upon, causing
it to pursue regime change in order to install a leader that would continue a
tradition of favorable economic conditions towards the U.S.
The United States attempted this coup primarily through the support
of opposition political parties and the preparation of opposition military
leaders. An unclassified State Department document entitled A Review of
36 Lesley Wroughton and Girish Gupta, “U.S. warns investors over Venezuela’s
‘petro’ cryptocurrency,” Reuters (January 16, 2018).
37 “Hugo Chavez: Memorable moments,” BBC News (March 6, 2013).
38 “U.S. Imports from Venezuela of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” U.S. Energy
Information Administration (accessed March, 23, 2018).
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U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela November 2001 - April 2002 reveals the
ways in which these actions took place. The document reveals the nongovernmental organization, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
and its funding of opposition political parties that supported an overthrow of
the Chavez regime.39 While the NED is an NGO and should be unaffiliated
with government, it receives all of its funding from Congress, has to report
to Congress, and so should be considered an acting arm of Congress.40
The NED’s program spent over two million dollars in six months, funding
political programs that were meant to politicize an uneducated citizen base
and activate it against Chavez.41 The NED also coordinated communications
between members of Congress and Venezuelan opposition leaders.42
Congress members were so comfortable with the idea of pushing for regime
change that they even held dinners with media influencers to discuss the
effects of creating anti-Chavez media.43 The United States also spent close to
one million dollars brining Venezuelan military officials to the United States
to participate in military training programs and coordination of an estimated
$697 million in military consummations.44
An unclassified C.I.A. document also reveals that the United States
was aware of an upcoming coup attempt against Chavez. The document
discusses an attempt being organized by disgruntled senior officers and a
group of radical new officers who would create justification for Chavez’s
replacement by provoking military action in upcoming demonstrations.45
The coup took place only five days after this report was published, installing
Pedro Carmona, a prominent businessman, as Venezuela’s new President.
Despite the undemocratic ousting of Venezuela’s President by the military,
the United States quickly recognized Carmona’s government and praised his
actions. One of Carmona’s first official meetings as President was also held
with the United States ambassador to Venezuela, in which they discussed
normalization of democracy in Venezuela.46 Carmona’s only actions as
39 “A Review of U.S. Policy Towards Venezuela November 2001 - April 2001,” U.S.
Department of State, July 2002.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 “Codel Ballenger 4/27 Dinner with Media Owners,” U.S. Department of State, May
2002.
44 Et al, 29.
45 “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,” National Archives, April 6, 2002.
46 “Venezuela: Ambassador Shapiro Meeting With Carmona,” U.S Department of State, April 16, 2002.
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President were to dissolve Venezuela’s National Assembly and Supreme
Court, destroying any democratic institution which held a check over his
power. This caused an uproar to break out in Venezuela among civilians
and the military, creating protests which reinstalled Chavez only 48 hours
later. Chavez would respond to the coup by blaming the United States as its
organizer, further increasing tensions between the nations, resulting in the
gradual decline of oil imports to the United States from Venezuela.47
As of 2018, efforts by the United States to influence regime change
in Venezuela had not yet ceased, and new developments had prompted a
stronger reaction by the United States. In an attempt to seek out funds for
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, Maduro has looked to outside investors
to help bolster the industry.48 Because the United States used to play the role
of supporting Venezuela’s oil industry with American investments, and no
longer does, outside countries are seeing the Venezuelan oil industry as an
opportunity to gain power that used to be held by the United States. One such
country is Russia, which has provided Venezuela’s capital of Caracas with
up to $10 billion in financial assistance geared towards the oil industry.49 Not
only do such investments give Russia influential power over the Venezuelan
oil industry, but they also disrupt American pursuits of regime change, as the
only source of funding Maduro receives is through Venezuela’s oil industry,
which has survived only due to outside investments.50 Therefore, not only
is Russia gaining power in a zero-sum game, but it is also preventing the
United States from securing its desired outcome of a President who would
promote favorable business conditions in Venezuela. Additionally, China
has played a major role in supporting Maduro, issuing $23 billion in loans to
Venezuela in a matter of years.51 China has organized many of these loans to
be paid back in the form of crude oil barrels, securing a steady source of oil
for the future.52 Venezuela seems to be turning towards the world’s Eastern
sphere of influence -- dominated by Russia and China -- for help, leaving
behind a long tradition of doing business with the United States. This has
47 Scott Wilson, “Chavez Raises Idea of U.S. Role in Coup,” The Washington Post
(May 5, 2002).
48 Op. cit., fn. 34.
49 Clifford Krauss, “Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool,” The
New York Times (October 29, 2017).
50 Op. cit., fn. 34.
51 Reuters Staff, “China says Venezuela can ‘appropriately’ handle debt load,” Reuters
(November 15, 2017).
52 Ibid.
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threatened the United States’ influence of power in the Western hemisphere
and has prompted the United States to continue pursuing regime change in
Venezuela.
To this end, the United States has continued its funding of the NED,
streaming money into Venezuela. Since Maduro was elected, the NED
has spent several million dollars per year undermining his presidency.53
It continues to pursue regime change by attempting to agitate a populist
civilian base and make it politically active against Maduro. Additionally,
after rising political tensions, the United States has recognized Venezuela’s
opposition leader, Juan Guaido, as the countries legitimate Interim President,
despite his failure to receive support from military leaders.54 The NED has
also funded the creation of political youth programs, media campaigns,
and has even directly funded existing political parties and the creation of
new ones.55 Furthermore, the United States government has gone public
in its denouncements of Maduro. In March of 2015, in a clear targeting
of the Maduro regime, President Obama signed Executive Order 13692.56
This executive order targeted specific individuals in office who had been
found to be in “violation of democratic principles” and had their U.S. assets
blocked, were prohibited from entering the U.S, and were no longer able to
do business with Americans.57 While this executive order did not directly
impose sanctions on Venezuela, it laid out the framework for one of the
few policy’s Obama and his successor would agree on. In August of 2017,
in response to the worsening political crisis in Venezuela, President Trump
passed Executive Order 13808, a sterner version of Obama’s 2014 order.58
Executive Order 13808 prohibited the import of Venezuelan oil and
prohibited American banks from creating any financial deals with PDVSA.59
53 Eva Golinger, “The Dirty Hand of the National Endowment for Democracy in
Venezuela,” Counterpunch.org (April 25, 2014).
54 “Recognition of Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s Interim President by Several European
Countries,” U.S. Department of State, February 4, 2019
55 “Venezuela 2017,” National Endowment for Democracy (accessed March 23,
2018).
56 Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13692 - Blocking Property and Suspending Entry
of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” Obama White House
archives (March 8, 2015).
57 Ibid.
58 Donald Trump, “Executive Order 13808 - Imposing Additional Sanctions with
Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” Treasury Department (August 29, 2017).
59 Ibid.
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The purpose of this order was to cut financial support for the Maduro regime
which was dependent on the funds it received from the export of its oil. The
passing of this order triggered many laws to be proposed in Congress, also
targeting Maduro. These laws called for the release of political prisoners,
the authorization of humanitarian aid, for Venezuela to hold open elections,
and for an increased amount of congressional appropriations to be set aside
for Venezuela.60 These pursuits are meant to increase pressure on Maduro
in a way that attracts global attention, in hopes of evoking a response from
this populist base. Through both sanctions and funding, the United States
has succeeded in this effort, contributing to an intensifying political conflict
which has been called a civil war by Maduro.61 While the United States
argues that it wants to create democracy in Venezuela through these efforts,
it is undeniable that this has only complicated political development in
Venezuela and has created dishonest outcomes from illegitimate democratic
processes.

Implications of Research Findings
To understand the conclusions that can be drawn from these research
findings, one must analyze the United States’ actions through the lens of
political realism. Historically, the United States has relied on Venezuela
as a steady, reliable supplier of oil. Oil is the lifeline of civilization in the
21st century and is a necessary resource for society to function. When
populist Venezuelan movements began to push for the nationalization of this
resource and for its control to be replaced back into the hands of Venezuela,
the United States saw a threat to a source of oil it had held for a century.
While the United States argues that the efforts it pursues in Venezuela are to
support a developing democracy, it is hard to believe that the U.S would be
so involved with Venezuela’s politics if it was not so rich in oil. Furthermore,
the pursuits of its efforts since 2000, have brought little to Venezuela but a
continual intensification of political disruption. It has fueled protests and
uprisings saying it supports the people but then has acted against them,
creating sanctions that have harmed Venezuela’s economy and forced people
to migrate into neighboring countries.
Furthermore, by pursuing regime change, the United States has only
weakened itself and given an advantage to its global competitors. Venezuelan
60 Clare Seelke and Rebecca Nelson, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations,”
Congressional Research Service (March 9, 2018).
61 “Venezuela crisis: Maduro warns of civil war,” BBC News (February 4, 2019).
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elites have been aware of the outcome the United States seeks to pursue in
Venezuela and has been pushed to create friendships with different countries.
The United States believed that by creating a sanction on Venezuelan oil, it
would ruin Venezuela’s economy and force it into aligning its interests with
the U.S. Instead, this has only pushed Venezuela to look towards China and
Russia as new sources for its economic dependencies. China and Russia have
happily complied investing billions in the country and making a new ally in
the western hemisphere. Thus, the United States’ attempt at regime change
to create favorable politics in Venezuela has backfired, creating a Venezuelan
government that looks to the U.S’s enemies for support. Not only have U.S.
pursuits of regime change In Venezuela contributed to a humanitarian crisis,
but they have also weakened the United States against its global competitors.
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What Does Special Forces Usage Demonstrate About
US Foreign Policy Goals?
Jack Hopkins
Abstract
This research paper focuses on the interrelatedness between the
deployment of US Special Forces, in both combat and supporting
capabilities, and the accomplishment of US foreign policy goals around the
world. Using a qualitative methodology, this paper uses primary sources such
as reports from Special Operations Forces commanders, CRS reports, and
other forms of Congressional documentation to investigate the relationship.
This paper will use three case studies to illustrate specific foreign policy
goals: firstly, counter-narcotics operations in Columbia; secondly, counterterror operations throughout the Middle East; and finally, counter-terror
operations throughout the African continent. The implications of this paper
indicate that the deployment of Special Operations Forces seeks to achieve
specific goals of limiting the production of narcotics, acts of terror, threats
to natural resources, threats to weak governments, and the development of
advanced foreign special forces groups to act without direct US involvement.

Introduction
Under recent Presidential Administrations, American Special Forces
have been deployed in a variety of functions both close to home and across
the globe, with the number of Special Forces deployments increasing greatly
under both the Obama and Trump administrations. Author Nick Turse argues
that ultimately, Special Forces are in a uniquely dangerous position as the
go-to forces for important and typically dangerous operations, and they
often perform with minimal support1. In his article, Turse contends that the
increase in their usage has placed them in further danger, as the overuse of
1 Nick Turse, “American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to 70 Percent of the
World’s Countries,” The Nation (June 26, 2017).
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Special Forces groups (SFGs) has contributed to an increase in extremism
in states where extended cooperation has occurred. Turse cited the nearly
fifteen percent rise in regions in Afghanistan that fall under the category
of “insurgent-controlled” between 2015 and 2017 that occurred in spite of
increased Special Operations Forces usage in the region.
Throughout history, military operations were conducted on a grand
scale. For hundreds of years war has meant ranks of soldiers fighting on vast
battlefields. After the horror of the trenches in the First World War, there was
little desire to return to traditional head-to-head methods of war, resulting in
the increasing use of non-conventional soldiers2. By World War II, this meant
an increasing reliance on airborne troops. During the Vietnam War, the US
deployed Green Berets to train the Royal Lao Army to combat Communist
guerrillas. During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Delta Force attempted
to rescue US embassy personnel trapped in Tehran. Subsequently, the 5th
and 7th SFGs were deployed in both Gulf Wars to combat Iraqi forces. The
ramping up of Special Operations Forces deployments has become standard
following the 9/11 terror attacks, after which there was an even greater
perceived need for soldiers that would not be restricted by the same protocols
that conventional forces must adhere to. During the Obama administration,
the number of foreign states Special Operations Forces operate in increased
from sixty (during the previous Bush administration) to 120. Similarly,
the US Special Operations Command has experienced a steady increase in
funding, rising from $3.1B in Fiscal Year 2001 to $9.8B in Fiscal Year 2014
and continuing to increase in subsequent years.3 This trend of heightened
reliance on these unconventional forces has become increasingly clear
throughout their history, and extensive development has transformed these
units into one of the world’s most effective fighting forces. This trend also
illustrates how the US has begun to work more secretively and selectively
to combat threats, leading to the following research question: How does the
strategic deployment of US Army Special Forces reveal US foreign policy
goals?
In order to ascertain the relationship between the deployment of SFGs
and US foreign policy, I will use a qualitative methodology that will rely
2 United States Army Special Operations Command, “Special Forces History,” US
Army (2018).
3 General Accountability Office, “Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to
Improve Transparency of Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments,”
GAO (July, 2015).
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on three different case studies: the first being counter-narcotic operations in
Colombia, the second being counter-terror operations in the Middle East, and
the third being counter-terror operations in Africa. This paper relies heavily
on government documents published by Congress and the US military,
as well as civilian journalism on the subject of US deployment of Special
Forces. Given the secretive nature of the Special Forces, there are a limited
number of publicly available sources, an issue that has made the verification
of secondary source information difficult.
The English School of International Relations as explained by Hedley
Bull is a uniquely accurate lens through which to view this research
question. This paradigm addresses how states cooperate to undertake issues
in their own best interest on the international stage. The core assumptions
of this theory are that the anarchical nature of the “society of states” has
led to international cooperation based on shared norms and goals between
states, that include: security, diplomacy, free trade, and many others.
States operate in this society of states through cooperation, a premise
arising from the theory’s roots in Liberalism, while also using a Realist
perspective to see the world as anarchical with states having vested interests
in every interaction. The focus on states cooperating due to shared norms is
particularly appropriate for this research question, as US Special Operations
Forces typically work in conjunction with foreign forces to achieve shared
goals. This collaboration is due to the continued diplomacy between
state governments that allow for the building of working relationships,
although each state ultimately works to pursue its own self-interest. In
the International School, the need to pursue a state’s own best interest is
a core assumption, arguing that this is best achieved through working as
a community. In the world of military operations, no one state is able to
address all threats to its stability all the time. In a globalized society threats
can come from far beyond a state’s borders. When these two perspectives
meet, it becomes clear why US Special Forces are deployed aggressively to
build the military relationships and capabilities of other states. Several of
these more recent deployments have been investigated in the following case
studies.

Case Studies
Operations in Colombia:
A key example of the American attempts to address threats to the
US from within the western hemisphere is US action in Colombia. Plan
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Colombia was a program proposed in 1998 under the Clinton administration
in cooperation with the Colombian Uribe administration, which proposed
to send $280M in assistance to Colombia.4 The program ultimately lasted
beyond its six-year outline, maintained through a series of extension deals for
US bases and personnel, later being replaced by the Obama administration
with the Peace Colombia initiative in 2015. Plan Colombia sought to increase
stability within Colombia by addressing the issues of long-term violence due
to conflict and organized crime, as well as strengthen the Colombian state
into an economic partner in the region. Plan Colombia had three distinct
phases as outlined by General Charles E. Wilhelm in his 2000 testimony
before the House Armed Forces Committee. The plan consisted of: 1)
Assisting the Colombians and other “Partner Nations” in building counternarcotic capabilities (Organizing, training, and equipping foreign forces), 2)
Large scale “operations to neutralize organizations involved in the illicit drug
trade” within drug producing regions in Andean Colombia, 3) Continuing
training to maintain the readiness of Partner Nation counter-narcotic forces.5
These goals are a direct outline of the US strategy to improve Colombian
military capabilities and have been used as the blueprints for other capability
development attempts around the world.
The plan sought to increase trust in the capabilities of state forces
following the terror caused by guerilla forces and organized crime that
had overwhelmed Colombian troops for decades. According to a House of
Representatives report, by the end of the year 2000 there was a proposed
$185.8M in total assistance for Plan Colombia.6 This funding included
millions for economic and social programs, in addition to $21.2Mfor training
the Colombian military and national police to combat drug trafficking
operations. Most interesting is the request for $80M that was only described
as being for “Classified Programs”. A broad category of actions that could
include surgical strikes or programs building cooperation with differing
factions within Colombia. Within Colombia, the US uses Special Forces to
4 William J. Clinton, “Joint Communique with President Andres Pastrana of
Colombia,” (Speech, White House, Washington, DC, October 28, 1998).
5 General Charles E. Wilhelm, “Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm,
United States Marine Corps Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command,”
Federation of American Scientists (March 3, 2000).
6 US Congress. House of Representatives. 2010. Making Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for The Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2000, And for Other
Purposes. 111th Congress (August 10).
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train a specialized counter-narcotics battalion, costing the US $3.9M in 2000;
the battalion intends to “conduct ground and airmobile CD operations in
coordination with the Colombian National Police.7 The program later grew
into the Counter Narcotics Brigade that would house three battalions of 980
men each, all trained by USSF to combat narco-trafficking. Between 2000 to
2013 there have been solid gains in combating narco-trafficking: the size of
the drug economy in Colombia shrunk from $7.5B in 2008 to $4.5B in 2013
and production of Coca dropped from roughly 160,000 hectares in 2000 to
nearly 50,000 hectares in 2013.8 With this being said, despite these efforts,
there were rises in the production of cocaine in 2007, and there has been
minimal influence on the street pricing of narcotics produced in the region
such as cocaine and heroin. Similarly the quality of these narcotics has not
decreased.
The American operations training the Colombian National Police
and National Army were led by the Army’s 7th SFG, also known by
their colloquial name the “Green Berets”. Their initial deployment was
intended to train Colombian forces in its northern region to protect the
nation’s oil-pipelines from leftist guerilla attacks, as the northern region
is not responsible for any significant cocaine cultivation or manufacturing
this demonstrates a secondary counterterror focus.9 The 7th group was
also responsible for the creation of numerous counterterror groups in the
Colombian military including the Commando Brigade, Rapid Deployment
Force, the Aviation Brigade, and the Urban Counter-Terror Special Force
Group.10 Due to the Tyler Amendment, there are caps on the number of US
military personnel that can be deployed in Colombia at 500, making the
achievements of these small teams all the more impressive.11 The goal of
combating terror tied into the Uribe Administration’s Plan Patriota initiative,
which sought to eliminate the presence of leftist groups in Colombia through
military force with United States support.12 Through the use of counterterror
7 op. cit., fn 5.
8 Daniel Mejía, “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs,” Brookings
Institute (2016).
9 Jeremy McDermott, “Green Berets move into Colombia’s oil fields,” The Telegraph (October 12, 2000).
10 Austin Long, “Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and
Beyond,” Rand Corporation (2015).
11 Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and
Assistance (FY200-2001),” CRS (July 5, 2001).
12 Kathleen T. Rhem, “U.S. Helping Colombian Military Cope with Drug War’s
Legacy,” American Forces Press Service (November 29, 2005).
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units, the Colombian military has waged a brutal campaign against guerilla
forces such as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and
National Liberation Army (ELN), forcing the FARC into peace talks after
decades of conflict. The long-term goal of Plan Colombia was to create
an effective and self-sufficient Colombian military, a goal that has clearly
been achieved as the Colombian Special Forces are viewed as the dominant
Special Forces group in the region, even becoming the go-to trainer for other
Central American Special Forces.
Colombia demonstrates how the US uses its Special Forces to build the
capabilities of regional allies to achieve several goals. Firstly, the US military
combating of narcotics trafficking out of Colombia through the creation of
highly effective domestic police and military personnel. For the US, this goal
made up the core reasoning for the creation of the Plan Colombia initiative,
and has been an overwhelming success in terms of aiding Colombia in the
War on Drugs. However, the loss in Colombian drug production has been
compensated for with increased production in regions of Mexico, ultimately
extending the need for US cooperation with other states to combat the
drug trade. Secondly, US forces combating the spread of Communism by
groups such as the FARC and the ELN. This goal has been at the core of US
foreign policy following the end of the Second World War and the start of
the Cold War. It was during the Cold War that the US funded paramilitary
organizations within Colombia to combat leftist guerillas, a decision that
created further instability in the country and increased drug exports. In the
enhancing of state capabilities, the US has been able to combat perceived
threats to the stability of the capitalist system, all the while improving De
Facto control for the Colombian government. Lastly, the creation of highly
effective Special Forces groups in the region will create greater stability
as states are better equipped to combat non-traditional threats such as
extremist or criminal organizations. Given the long history of conflict within
Colombia, the building of strong state capabilities alleviates the need for
extended US support for programs, while also creating a force that will better
be able to combat regional threats to stability.

Operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula:
As the war on terrorism has evolved, there has been a broadening of
the scope of actions taken by Special Forces to combat the organizations
involved in perpetrating acts of violence. This ever expanding mission has
led to Special Forces units being deployed from the Philippines to Africa for
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the sole purpose of combating the presence of extremist organizations. In
Africa, these operations have been carefully coordinated with local ground
forces. Meanwhile, US SFGs in the region work to improve the capabilities
of local ground forces in combating terrorism and rebel groups that operate
on the continent. Africa is a hotbed for anti-governmental conflict with many
states facing some form of opposition from within their borders. For the US,
the goal of combating the influence of regional terror groups aligns with
partner nation’s interests in maintaining regional stability. This cooperation
exemplifies the ideals of the English school, as both nations experience direct
benefits for their own interests through military cooperation.
The largest US Special Forces presence in the region is centered in
Djibouti, using the existing Camp Lemonnier base as an organizing platform
for the operations conducted throughout northeastern Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula.13 Currently there are roughly 1,500 Special Operations Forces
deployed to the continent. These Soldiers conduct training exercises with
partner nations as well as so called “kinetically-centered counter terror
operations” that fit the typical capture or kill specialty of Special Forces.14
15
This specialty has been particularly useful in combating the spread of
groups such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, with Special Operations Forces targeting the leadership of these
groups. The lingering presence of Special Forces in Africa began due the
Obama administration, and later the Trump administration, adopting a more
aggressive strategy to combat Islamic terror in the region. Former national
security advisor John Bolton, an extreme Realist, has voiced his support
for increasing US operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in order
to protect US regional interests from the potential damage that regional
instability can bring.16 According to a Senate Armed Services Committee
statement, “Our vital national security interest in Africa is protecting the lives
and interests of the American people by reducing threats to the homeland and
abroad,” illustrating the one sidedness of US support in Africa.17
13 Kathryn Watson, “Where does the US have troops in Africa, and why?,” CBS
(October 23, 2017).
14 Nick Turse, “Commandos Without Borders,” LobeLog (December 22, 2016).
15 General Joseph L. Votel, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,”
House Armed Services Committee (March 1, 2016).
16 Salem Solomon, “What Does John Bolton’s Security Adviser Role Mean for
Africa,” Voice of America (March 26, 2016).
17 General Carter F. Ham, “Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee,” Senate
Armed Services Committee (April 7, 2011).
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The one sidedness of US efforts in the region represents the reality of
the continually shifting nature of power in the region, where the US has
worked hard to increase the military capabilities of partner nations to act
without further American assistance. While cases on continental Africa are
currently secret, the very public case of Yemen has allowed for an insight
into US actions in the region. In Yemen, the US has deployed Special Forces
to aid the ousted government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi in
its sustained conflict with Shiite Houthi minority rebels. Blurring the lines
between genuine concern over the situation in Yemen and American regional
interests is the ongoing presence of the Saudi Arabian troops in Yemen.18
Saudi Arabia, a key US ally in the Middle East, views the Shiite Houthi
rebels as a threat to its influence in the Arabian Peninsula as the leading
Sunni power in the region. Adding fuel to this concern is the fact that the
Houthi rebels are backed by Iran, a regional rival of Saudi Arabia and a
country that is in direct opposition to the US involvement in the Arab world.
Thus shaping the conflict in Yemen into a proxy conflict over who will be the
dominant power in the Islamic Community in the region.19
Greater conflict in the Middle East, fueled by the support of larger
nations, has begun to take a toll on the region. Between 2006 and 2014, the
presence of US SFGs in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula increased 900%,
and with this increased military presence came a spike in the number of
terror attacks per year in addition to the number of militant groups active
on the African continent.20 As mentioned at the beginning of this paper,
the presence of US Special Operations Forces around the world has been
increasing, but so too have the number of attacks on Special Operations
Forces. These attacks are most commonly acknowledged when occurring
in the Middle East, where the US has maintained an on and off presence for
nearly twenty years.

Operations in the Middle East:
Combat operations by SFGs in the Middle East have been a standard
procedure following the 9/11 attacks, although the groups had previously
18 Saeed Al-Batati and Eric Schmitt, “Thousands of Yemeni Forces Target Qaeda
Stronghold,” New York Times (August 6, 2016).
19 Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Eric Schmitt, “Army Special Forces
Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels,” New York Times (May 6,
2018).
20 op. cit., fn. 13
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been active in the region carrying out humanitarian missions. The war on
terrorism required extensive and continuing operations by SFGs in Iraq and
Afghanistan to achieve the US campaign’s goal of combating the influence
of terror groups. These operations took on many different forms, focusing
largely on collaboration between US forces and existing regional forces,
although some took on more direct combat roles.
In the case of Afghanistan, the Army’s 5th SFG received orders
to deploy to the region within two days of the 9/11 attacks. This quick
response illustrated the US eagerness to take action in reprisal following the
devastating attack.21 22 According to a report written by Major Isaac J. Peltier
analyzing the usage of SFGs in Iraq and Afghanistan, “5th SFG immediately
began preparations for deployment and on 10 October 2001, less than a
month after 9/11, the 5th SFG main body arrived at Karshi Kanabad (K2),
an old Soviet airbase in Uzbekistan”.23 The 5th group was deployed to help
coordinate and organize counter-Taliban operations with regional militias,
as well as the numerous American and allied forces. The regional forces
were comprised of several different tribes made up of ethnic minorities
such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, each had large established militias
with forces numbering in the several thousands. Following the insertion of
Special Forces teams, the regional commanders asked their new allies to
conduct air strikes, a tactic that would become a hallmark of SFG operations
in the region and became infamous for the number of civilian deaths that
they brought. These air strikes, carried out by American forces, took many
forms. The usage of AC-130 planes allowed for more targeted strikes using
.50 caliber guns on board to attack Taliban positions, whereas the usage
of BLU-28 Daisy Cutter bombs were used to inflict massive damage to
Taliban forces.24 In the wake of these attacks, the new regional allies were far
more willing to work with the small number of American forces to combat
the Taliban’s hold over the Northern region of Afghanistan, choosing to
target the city of Mazar-e Sharif which served as a Taliban stronghold. By
November 2001 the newly allied militias began their assault on the city,
21 MAJ Isaac J. Peltier, “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces,”
School of Advanced Military Studies (May 26, 2005).
22 Deirdre Tynan, “US Special Forces Shop Outside Afghanistan,” Center for Security
Studies (2018).
23 op. cit., fn. 21.
24 “Task Force Dagger – Operation Enduring Freedom,” American Special OPS
(2018).
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fighting from the South into the city under the cover of airstrikes targeted
by US forces, driving Taliban forces out of the city on November 10th just
five days later. This initial victory illustrated the benefit of unconventional
warfare in combating forces in areas where a larger conventional ground
force would be unable to operate due to a lack of facilities. In Iraq, the main
issue with using conventional forces was the lack of airstrips for the landing
of troop carrying planes as conventional forces are not intended to maintain
extended operations by aerial insertion.
The lessons gleaned from Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan were
applied to Task Force Viking, an effort by the 10th SFG to aid conventional
ground forces in combating the Iraqi Army immediately after the invasion in
March of 2003. Task Force Viking operated largely in the northern Kurdish
region of the Iraqi state, working with Peshmerga militias to force the Iraqi
army out of the Kurdish region and alleviating pressure on conventional
forces to the South. The Kurdish forces were a uniquely helpful partner, as
opposed to tribal forces in Afghanistan where the loyalty of militia leaders
required millions of dollars to be achieved. The previous humanitarian
operations by the 10th group in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s attacks
on Kurds built a rapport between US forces and Kurdish leaders. These
operations, named Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, were said to have
saved roughly 500,000 Kurds from death by providing humanitarian aid and
protection.25 The strong bond between these forces allowed for the 10th group
to make use of the nearly 70,000 Peshmerga soldiers active in the region to
achieve its goal of combating Iraqi forces, ultimately only 7,000 Peshmerga
forces came to be the main assault force working with the 10th group.
Following successes in pushing back Iraqi forces the assault force retook the
city of Kirkuk, a major city in the Kurdish regions and a key portion of the
Iraqi oil production network. Due to suspicions on the part of neighboring
Turkey surrounding the possible creation of a Kurdish state, whose historical
borders cross into current Turkish territory, the Kurdish forces were initially
unable to maintain a lasting presence in the city. During its short operational
period, Task Force Viking was responsible for retaking Kirkuk and Mosul,
dealing a major blow to the Iraqi government’s hold in the region.
As the war on terrorism has continued, US Special Forces have been
responsible for numerous operations in a variety of countries throughout the
25 US Army, “10th SFG History,” United States Army Special Operations Command
(2018).
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Middle East. Following the initial deployments of Special Forces to topple
the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Forces have conducted
operations to combat the presence of violent extremist organizations in
the region. Currently there are efforts in Syria by the Army’s 75th Ranger
regiment to sustain the gains made by government opposition groups, the
Rangers being the Army’s premier quick combat force specializing in rapid
operations in difficult terrain.26 There are likely many more operations
currently occurring in the Middle East outside of the public purview. Due to
their uniquely specialized nature, SFGs conduct operations in the shadows
so as to not compromise their tactics or Soldiers which make these groups
so effective. The recent publicity of Special Forces, after the 2012 raid that
resulted in the death of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has increased
the opinion that unilateral action by these forces is the most concise method
to addressing American counterterror objectives. The history of the Special
Forces in the Middle East exemplifies the benefits that can be achieved
through continued cooperation between these Soldiers and local forces,
rather than more popular unilateral strikes. Between 2002 and 2013 the US
granted $62.8B in aid for security to the Afghan government, not including
the millions provided by the CIA and other US branches have given to nongovernment forces.27 In return for their large investments in the region, the
US has managed to limit the influence of violent extremist organizations,
although this has not improved the overall stability in the region. Ultimately
the US goal of retaliating against the influence of Al-Qaeda and protecting
the oil infrastructure of Middle Eastern states drove the US military policy
in the region. During its time in the Middle East, there has been a record
of a lack of shared interests between the US and its allies in the region,
illustrating the realist perspective present in the International School as all
parties in the region collaborated to achieve their own goals.

Conclusion
The recent deployment of Special Forces has highlighted US foreign
policy goals throughout the world, focusing on protecting American security
and resource interests abroad.
Combating the distribution of drugs is not a strategy intended to aid
26 Adam Linehan, “US Army Rangers are operating on the ground inside Syria,”
Business Insider (March 8, 2017).
27 Charles Michael Johnson Jr., “Afghanistan: Oversight and Accountability of US
Assistance,” US General Accountability Office (June 10, 2014).
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states that have been ravaged by the presence of drug organizations, but
instead the US seeks to prevent the flow of drugs into its own markets and to
eliminate possible sources of funding for groups it actively views as threats.
In resource rich areas, the protection of key infrastructure and support for
government capabilities is aimed at the protection of US resource suppliers-particularly true for oil. This is exemplified by the US involvement in Yemen,
where Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter, has managed to use its considerable
influence over US foreign policy to direct the flow of troops into a conflict
that it otherwise would have been unlikely to engage in. Finally, the US goal
of maintaining regional stability is achieved through establishing greater
capabilities for foreign governments in regions currently experiencing, or on
the verge of experiencing, internal conflict. By hedging its bets the US is able
to pick and choose which governments it feels should continue to remain in
power, as is the case in Syria where US forces have trained and armed antigovernment forces in the hopes of overthrowing the Assad government.
It should be noted that the findings in this paper are incomplete due to
the highly secretive nature of special operations and the need to maintain
informational security regarding sensitive subjects. With greater access to
classified military documents, there would be a greater amount of evidence
to these findings. It will likely be several decades before documentation
surrounding the full usage of Special Forces in the past two decades will
come to light, and until then continued vigilance regarding the impacts of
greater usage of Special Forces will be required.
The case of Colombia illustrated the US interests in narcotics and in
protecting the foothold of Capitalism around the globe. For this particular
goal, the deployment of SFGs has been greatly successful given the small
amount of resources required on the part of the US to work with the
Colombian military. In the Middle East and Africa, US forces have been
extremely successful in regime change and the dismantling of terrorist
networks. While these overt goals have been achieved with a degree of
success, the far more subtle goal of securing resources for the US has been
a landslide victory. The protection of key infrastructure has ensured that
the US will not face market pressures and is able to sit on its vast domestic
emergency supply for far longer. Where there has been success there is also
failure. The goal of dismantling drug organizations and terrorist groups has
been successful, but with organizations such as these there is always another
group seeking to take over where another has failed. Similar to a hydra,
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each group that is eliminated spurs the growth of another cartel sleeking to
reclaim markets or another terror group with similar aims. In this sense, the
US’s frequent deployment of SFGs has made maintaining the successes of
these security goals into a greater challenge, with goal posts that continue
to move every time an inch of ground is covered. For the US to maintain its
accomplishments there is a need for a more Liberal approach of international
cooperation to address the root causes of the issues, rather than a Realist
attempt to quash the threats at hand.
The individuals that make up these SFGs experience great stress from
numerous deployments and dangerous situations, but are also extremely
effective at working collaboratively with foreign forces. The continuing
advantages of greater collaboration leads me to believe the US must
pursue greater educational roles instead of combat roles for its Special
Forces. Previously exhibited through the support based approach used in
Colombia, which built greater military capabilities for allies, that allows
for the accomplishment of foreign policy goals with minimal deployments
of US forces. An example of this perspective is the continued training
efforts between the US and India, who already possesses some of the best
trained SFGs, in order to allow India greater capabilities to curb the antiAmerican regime in Pakistan. These forces are trained in unconventional
warfare and maintain skills far above the typical soldier, and as such they
should be viewed as the force of last resort for the US, only necessary when
conventional forces or partner nations are unable to take action.
It should also be noted, there will likely be a shift in the deployment
of SFGs away from oil rich states if the 2014 British Petroleum report
prediction that the world has only fifty-three years of oil reserves remaining
proves true.28 Current deployments are heavily concentrated in oil rich
regions, and typically surround oil production infrastructure, as the US
sees protecting friendly oil production capabilities as a part of national
security interests in spite of recent claims that the US will be more selfsufficient in terms of oil production. In an age focused on the production of
highly efficient renewable power sources, SFGs will likely be redeployed
to ensure a steady supply of Lithium and Cobalt, two key materials for the
construction of rechargeable Lithium-ion batteries. Cobalt poses far more of
an opportunity for US involvement; top producers Zimbabwe, a relatively
safe state with few threats to its sovereignty, and the Democratic Republic of
28 Nasdaq, “How Much Oil is Left in the Earth,” Nasdaq (December 27, 2017).
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Congo, a state suffering from internal conflict that the government appears
unable to quash, could benefit greatly from cooperation with the advanced
resources provided by US SFGs.29 This will likely lead to a greater number of
deployments, particularly to the DRC, in order to ensure that cobalt mining
infrastructure remains secured for US interests.
The deployment of SFGs also have been used, and will continue to be
used, to combat threats to the future of capitalism. The United States, being
the architect of the Liberal World Order, is in a unique position to ensure
its long term viability. As a result, SFGs have been deployed to combat
zones to aid forces that see the potential existence of capitalism as a boon
to the local populations. This was made clear by the deployments to fight
Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq, as well as training the Colombian military
to combat leftist guerrillas. The Baathist political platform is based on a
socialist ideology, although the regimes who implement it tend to use this
ideology to use the government to prop up friends and powerful industries.
In Colombia, a history of conflict between the Capitalist government and
a variety of both socialist and communist guerrilla groups has lasted for
nearly sixty years. While it would be easy to say Special Forces are deployed
to help promote Democracy and American values in these cases, the only
concrete goal that I have been able to perceive is the expansion of Capitalism
into regions where it was perceived to be under threat. As a result of this
trend it is clear that should forces friendly to Capitalism arise in Socialist
states, particularly resource rich Socialist states, the US will lend the support
of SFGs to better ensure their success.
In summary, American Special Forces have become known as one of
the greatest tools in the American Army’s command. These forces receive
highly extensive training in combat, survival, language, and more by the US
and through training with other highly specialized foreign special forces.
As a result, they are uniquely capable of conducting operations effectively
with minimal troop numbers, making them a highly cost effective force for
the US. These troops will continue to carry this high reputation, but they
should continue to be viewed as the highly specialized resource they are, not
as a force that can be deployed for any mission that is perceived as difficult
for standard forces. With advances in AI weapon systems that can operate
in the dangerous conditions previously reserved for Special Forces, SFGs
should be viewed first and foremost as a human asset. They are especially
29 “Cobalt,” Royal Society of Chemistry (2019).
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well qualified for collaboration with local forces, acting as a force multiplier
in combat operations and as a valuable source of combat knowledge.
While it may be popular to use these forces more frequently, making them
a conventional force will set a dangerous precedent for the overuse of
specialized forces for non-specialized tasks.
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Anthony Branch graduated from Cal Poly in 2016 with a degree
in Political Science and Global Politics. Currently, Anthony works for a
company called WeWork as a Lead Intelligence & Risk Mitigation Analyst.
As an Intelligence Lead, he is tasked with maintaining global situational
awareness of potential and developing risks capable of impacting the
personnel and assets of WeWork. The Intelligence Lead position develops
and leads the intelligence component within the WeWork Security Team
to provide accurate, relevant, insightful and timely threat analysis and risk
assessments in support of executive protection, business operations and
enterprise risk. Anthony has been specifically assigned to the Asia-Pacific
account, covering the interests and investments within that region.
Anthony transferred to Cal Poly from Santa Barba City College for
political science in 2014. Anthony initially had planned on going to law
school after earning his undergraduate degree, since he had worked at
the public defender’s office for some time and it seemed appealing to his
interests. At the end of his career at Cal Poly, Anthony was at a crossroads of
whether he should pursue law school or pursue international relations. After
graduation Anthony took a year and a half off to do some soul searching,
upon which he concluded that he would regret not pursing international
relations more than he would regret not being an attorney. After this decision,
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Anthony attended NYU, where he studied and completed his master’s degree
in International Relations, with a focus on National Security.
He credits a mentorship he established with a faculty member at Cal
Poly as helpful in guiding his interests towards the right career path. Anthony
found professors to be a very valuable resource as they are more open to
interacting with students due to the smaller class sizes and Cal Poly being
more of a teaching, rather than research, institution. So far, Anthony is most
proud of the international research he conducted and published during the
summer of 2018 in Armenia as an International Fellow at CRRC.
Anthony’s initial thoughts when considering his career path mainly
pointed towards staying in academia, since developed a passion for
researching. But nowadays, he finds himself more interested in making
a direct impact, rather than writing and reading on subjects whose only
audience is others in the same field as him. Anthony has had a lot of different
and “weird” jobs throughout his career so far. The most notable two are
working at the public defender’s office, where he did investigations and
clerical duties like writing motions. The other one was working at a company
called Global Power Supply as a project manager, where he learned valuable
skills on how to effectively lead a team.
At the moment, Anthony is also acting as a space policy counselor
for the Space Games Federation. It is helpful to think of the Space Games
Federation as being similar to FIFA or the Olympic committee, but instead
an international governing body for zero or micro gravity sports. The idea
is that it’s not happening tomorrow, but in the next ten years there should
be something constructively developed. Anthony’s role as a space policy
counselor focuses mainly on analyzing and assessing policy proposals to see
how they would affect and interact with the international sports governing
body as a whole.
There are three things Anthony learned during his time as a Cal Poly
political science undergraduate that he claims have helped him get to where
he is today:
1) Learning how to think, write, and read analytically at a higher level. It
sounds simple, but those skills have been very useful in his career so far.
2) Learning research methods. At Cal Poly he took courses in research
methods, which have been very helpful and applicable in his research
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ambitions abroad at the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in
Armenia and at NYU.
3) The quantitative skills that are taught in the Cal Poly Political science
curriculum. Anthony believes that experience with SPSS or excel can be very
useful in certain jobs and gives you a leg up over competitors.
Anthony’s advice to current Cal Poly political science students:
Due to the nature of industry these days it’s a bit more difficult to find
a job with solely a bachelor’s degree. Anthony suggests grad school as a
very good opportunity and advises using and optimizing all the resources
available to you. Anthony’s suggestion to Cal Poly political science students
is to make sure to lock down at least two faculty members that can serve as
a reference and/or write you a letter of recommendation. Most importantly,
it will be more helpful and effective for employers to discuss with faculty
members that are familiar with your work and interests. For current students,
Anthony advises that it is very good to find a mentor, since it is very
beneficial for you to develop a professional relationship with somebody who
has many years of experience. They can give you a better outlook on where
your career trajectory can go due to the wealth of knowledge and experience
that their background carries.
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New Colonialism in Developmental Aid
Emily Meyer

Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests United States’ economic foreign aid
is wasted and should be cut. In challenging this conventional wisdom, I
argue that though there is potential for good through foreign aid, bilateral
aid programs like that of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation resemble
neo-colonialism. This paper examines international aid’s effects on
establishing debt traps, promoting exploitation, and reinforcing hierarchy.
Through analysis of primary and secondary evidence, including but not
limited to UNCTAD and WWF-SIGHT reports, I look at how the effects
of international aid contribute to the sovereignty of the recipient countries.
My findings reveal that though Chinese international aid and investment
has creates several positive short-term changes in African economies,
these advances come with a cost. Due to a lack of regulations on aid-based
development projects, powerful countries are allowed to take advantage of
both the recipients’ natural resources and political sovereignty.

Introduction
In the fall of 2018, discussion began on Africa’s response to China’s
growing economic diplomacy which despite positive perceptions, has
evoked popular support for anti-China rhetoric among African voters. With
upcoming elections in a time when China is the most crucial economic
partner to many African countries, the influence over Africa has become
increasingly concerning. Because extractive sectors are at the core of
African-Chinese economic ties, there are rising concerns about exploitative
practices resulting from foreign involvement. China’s increased engagement
in Africa has been criticized by some Western politicians as a form of new
colonialism, with growing indebtedness to China being the main concern.
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This comparison of international aid to neocolonialism creates a large
concern about the effects on aid-receiving countries’ sovereignty.
Chinese developmental aid to Africa reflects both the historical
trend of powerful nations’ colonialism over developing countries, and the
growing power of non-western nations. This aid comes at a time when
China’s growing political and economic power is posing a threat to western
powers like the United States. African nations have been facing a need
for restructuring debt and sustainable development. Although there is the
widespread concern of aid creating further indebtedness, most African
countries still view Chinese lending as the best option to develop their
economies, rather than inattentive western nations.1 This choice reflects the
growing divide between the United States and China, as has been emphasized
by American political rhetoric. This observation also shows the negative, or
at least complicated effects of increased technology on developing nations.
As we have seen in historical examples, like the United States’ failed aid
to Haiti, which ended up dismantling Haiti’s agricultural sustainability,
development aid has both promising and dangerous possibilities.
For China, the implications of increased economic engagement benefits
both their political and economic positions. However, with increased
economic presence in Africa’s development, China is taking on a greater
level of responsibility for ensuring that the development projects they are
funding are sustainable. If attended to, this could have amazing effects for
African countries’ development. However, a more realistic view would see
that rather than giving out “free money,”2 which is a common view of some
recipient states, China is effectively buying influence, and thus creating
a newer type of colonialism of African states. However, Chinese backed
infrastructure does not guarantee economic growth that would make rising
debt sustainable. This is supported by CARI3 data showing Chinese loans
as the most significant contributor to high debt risks in several African
states.4 The main problem with this type of aid is that because it is a bilateral
aid agreement, it is not distributed with analysis and regulation from other
international actors. This issue reflects heavily on what effects international
1 Joe Bavier, Christian Shepherd, “Despite debt woes, Africa still sees China as best
bet for financing,” Reuters (August 30, 2018).
2 Ibid
3 China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University.
4 Joe Bavier, Christian Shepherd, “Despite debt woes, Africa still sees China as best
bet for financing,” Reuters (August 30, 2018).

121

Emily Meyer

aid, like that we see by China, has on both sustainable development and
independent states’ sovereignty. These concerns lead me to ask the following
research question: How does development aid resemble neo-colonialism on
developing nations’ sovereignty?
My three case studies analyzed how international aid: establishes debt
traps, promotes exploitation of natural resources, and reinforces cultural
hierarchy. In each of these cases, I looked at developing nations’ sovereignty
as the unit of analysis. For this research, I defined sovereignty as a state’s
ability to govern its people, allowing for sustainable development. The
theoretical paradigm I am using that best frames my research is dependency
theory. Dependency theory holds itself as a theory of underdevelopment, in
which throughout the last century, poor countries “exiled to the periphery of
the world economy could not develop as long as they remained enslaved by
the rich nations of the center.”5 I am using this theory to assert that the lack
of regulations that often come with capitalism are a primary factor for the
inequality of economic growth between rich and poor countries. This theory
helps me frame my research by looking at how in cases where international
aid is given, the rich donor countries tend to neglect the responsibilities of
regulating how their aid is distributed. The lack of regulations when aid
is given to less developed governments allows not only for irresponsible
allocation of funds, but also for abuse of the recipient countries’ people.
Donor countries’ lack of responsibility in enforcing regulations directly
affects economic, environmental, and cultural balances in recipient countries.
Without the state capacity to handle unforeseen circumstances resulting
from economic aid, these countries face no other choice but to depend on
constant support from their donor countries, which further inhibits recipient
governments’ autonomy over sustainable development.

Research Findings
Establishing Debt Traps
China has become one of the largest bilateral aid donors in some
countries and regions, due to their unique foreign aid practices which include
debt forgiveness and concessional loans. China often promotes economic
projects in countries, areas, and sectors that developed governments and
MNCs have avoided because they are determined to be unfriendly, too
5 Andres Velasco, “Dependency Theory,” Foreign Policy vol. 133 (November/
December 2002).
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arduous, or infeasible. Chinese economic assistance becomes an attractive
alternative to the IMF and World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative,6 which only applies to eligible debt acquired during a specific
period of time from specific creditors.7 Though concessional debt has been
decreased in more middle-income African states, China still maintains this
practice in more heavily indebted countries.
Due to several external forces, such as the global financial crisis and a
sharp decline in commodity prices, Africa’s external debt stock has grown
rapidly in the last decade. Between 2011 and 2013, external debt-to-GNI
ratios were much higher in Africa than other regions such as East Asia and
Latin America.8 This increase in debt stock has led to riskier practices
by African countries, which include inviting more investor interest into
emerging markets. Although debt relief programs have been somewhat
effective in reducing debt burdens of eligible countries, long-term debt
sustainability remains a great concern for many poor countries. In recent
years, several African states have experienced upward trends in external debt
ratios, with two countries being considered to be in debt distress and seven
classified as high risk.9
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Djibouti have been three of the primary
countries illustrating the dangers of China’s “debt trap diplomacy.”
Infrastructure projects like those of the CPEC’s10 development scheme has
become a point of questioning the Chinese “Silk Road” projects.11 CPEC
projects reflect the growing bilateral relationship between the countries,
highlighted by China’s geopolitical ambition to gain influence through
infrastructure projects promoting connectivity across Pakistan.12 These
projects all fall under the greater scheme of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
6 Launched in 1996 by IMF and World Bank as the first comprehensive approach to
reducing the external debt of the world’s poorest, with debt relief placed within an
overall framework of poverty reduction.
7 Economic Development in Africa: Debt Dynamics and Development Finance in
Africa, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New York and Geneva
(2016).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
11 Drazen Jorgic, “Fearing debt trap, Pakistan rethinks Chinese ‘Silk Road’ projects,”
Reuters (September 29, 2018).
12 Daniel S. Markey, James West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” The New
Geopolitics of China, India, and Pakistan (2016).
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(CBRI) , an ambitious plan to deepen Chinese economic integration and
connectivity across Asia and into Africa and Europe.
The new Pakistani populist government under Prime Minister Imran
Khan has expressed concern about rising debt levels, leading to ideas that
the country must wean itself off of foreign loans. This unease about foreign
aid reflects similar sentiments from incoming governments in Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, and The Maldives about Chinese investment. Despite Pakistani
government desires to review all BRI infrastructure projects, People’s
Republic of China (PRC) officials have only been willing to review projects
that have yet to be put in place.13 Although Pakistani officials have said that
they remain committed to Chinese investment, this commitment is paired
with a need to push or more affordable prices and a further focus on social
development projects. However, it is hard to have Pakistani demands be
taken seriously considering how dependent they are on Chinese loans to prop
up their already vulnerable economy.14
Sri Lanka has been a primary example of debt caused by infrastructure
“untied” loans from China. The projects that loans have gone toward have
racked up more than $8 billion of debt to Chinese-backed banks with interest
rates as high as seven percent. This has led to an inability to pay back.15
Because of this massive debt, nearly all of Sri Lanka’s revenue is now going
toward debt repayment, Sri Lanka to be dependent on China to keep their
economy somewhat afloat. Although their debt has not been as established,
Djibouti has been speculated as an upcoming victim to China’s debt trap
diplomacy. Like Sri Lanka, last year, as part of China’s BRI, Djibouti
borrowed more money than it can pay back for infrastructure projects.
They are currently projected to take on public debt worth around 88% of
the country’s overall GDP, with a large amount owed to China.16 This
vulnerability has only led to more dependency on Chinese intervention, as
American politicians such as Senator James Inhofe have expressed concern,
saying that “China initiated a campaign weaponizing the debt owed to it
by Djibouti, drowning President Guelleh and leaving him and his country

13 Drazen Jorgic, “Fearing debt trap, Pakistan rethinks Chinese ‘Silk Road’ projects,”
Reuters (September 29, 2018).
14 Ibid .
15 Amy Cheng, “Will Djibouti become latest country to fall into China’s debt trap?”
Foreign Policy Editorial Report (2018).
16 Ibid .
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no choice but to transfer national assets -and sovereignty- as repayment.”17
As highlighted by Inhofe, this Chinese takeover of Djibouti’s debt has had
an effect not only on its economy, but on the national sovereignty of the
recipient nation and its ability to develop independently.

Promoting the Exploitation of Natural Resources
This case study analyzes how the environmental damage and
exploitation of workers caused by economic aid resembles neocolonialism
by diminishing a states’ capacity to develop sustainably. Foreign aid in
developing nations, like China’s aid to Africa, is primarily driven by a
need for natural resources as well as the aim to open foreign markets to
Chinese goods and help PRC companies. Despite increased efficiency and
rising domestic production, China’s rapid urbanization and industrialization
continues to increase demand for coal, oil, and other natural resources.18
70% of infrastructure financing takes place in countries with oil fields, but
China places a higher level of investment in mineral markets.19 Although
Africa is the primary recipient of foreign aid being focused on for natural
resource exploitation, China has expanded their reach beyond the eastern
hemisphere.
According to a CRS report, natural resource extraction/production
is the most highly invested type of aid by the PRC, with over $32 million
having been donated to Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia between
2002-2007.20 Over two thirds of China’s investment projects on the western
hemisphere were in natural resource sectors. While the increase in Chinese
demand for natural resources has accelerated growth in some resource-rich
sub-Saharan African countries, the facilitating of exports of raw materials
makes Chinese companies the biggest beneficiary of them all, requiring
that 50% of project materials and services are to be sourced in the PRC.21
In addition, China’s unique way of accepting debt relief in kind creates a
17 Senator James Inhofe (R-Iowa) to National Security Advisor John Bolton,
Washington, D.C. (May 2, 2018).
18 Miria Pigato, Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an
Evolving Global Context,” World Bank (March 2015).
19 Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, Anne Leland,” China’s
foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2009).
20 Ibid .
21 Miria Pigato, Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an
Evolving Global Context,” World Bank (March 2015).
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direct source of oil or minerals through payments on loans. Because of this
convenient debt payment system, African oil accounts for 80% of China’s
trade in the region and one third of its oil exports.22
Investments into mined resources have led to exploitation of workers,
as seen through the extraction of cobalt in the Congo. According to the
Washington Post, foreign investment has added significantly to the growing
mining industry. The cobalt industry has moved from small scale mines to a
single Chinese company, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, which supplies several
large battery makers. Cobalt is essential to lithium batteries frequently
used in electronics, with its soaring demand requiring 100,000 workers to
be submitted to harsh and dangerous labor conditions.23 The lack of proper
tools and safety regulations cause this working environment to be linked to
health problems and even deaths among locals. Despite several labor rights
and health concerns, Congolese cobalt still makes up 60% of the world’s
cobalt supply, displaying a general underinvestment into the welfare of
miners and locals. Similar nonchalance is exercised by the president of
Huayou Cobalt, who claims that his company has never questioned how
its minerals have been obtained, despite a long-standing history of mining
operations in the Congo.24 Although 90% of Chinese cobalt comes from
mines in the Congo, the Chinese government has shown little desire to take
on the responsibility of regulating exploitative mining practices. Chinese
companies have similarly ignored the problem of regulating and decreasing
the prevalence of child labor in Congo’s mining industry, which currently
stands at an estimated 40% of the mine workers.25 In addition to safety
concerns for the workers, Chinese investment into mines contributes to the
43.2% of protected environmental areas being somewhat overlapped by
mining activities.26
We have seen the safety risks of mining operations in Brazil and
Australia’s recent incidents with mining dams. In 2015, a Brazilian iron
ore mine experienced a breach in their dam and released 39.2 million cubic

22 Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, Anne Leland,” China’s
foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2009).
23 Todd Frankel,” The Cobalt Pipeline,” The Washington Post (September 30, 2016).
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 WWF-SIGHT Analytics, World Wildlife Fund UK (2017).
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meters of waste, resulting in nineteen deaths.27 In addition to safety concerns
for the workers, a breach in mining operations can be detrimental to the
environmental welfare of the surrounding area, creating great challenges for
governing bodies trying to achieve sustainable development. Deforestation
and biodiversity loss are other huge concerns when looking into the effects
of infrastructure projects like bolstering artisanal mines and mining for
oil. Since artisanal mining takes place in primarily tropical environments,
several different species of flora and fauna are at risk of being degraded or
poisoned. This is the case in Botswana and Guinea, which currently have the
highest proportion of environmentally protected land being overlapped by
mining activities. 88.9% of Botswana’s protected areas are being somewhat
overlapped by mining concessions and 16.3% are being overlapped by
oil and gas concessions.28 This shows an incredible hypocrisy, since these
lands being exploited are supposed to be protected to maintain biodiversity.
However, we cannot only blame the recipient states for this degradation
of supposed protected land. Without donors accepting responsibility for
mitigating land degradation, many recipient states will not have the capacity
to handle environmental problems.

Reinforcing Cultural Hierarchy
In the last few decades, China has shifted toward soft power, the ability
to control or influence others and the outcomes of events.29 During the 1970s
and 80s, China’s assistance in Africa took place in the form of infrastructure
projects, public works, technical and public health assistance, and
scholarships to study in China.30 Beginning in the late 1990s, China started
to focus on improving ties with neighboring countries, as well as taking a
greater role in the international system. China’s increased involvement and
foreign aid to developing countries reinforces a cultural hierarchy through
the promotion of Chinese-based higher education and use of their soft power
to push political agendas, specifically the isolation of Taiwan and rejection of
Western supremacy. This goal to sway developing countries, specifically in
27 Oli Brown, Zhanyl Moldalieva, “Dam or be damned: Mining safety under scrutiny,”
United Nations Environmental Programme (March 22, 2018).
28 WWF-SIGHT Analytics, World Wildlife Fund UK (2017).
29 Jeffrey Gil, “The Promotion of Chinese Language Learning and China’s Soft
Power.” Asian Social Science pg. 116-122 (2008).
30 Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, Anne Leland,” China’s
foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2009).

127

Emily Meyer

Africa, toward their political positions has been illustrated through Chinese
rhetoric on the long-standing relationship between Africa and China, dating
back to the fifteenth century. Harping on nostalgia of the “peace loving”
Admiral Zheng He, China referenced an antique bilateral friendship during
the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to remind African countries
of where their allegiance should lie.31 In addition, many Chinese websites
have flooded with documents reinforcing the importance of Africa and
China’s historic relationship. This rhetoric has often relied on relating
China and Africa’s common history of seemingly endless and torturous
process of Western countries abusing their recipient countries, as well as the
asymmetrical effects of Western aid.
Education is a massive portion of what makes up a culture. We have
seen, through Western countries’ bolstering of foreign engagement in
educational sectors, the creation of a “brain drain” of knowledge vacuuming
skilled laborers from the periphery into the core. Similarly, China’s
investment into increasing the number of foreign students in Chinese
institutions has been a main objective for not only helping developing
nations, but also increasing foreign desires to gain educational and work
skills from China. This strategy, focused on education, has been bolstered
by the PRC in recent decades. The Chinese government has established
an office for promoting Chinese language and culture across the eastern
hemisphere. This goal of cultural integration is highlighted in the Chinese
government’s eight principles for economic aid and technical assistance to
other countries, which was established in the mid-1960s. We can see from
the eight principles a focus on achieving the objective of “In giving any
particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see it to that the
personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.”32 Bolstering
lesser developed countries’ labor and educational levels is a primary goal for
China’s own economic development.
China’s Hanban project33 has established 210 Confucius Institutes

31 Kenneth King, “Aid within the Wider China-Africa Partnership: A view from the
Beijing Summit,” University of Hong Kong & University of Edinburgh Publications
(November 5, 2006).
32 Zhou Enlai, “The Chinese Government’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and
Technical Assistance to Other Countries,” Wilson Center History and Public Policy
Digital Archive (January 15, 1964).
33 National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language.
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worldwide to teach Chinese language and culture.34 This project has been
assessed by some as influencing, cultivating friendships, and promoting
an understanding of Chinese culture and language across the recipient
countries. China has trained more than 300 teachers and spent $26 million
on textbooks and equipment for this program.35 Other tactics by China have
included hosting overseas scholars with the goal of creating an educational
vacuum. After the United States tightened its visa policies in the beginning
of the century, China has loosened their requirements and announced a goal
of attracting more international students. In the 2016 FOCAC Johannesburg
Action Plan, educational plans were established by declaring that China
“will offer 2,000 degree education opportunities in China and 30,000
government scholarships to African countries.” This plan was cultivated
in order to welcome more African youths to study in China and expand
training for African professionals on economic development and technical
management.36 This action plan has manifested in sending Chinese “youth
volunteers,” to African nations, where they are engaged in teaching and
training in subjects of Chinese language and medicine, computer skills,
agricultural technologies, and sports.37
In addition to the need for natural resources, China’s foreign aid
is primarily driven by diplomatic objectives. These political objectives
are defined by the desire to isolate Taiwan as well as garner support in
international institutions such as the United Nations. Forging friendships
with non-aligned nations in order to compete with Taiwan is essential for
Chinese political agendas, especially considering Taiwan currently has
diplomatic relations with 12 Latin America and Caribbean countries.38 For
example, China’s recent aid to Costa Rica has been directly linked to a
34 Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, et. al., “Comparing Global
Influence: China’s and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the
Developing World,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service
(August 15, 2008).
35 Ibid.
36 Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018), The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(December 25, 2015).
37 Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, et. al., “Comparing Global
Influence: China’s and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the
Developing World,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service
(August 15, 2008).
38 Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, Anne Leland,” China’s
foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2009).
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desire of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC and the termination
of relations with Taiwan. The political effects of Chinese economic aid
in Africa have been huge. Only four of 48 sub-Saharan African countries
(Burkina Faso, Sao Tome, the Gambia, and Swaziland) still maintain official
relations with Taiwan.39 This geopolitical shift in African countries’ alliances
illustrates a large presence of cultural hierarchy in Africa with Chinese
interests superseding those of Taiwan.

Implications
Although Chinese international aid and investment has created several
positive short-term changes in African economies, these advances come
with a cost. When measuring the effects of aid, it’s imperative that we
look beyond mere economic advances, and instead balance these with the
elimination of parts of domestic sovereignty. Though some economies may
have improved due to Chinese economic activity, can this be reconciled
with the influx of Chinese economic firms and companies in these emerging
markets? This is an vital question we must ask in order to fully realize all
of the effects of economic aid. Without a balanced analysis, our conclusions
can easily sway toward the more obvious effects.
Although China has been quick to downplay the geopolitical ambitions
of their Belt and Road initiative, the resemblance between China’s expansion
of influence across the continent and traditional colonial expansion
is undeniable. Gaining soft power through investing in developing
infrastructures and economies is a clear strategy to raise China’s influence.
Some have asserted that the growth in learning the Chinese language in
Africa reflects more of an economic interest in China than a desire to emulate
Chinese politics, society or culture. However, it is important to understand
the effect this increase of Chinese education has had on the cultural influence
China has had on recipient countries. It is easy to see how the United States’
reputation of having first-rate universities has attracted many students to
Western cultures, so we can similarly analyze China’s growing attempts
to assimilate foreign students to Chinese cultural and educational ideals.
As we have seen in Western ‘brain drains,’ an invitation to train in more
developed countries tends to primarily increase the level of skilled workers
in the countries that give technical assistance, given the wider range of
opportunities for skilled labor compared to their home nations. Although
39 Ibid.
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the United States stands as a global hegemon, China’s willingness to get in
contact and engage with foreign students presents a challenge to the U.S.’
broad educational scale.
Additionally, while mining and infrastructure projects do show promise
for contributing to a country’s sustainable development, it’s important to
ensure that mining activities are regulated, with responsibility being put
on foreign investors to maintain safety standards. If donors aren’t put to a
responsible standard, the negative effects, such as environmental degradation
and exploitation of workers’ safety, will outweigh the positive gains made.
The implications of Chinese developmental aid are mixed, but it is important
to keep a skeptical eye for unforeseen challenges to recipient states’ capacity
to develop sustainably. Although this research has focused on the specific
case of Chinese economic aid, this is just one example of the dangers of
bilateral aid. The overarching theme of powerful countries “selflessly”
helping developing nations always comes with some hidden motives.
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As the founder of Paideia, Katie has an impactful legacy on Political
Science at Cal Poly. Unsurprisingly, her career following her graduation in
2015 is similarly impressive. Katie is currently enrolled in grad school at
Naval War College, while also working as a Defense Policy Analyst at the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
Initially, Katie chose Political Science because she wanted to be a
lawyer. However, her Political Science education sent her in a different
direction. In particular, Katie credits Dr. Lowham taking the time to create
an individualized graduate level course for me, Congress with Prof. Den
Hartog, classes with Anika Leithner, and concepts discussed with Prof Moore
as classes and professors who were memorable and important in her political
science education.
During her summers at Cal Poly, Katie interned for her local
Congresswoman in Palm Springs after her freshman year, the Department
of State at the US Mission to the UN in New York in the summer after
sophomore year, and for Senator Hatch in DC summer after her junior year.
These internships helped instill a desire to work in the public sector, while
also helping Katie accumulate valuable career experience. Unsurprisingly,
Katie cites such experience is vital for becoming a Defense Policy Analyst.
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“Usually to get a job in the House, or the Senate, offices and committees
prefer you to have some previous congressional experience to [you]
understand processes and procedures. A graduate degree is helpful but not
necessary. There is no one track that represents necessary experience, [but] it
is helpful to have relevant experience in whichever area you want to work in.
I had foreign policy and defense experience prior to my work on the Senate
Armed Services Committee, but I also had references and a network that
vouched for my work ethic. Connections matter.”
Following graduation, Katie accepted a position in the private sector,
and was initially very excited to do so. But after 2 years, Katie realized
that the public sector aligned more seamlessly with her values, specifically
her desire to “make a difference.” Thus, she returned to the public sector
as a Defense Policy Analyst. Her advice for anyone seeking direction or
career advice following graduation draws on her own experience, as she
recommends identifying your values, and then pursuing a career that coheres
with those values. Katie strives to benefit the greater good, and her job is
the best way for her to do that. So, even after a hard day at work, she always
returns motivated to fight the good fight, replete with the knowledge that she
is helping people in the best way she can.
Aside from work, Katie runs marathons, camps, and skis, and generally
loves spending time outdoors. She also travels copiously and tries to track
down her favorite west coast beers on the east coast. Though she has no pets,
she endeavors to own a dog when her place can accommodate one.
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Intellectual Property Theft and its Impact on the
US-China Relationship
Amy Holmes
Abstract
Growing in frequency in recent years, theft of United States intellectual
property by China has become a serious concern for the US government.
This theft impacts many areas of US life including increased cost of goods,
difficulty participating in international trade, and increased national security
concerns. This paper looks at three areas of intellectual property theft: patent
theft, copyright theft, and trade secret theft, using specific examples of each.
In examining each of these examples, we discuss the implications of this
theft for US citizens as well as the relationship between the United States
and Chinese governments. This paper concludes that Chinese intellectual
property theft has a significant negative impact on the relationship between
China and the United States and should be curtailed appropriately by both
governments.

Introduction
In the fall of 2018, the United States announced that it was launching
a campaign against China’s continued economic attacks through intellectual
property theft.1 The new initiative, called the China Initiative, by the US
Government combines ongoing efforts by the FBI and Justice Department
into one cohesive unit, with a goal of combating trade secret theft.2 By
heavily analyzing foreign investments into ‘sensitive technologies’ such as
those within the telecommunications sector, the US government believes that
they can locate the sources of the most dangerous intellectual property theft
1 Ellen Nakashima, “With new indictment, U.S. launches aggressive campaign to
thwart China’s economic attacks,” The Washington Post (November 1, 2018).
2 “Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Initiative to Combat Chinese
Economic Espionage,” speech, Office of the Attorney General, Washington D.C.,
November 1, 2018).
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threatening the US today. This initiative “sends a clear message to Beijing
that Chinese economic espionage — whether by cyber or human means —
will not be tolerated.”3The China Initiative will focus on US trade secret
protection overseas, by ensuring that there are adequate protections both
domestically and internationally. Domestic protection is reasonably secure,
but international security, especially in nations such as China, is weak and
leaves other countries at risk of theft.4
The formation of this initiative represents continuity over time.
Intellectual property disputes have been a significant issue between
the United States and China.5 For instance, the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) of the World Trade
Organization, formed in 1995, introduced countries to many issue areas of
intellectual property.6 The TRIPS agreement requires all member nations of
the World Trade Organization to adhere to minimum standards of intellectual
property rights within their home nations in order to better protect global
rights and laws.7 Since the formation of TRIPS in 1995, the United States has
filed twenty three dispute cases against China alone.8 One of the purposes of
the TRIPS agreement is dispute settlement, however, this settlement option is
geared more toward country-based disputes rather than individual disputes.
In more recent years United States citizens have been increasingly filing
intellectual property claims against Chinese citizens and companies within
US courts in an attempt to assert their dominance over Chinese companies.
While intellectual property theft has been prevalent for years, it has increased
significantly in more recent times, with China being one of the biggest
perpetrators.9
The implications of the China Initiative on US technology and public
policy will likely be substantial. As technological innovation continues to
progress, intellectual property rights and their protection will also become
more prevalent. Intellectual property theft hurts many aspects of US life
including consumer health & safety, economic stability, and national

3 op. cit., fn. 1.
4 Ibid.
5 World Trade Organization, “Disputes by Member,” World Trade Organization.
6 World Trade Organization, “TRIPS: An Overview,” World Trade Organization.
7 Ibid.
8 op. cit., fn. 4.
9 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2017. 2017 Special 301 Report.
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security.10 When countries like China illegally replicate US goods, they
may do so using unsafe or hazardous materials, and they may also fail to
ensure that the consumer will be able to safely use these products. When
DVDs, CDs, and other multimedia are pirated and re-distributed, the
consequences for those involved in the original production are incredible.
Nearly every person involved in the creation of that media is harmed
economically, through what could be prevented with proper enforcement of
intellectual property laws. It was estimated in 2007 that music theft alone
amounts to losses of over $15 billion annually.11 With the popularization
of streaming services, such as Spotify and Pandora, the economic losses to
the music industry alone are staggering. While music theft is a large issue,
it is minuscule in scale to the issues of patent, copyright, and trade secret
theft. One of the most concerning aspects of intellectual property theft is the
threat it poses to national security. Many of the technologies developed for
national security purposes are protected by trade secret laws.12 Trade secrets
are extremely vulnerable to theft through hacking, international investment,
and intra-industry job changes.13 The China Initiative plans to focus on
these issue areas to protect US intellectual property on a global scale.14
This initiative will likely result in litigation between China and the US over
intellectual property and more in-depth procedures for global protection
of intellectual property. The growing battle between China and the United
States over technological and economic power leads me to ask this research
question: How does intellectual property theft impact US – China relations?
To illustrate the impact of intellectual property theft on US – China
relations, this paper will use qualitative methodology in the form of case
study research. These case studies will examine different instances of
Chinese theft of US intellectual property through patents, copyrights, and
trade secrets.

10 Ibid.
11 Stephen E. Siwek, “The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the U.S.
Economy,” Institute for Policy Innovation: Center for Technology Freedom (August
2007).
12 “International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 115th Congress,”
Congressional Research Service (March 5, 2018).
13 Ibid.
14 Op. cit., fn. 2.
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Case Study: Patent Theft
According to claims by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), China has been repeatedly denying U.S. patent
holders the intellectual property rights that they are entitled to, as declared by
the TRIPS agreement.1516 The statement by the USTR alleges that China has
enacted policies that accord less favorable treatment to foreign intellectual
property rights holders than Chinese citizens.17 China has repeatedly
promised the United States that it will work toward curbing the intellectual
property theft that occurs within its borders and has repeatedly failed to keep
those promises. Chinese domestic intellectual property rights declarations
include provisions that prohibit imported technologies from “restricting a
Chinese party from improving the technology or from using the improved
technology.”18 These provisions are one of many that promotes Chinese
intellectual property theft. When expanding into international markets,
business owners and their innovation teams have expectations that their
technologies and intellectual property will be safe and remain protected
regardless of where the information is taken to.19 However, China has proven
that this is not the case within its borders.
In 2014 Segway Inc. creator of the self-balancing transportation
system also known as Segway, filed a complaint through the United States
International Trade Commission alleging patent infringement by China-based
Ninebot Inc.20 Segway claims that Ninebot and their associated companies
infringed upon four of Segway’s US patents, including the patent for their
then unrivaled “yaw control” which allowed for the balancing of the device
while the passenger was onboard.21 There were three Chinese manufacturers
of these self-balancing scooters mentioned in the complaint, all of which
were believed to have infringed upon at least one of the patents, and most
15 Glenn Hess, “U.S. Files Complaint Over China’s Patent Policies,” American
Chemical Society (April 2, 2018).
16 op. cit., fn. 5.
17 “USTR requests consultations with the government of the People’s Republic of
China,” (press release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018).
18 Ibid.
19 Brian T. Yeh, “Intellectual Property Rights Violations: Federal Civil Remedies and
Criminal Penalties Related to Copyrights, Trademarks, Patents, and Trade Secrets,”
Congressional Research Service (May 27, 2016).
20 Segway Inc. v. Ninebot Inc, et al., United States International Trade Commission,
(2014).
21 Ibid.
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of which were believed to have infringed upon all four mentioned patents.
These devices were manufactured in China and then imported into the United
States where they were sold for profit.22 Instead of pursuing legal channels,
this dispute was settled by Ninebot Inc. purchasing Segway Inc. in order
to gain access to the original patents, and therefore no longer be liable for
infringement.23
Events like the Segway case are more common than one would think,
however enforcement of these infringements is not always feasible. A United
States-based company may have patent protection domestically, and in some
other countries, but receiving a patent in China is a more difficult process.
The application for a patent must be submitted in Chinese, which can often
to lead to incorrect translations, resulting in vital aspects of the patent being
excluded from the application.24 Often times there are technical terms used
in English that do not translate to Chinese, and instead of finding an alternate
means of communicating the idea, the translator will leave the section out
entirely. The enforcement mechanisms in China are also problematic. As
mentioned earlier, international patents are given significantly less protection
than those filed with the Chinese government.25 China has also been known
to restrict access to the Chinese market unless a company agrees to turn over
their intellectual property to the Chinese government for their unrestricted
use.26 China produces approximately 62% of the world’s counterfeit goods,
and when China is set to include Hong Kong, that number jumps to over
80%.27 The lack of enforcement and continued manufacturing of counterfeit
goods severely harms the relationship between the United States and China.
United States-based companies are less likely to look toward China as a
production center, as these companies do not want to risk losing intellectual
property protection or face the issue of unenforceable infringement within
China. The United States also faces significant battles in allowing Chinese
goods into the US market when they may be patent infringing or counterfeit
goods.
22 Ibid.
23 Jack Linshi, “Why This Chinese Startup Just Bought a Company Americans Love
to Ridicule,” Time Magazine (April 15, 2015).
24 EU China IPR Helpdesk, “Guide to Patent Protection in China,” China IPR SME
Helpdesk (2018).
25 European Commission, “Report on the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in third countries,” European Commission (February 2, 2018).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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Case Study: Copyright Theft
Copyright protects expressions fixed in a tangible medium. Many
literary works, including scholarly articles, are protected by copyright.28
Registration is not required for copyright protection both domestically
and internationally, though it is recommended. Despite there being no
full and complete registry of copyrighted works, there are still alleys
for litigating infringement. China is one of the biggest perpetrators
of copyright infringement and piracy in the world, despite its alleged
commitment to preventing and prosecuting these crimes.29 China has been
placed on the Priority Watch List by the United States for its “widespread
infringing activity, including trade secret theft, rampant online piracy and
counterfeiting, and high levels of physical piracy and counterfeit exports to
markets around the globe.”30
Computer software is one example of a copyrightable material that is
extremely vulnerable to theft. Many companies choose not to register their
software for copyright protection due to the secretive nature of their source
code. Source code is the proprietary code behind a computer software, and
often includes comments on how the software works.31 While registration
of the copyright is not required, it increases the likelihood of succeeding in
litigation. In China, this process is made significantly easier if the owner of
the copyright has previously registered it. However, the registration system in
China requires that owners provide extremely detailed information regarding
the material to be copyrighted.32 Once the information is submitted, it is
entered into a database which the Chinese government alleges is used
only in the event of litigation.33 However, it is suspected that the Chinese
government looks at the registrations and choosing to pursue infringement on
those that look to provide the most economic incentive.34
The theft of United State intellectual property becomes increasingly
28“What Does Copyright Protect?” US Copyright Office.
29 Grant Clark, “What’s Intellectual Property and Does China Steal It?” Bloomberg
(March 22, 2018).
30 op. cit., fn. 9.
31 Merriam-Webster, “Source Code,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1965).
32 EU China IPR Helpdesk, “How to File a Copyright Registration in China,” China
IPR SME Helpdesk (2018).
33 Ibid.
34 Paul Goldstein, “Intellectual Property and China: Is China Stealing US IP?”
Stanford Law (April 10, 2018).
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concerning when defense technologies are involved. Many of these
technologies may not be registered due to the protection of sensitive
materials but are still vulnerable to theft through other measures. Copyright
theft has become increasingly perpetrated through digital hacking.35 Chinese
citizens hack into computers and networks located in the United States and
take valuable information off of them without the owner of the material
or computer ever knowing.36 Effective countermeasures to this theft have
proven difficult to implement due to the advanced hacking capabilities of the
Chinese citizens, as well as the lack of consequences within China to deter
citizens from committing these crimes. After negotiations with the United
States in 2018, China has once again, committed to strengthening their
intellectual property protections. It has also ensured the United States that it
will increase the consequences of intellectual property theft, however, it will
be at least a year before the results of these measures are seen.37
Copyright theft, piracy, and counterfeiting impact many areas of the
United States life, however, the national security aspects of these incidents
are some of the most dangerous. Counterfeiting, which is a form of copyright
infringement, can have extremely dangerous results. Pharmaceutical
counterfeiting is one of the most dangerous forms of copyright infringement
for American citizens. Counterfeit drugs may be created using hazardous
or toxic materials that do not serve the purpose of the original drug and
may cause life-threatening results. Counterfeit medications make their way
into the hands of United States citizens through online pharmacies which
are becoming increasingly difficult to regulate.38 Chinese servers often host
these pharmacies and post drug prices that are extremely appealing to US
consumers. Mechanisms to detect these counterfeit pharmaceuticals are not
foolproof, as the Food and Drug Administration cannot have access to every
pill that enters into the United States.39
Copyright infringement has a significant impact on the relationship
between China and the United States. Theft of source code could have
serious implications for the national security of the United States and
35 op. cit., fn. 9.
36 Ibid.
37 Wayne M. Morrisson, “Enforcing US Trade Laws: Section 301 and China,”
Congressional Research Service, (December 3, 2018).
38 Temple University, “Combating Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals from China,” Science
Daily (July 17, 2017).
39 Ibid.
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the power battle between China and the US. The counterfeiting of
pharmaceuticals could have major ramifications if these drugs lead to the
death of an American citizen. Basic piracy leads to significant economic
losses for the United States and has the potential to alter the entertainment
industry immensely. While China continues to promise that they will
improve the protections for intellectual property rights within its borders,
they have repeatedly fallen short of their targets, and it will be years before
the newest round of promises begins to have an effect. The relationship
between China and the United States depends on China improving its
protections and preventing or discouraging these thefts in the first place.

Case Study: Trade Secret Theft
In 2013, Micron Technology, an American company that produces
semiconductor devices, including dynamic random-access memory (DRAM),
bought a Taiwanese chip maker and created Micron Memory Taiwan, an
Asia-based offshoot of their main corporation focused on building DRAM.40
DRAM is considered an old technology in the US, but prior to the formation
of MMT, it had never been produced in China.41 According to an indictment
by the US Department of Justice, the President of MMT left soon after the
purchase and moved to another technology company. The new company then
set up an over $700 million deal with Jinhua, a Chinese government-owned
company, and began producing DRAM around 2016, a first for China.42 It
was fairly clear to Micron, as well as the Department of Justice, that the
President of MMT had taken valuable trade secrets learned during his time at
MMT and used them in his new position.43
Events such as these are caused by weak laws and enforcement in other
countries. According to a CRS report on the Protection of Trade Secrets,
a company’s ability to protect its trade secrets is diminished, sometimes
completely, by weak rule of law and ineffective or non-existent enforcement
of intellectual property rights.44 Theoretically, this is where a global system,
such as TRIPS, should come into play for the protection of IP rights in
40 Adam Rogers, “US Accuses Chinese Company of Stealing Micron Trade Secrets,”
Wired Magazine (November 1, 2018).
41 Ibid.
42 United States of America v. United Microelectronics Corporation, et al., CR 18 465,
(2018).
43 Ibid.
44 Brian T. Yeh, “Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and
Legislation,” Congressional Research Service (April 22, 2016).
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foreign nations. However, China has continually violated its promises to
the US to curb IP theft occurring from within its borders.45 This lack of
enforcement then leaves it the US to seek out and attempt to prosecute theft
occurring overseas. When the theft is perpetrated by a general company with
no government ties, the US refers to it as trade secret theft. However, when
the theft involves another government, such as the Micron case, it becomes
economic espionage.46
Trade secret theft is one of the most dangerous aspects of IP theft,
due to its prevalence in national security. The Trump administration has
recently banned certain government agencies from using devices produced
by Chinese manufacturers amid fears that they may contain backdoors that
provide access to US government networks.47 Many of the technologies
developed with national security in mind are protected by US trade secret
laws. They are extremely vulnerable to theft through hacking, international
investment, and as seen in the Micron case, persons switching jobs within
the same field. This is likely why the Trump Administration is focusing so
heavily on trade secret theft and economic espionage. While the Micron
case gives us a great example of employment risks, one of the largest risks
to national security comes from foreign investment.48 When technology
companies begin their marketing process, they are eager to break into the
Chinese market. However, China selectively grants market access to foreign
investors in exchange for the transfer of technology, often protected by US
trade secret laws. This results in what some may think is trade secret theft,
but is actually a legal mechanism for gaining access to US intellectual
property.49 According to a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the Center
for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, the economic losses stemming from
trade secret theft alone amount to between one and three percent of US GDP
annually, or roughly 350 billion dollars a year.50 The difficulties in finding
and prosecuting those involved in this theft are what result in the losses being
so significant.
45 op. cit., fn. 8.
46 Charles Doyle, “Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of
the Economic Espionage Act,” Congressional Research Service (August 19, 2016).
47 Catalin Cimpanu, “US Bans Exports to Chinese DRAM Maker Citing National
Security Risk,” ZDNet (October 28, 2018).
48 op. cit., fn. 10.
49 op. cit., fn. 8.
50 PwC & CREATe.org, Economic Impact of Trade Secret Theft: A Framework for
Companies to Safeguard Trade Secrets and Mitigate Potential Threats (February 2014).
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One of the reasons that China is so prevalent in the theft of US intellectual
property is that they have no incentive to crack down on it. The theft benefits
its economy, and likely directly benefits the Chinese government. This is why
it is vital that the US takes steps to prevent the theft in the first place. Once it
is in Chinese hands, the only remedies are punitive and cannot compensate
for the losses caused to US companies. While US companies can sue in the
United States, and the government as a whole can choose to pursue dispute
settlement through TRIPS, neither of these methods have proven successful
in deterring Chinese trade secret theft.

So, what? Implications of Research Findings
Intellectual property theft has a profoundly negative impact on the
relationship between China and the United States. It causes the United States
to look more closely and more suspiciously at foreign investment, potentially
limiting funding options for US-based companies. Intellectual property theft
also amounts to significant economic losses for the United States each year.
These impacts go beyond just the penalties and losses of the theft. In order
to combat theft, the US must put forward more than just the threat of the
company being sued. In recent months, the US government has threatened
sanctions against China due to its rampant theft.51 While sanctions may
offer some temporary relief, they will not be a lasting solution, as retaliatory
sanctions that further harm the US economy are often placed in response.
China and the US have a deep trade relationship. China is the United
States’ largest trade partner, exchanging over $636 billion in goods in 2017
alone.52 China’s intellectual property theft could severely damage this trade
relationship, leaving both countries struggling to find the goods they need
to continue life as usual. My research findings show that there is a desperate
need for increased intellectual property protection within China, as well as
better global mechanisms for protection. There should be more of a focus
on preventing and prosecuting Chinese intellectual property theft while
also focusing on maintaining a positive and workable relationship with
China. China needs to own up to its thefts and work to ensure it is providing
adequate protections for international and domestic intellectual property,
51 Jenny Leonard & Shawn Donnan, “Trump Administration Weighs Hacking
Sanctions on Chinese Entities,” Bloomberg (September 7, 2018).
52 Sarah Gray, “These are the Biggest US Trading Partners,” Fortune Magazine
(March 8, 2018).
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while also ensuring that the theft that occurs in its nation is neutralized and
effectively reprimanded.
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